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Abstract 
 
Recent empirical term structure literature questions the usefulness of the standard 
three-parameter yield curve model in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and the 
widespread adoption of unconventional monetary policies, such as Large-scale Asset 
Purchases (LSAP). This thesis builds on these concerns by extracting a new parameter 
from the term structure that measures the position of the traditional hump in the yield 
curve along the maturity axis. My alternative decomposition of the term structure makes 
it easier to track-down the influence of quantities on interest rates. Given that 
Treasuries are held as safe assets by many investor types, I interpret the new parameter 
as a gauge of investors’ risk appetite. It is time-varying and pro-cyclical, leading the 
business cycle and indexes of financial stress by several months and forming part of the 
risk-taking policy transmission channel. My results contradict the widely-held view 
from event studies that LSAP reduce long-term Treasury yields. They can also explain 
the often divergent relative movements between Treasury term premia and the premia 
on risky assets, such as corporate credits. 
 
(175 words) 
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Summary 
 
Further Investigations into the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Michael J. Howell 
 
The interest rate term structure plays a critical role in the Neo-classical economic 
framework by linking together the present and the future. Applying latest mathematical 
and statistical techniques, the empirical literature increasingly acknowledges that it is no 
longer sufficient to characterise the term structure using just the standard three yield 
curve parameters of level, curvature and slope. In this PhD thesis, I seek to extract 
further information and add to existing knowledge by identifying and interpreting, to 
ensure is does not appear ad hoc,  a fourth yield curve parameter, which ultimately may 
help to better understand the risk-taking policy transmission channel. This new 
parameter describes the position of the traditional hump in the yield curve along the 
maturity axis. Its existence has been previously recognised, but it is typically either 
discarded as having no economic meaning or else treated as a constant to simplify yield 
curve estimation. I argue here that the position of the hump contains valuable 
information about the risk appetite of economic agents, such as investors and credit-
providers, largely because Treasury bonds represent canonical safe assets. The greater 
demand for safety at longer investment horizons will reduce term premia at those tenors, 
causing the yield curve to flatten and the position of the hump to move inwards. The 
position of the hump could be measured from the degree of asymmetry implicit in the 
pattern of term premia across the Treasury term structure. But in practice, given the 
absence of reliable term premia estimates, I measure the position of the hump from spot 
yields using a statistic I create and name D-star (for ‘distance’). A higher (lower) D-star 
should capture the existence of negative (positive) skew in the pattern of term premia 
across the yield curve; so reflect excess supply (demand) for safe assets at longer tenors 
and, thus, signal risk-seeking (risk-avoiding) behaviour. 
 
By including D-star, this new yield curve decomposition makes it easier to track down 
the influence of quantities on the shape of the term structure. I test whether empirical 
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estimates of D-star derived from the US Treasury market can predict future outcomes of 
a number of key macro-finance variables, notably the national financial stress indexes 
(FSIs), devised by various US Federal Reserve districts. It appears from my results that 
D-star consistently adds value around a year ahead. This suggests that D-star could be 
included among the array of variables regularly monitored for financial stability 
purposes. I subsequently proceed, in the final section of this thesis, to use these D-star 
estimates empirically to better understand policy transmission in the wake of the 
2007/08 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession (GFC) and the subsequent Large-
scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) policy response. LSAP should cause D-star to fall-back 
alongside declining term premia, as is apparently shown by a large number of recent 
event studies. Paradoxically, I demonstrate the opposite result: LSAP policies ultimately 
have a positive effect on risk appetite and lengthen D-star. This, I argue, is because 
LSAP are multi-faceted: the signalling and liquidity impacts of LSAP on the demand 
for government bonds outweigh any scarcity and duration effects. Tracing thought the 
transmission channels using a Bayesian vector auto-regression (BVAR) model, these 
positive effects appear to be encouraged by second-round influences based on lower 
perceived systemic risks, explained by Treasuries being held as safe assets by many 
investors. In other words, the cash injections that are associated with a decrease in the 
effective supply curve for maturity subsequently induce an offsetting fall in the demand 
curve. Using this risk-taking transmission channel, I argue that LSAP ultimately result 
in higher (not lower) Treasury term premia, steeper (not flatter) yield curves and higher 
(not lower) long-term yields. My framework also helps to understand the apparent 
negative correlation between corporate debt spreads and Treasury term premia, because 
risk-seeking investors switch from safe to more risky assets. This outturn is time 
consistent with policy-makers’ original intentions to encourage greater risk-taking 
following the GFC. My empirical results suggest that changing risk appetite has the 
greater impact on corporate credit spreads, whereas the liquidity effect from LSAP is a 
more important determinant of Treasury term premia. The existence and measurement 
of D-star facilitate this re-interpretation. 
 
Supervisors: Dr. David Schroeder/ Dr. Roald Versteeg 
Titles: Lecturers in Finances, Birkbeck College, University of London  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: The Interest Rate Term Structure 
 
“…yield quotations must appear as a bewildering welter of unrelated interest rates. Yet 
this seeming jumble of rates is not without order.” Jacob B. Michaelsen, The Term 
Structure of Interest Rates (1973) 
 
The recent Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession (GFC) have focussed attention 
on the stability of the balance sheet structures of investors; the efficacy of subsequent 
zero-interest rate policy response (ZIPR) and the implementation and transmission of 
Large-scale Asset Purchases (LSAP). This thesis analyses the US Treasury interest rate 
term structure in this light. The term structure is central to the Neo-classical economic 
framework by linking the present with the future. It is traditionally characterised just by 
its level, slope and curvature. However, I identify a fourth parameter, based on the 
position of the hump in the yield curve along the maturity dimension, which adds new 
information and makes it easier to track down the influence of quantities on the shape of 
the term structure.  
 
My starting point is an attempt to devise a practical measure of the implicit distribution 
of term premia across the Treasury term structure based on its degree of asymmetry. 
The position of the traditional hump in the yield curve along the maturity axis (i.e. the 
additional parameter) should characterise the distribution of term premia across tenors. I 
term this new parameter, D-star, and show that it can be easily calculated for all yield 
curve types using a simple distance measure. D-star estimates for the US are later cross-
checked with a Kalman filtered factor. Although it is statistically significant, D-star 
does not add much in economic terms to the explanation of the current yield curve 
beyond that already known from the three traditional yield curve factors. However, it 
contains other information about the risk appetite of investors, which is relevant for the 
predictability of future yields. In fact, the general existence of unspanned macro-factors 
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that improve prediction has been studied by Coroneo et al. (2016). My approach differs 
because I argue that D-star also helps to forecast broader macro-finance variables, such 
as a composite US financial stress index (FSI) and the high yield credit spread (B less 
BBB-rated corporate bonds), approximately one year ahead. My results demonstrate 
significant one-way Granger causality for this new parameter, compared to the other 
yield curve factors. I go on to show that D-star allows a better understanding of the 
policy transmission mechanism, given the low importance assigned by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) to interest rates, and its existence enables us to more clearly delineate the 
risk-taking channel from the credit channel. 
 
It seems plausible that more distant (nearer) yield peaks in the term structure reflect 
relatively larger term premia at longer (shorter) time horizons. Intuitively, these should 
identify risk-seeking behaviour, because the demand for Treasury securities is a 
derived-demand for safe assets by many investor types. Safety is here defined in terms 
of a preferred habitat, based either on regulation needs or on duration and minimum 
liquidity requirements. Excess safe asset supply (demand) at any maturity will raise 
(lower) local term premia, resulting in limits to arbitrage. Hence, risk-seeking 
(avoiding) behaviour should lead to an excess supply of (demand for) Treasuries at 
longer horizons and so raise (depress) more distant term premia, causing a steeper 
(flatter) yield curve; a negatively (positively) skewed distribution of term premia and a 
yield curve hump positioned at a longer (shorter) tenor.  
 
Recent large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) by Central Banks, in the wake of the 
2007/08 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession (GFC), and the growing safe asset 
demands from foreigners and domestic financial institutions, following new regulations, 
have disrupted the normal balance between supply and demand in the US Treasury 
markets. The effects of these quantitative imbalances, which are absent from the 
standard finance models, are likely to be felt across the interest rate term structure. 
When changes to the effective supply of government securities (including LSAP) distort 
local term premia, these scarcity effects may simply inconvenience certain investors and 
have a limited macro-economic impact beyond lowering average term premia and, 
hence, average Treasury yields. However, when these imbalances are driven by demand 
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factors, they may tell us something about investors’ risk appetites. I treat this as an 
empirical question, albeit one also faced when interpreting the standard yield curve 
factors. One complication is that changes in the authorities’ net supply function may 
themselves induce fluctuations in the demand functions of investors because they 
potentially signal future policy intentions (‘Forward Guidance’) as well as providing 
extra liquidity (‘Quantitative Easing’). Taken together these responses may reduce 
perceived systemic risks
1
.  
 
A proper evaluation of these effects is made difficult because of a lack of data on the 
supply of bonds and investor demands across the various maturities and the widespread 
scarcity of reliable term premia data. These observations motivate the three core 
chapters of this thesis. These try to extract further quantitative information from the 
term structure, with a focus on implementing a practical estimation method for D-star, 
and then applying it to predict future financial stress and better understand the 
transmission of monetary policy. My key contributions in this thesis are: 
 
 Measurement: The third chapter A New ‘Preferred Habitat’ Yield Curve 
Parameter introduces a measure of the position of the traditional hump along the 
maturity axis, termed D-star, that implicitly describes the cross-sectional pattern 
of term premia across tenors. This may also be the point where the curvature of 
the term structure peaks. Term premia are by implication relatively smaller at 
subsequent maturities. I use the preferred habitat framework of Vayanos and 
Vila (2009) and adapt the ‘gap filling’ model of Greenwood, Hanson and Stein 
(2010) to explain D-star. Low Treasury term premia at longer maturities suggest 
a smaller D-star value. This could reflect an excess demand for safety at those 
tenors, implying a reduced risk appetite among investors. Investors’ risk appetite 
is here defined in terms of deviations away from a risk-neutral duration point 
and calculated from the inflection point on the yield curve using a standard 
average distance measure. It might be described by market participants as the 
                                                          
1 It could be argued from a supply perspective that any lengthening in the average maturity of government debt, by 
postponing the need for subsequent re-financing, also reduces systemic risks. 
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‘duration-weighted average butterfly spread across tenors’. I explicitly do not 
use term premia estimates for this calculation. The derived factor represents a 
fourth yield curve parameter and is a convenient measure of the investment time 
horizon. The values of D-star are cross-checked with alternative Kalman filter 
estimates. The resulting data are time-varying, with a mean of 6.3 years (1946-
2016) and a standard deviation of 10-months. 
  
 Evaluation: Chapter 4 Using the Interest Rate Term Structure to Model Risk 
Seeking Behaviour and Predict Future Financial Stress tests the efficacy of D-
star as a warning sign of future financial stress, using officially published 
financial stress indexes (FSIs) and their key constituents (Hakkio and Keeton, 
2009). D-star tends to rise ahead of financial booms and to fall ahead of 
financial crises and economic recessions. D-star appears to Granger cause 
standard measures of US economic activity and risk premia, and it adds 
information 12-15 months ahead over conventional benchmarks, according to 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), out-of-sample predictions and event 
studies. 
 
 Transmission: The fifth chapter Do Central Bank Asset Purchases Drive 
Treasury Yields Higher or Lower? explores the economic and financial 
transmission of these risk appetite effects in more detail, using a Bayesian VAR 
framework similar to Rey (2016). This sees LSAP as one part of the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu, 2012) and explicitly tries to model 
the relative movements between Treasury term premia and other risk premia, 
such as corporate credit spreads. Variance decomposition suggests that risk 
appetite has the greater impact on credit spreads, whereas LSAP is a more 
important determinant of term premia. Here, I reach opposite conclusions from 
many recent event studies (Gagnon, 2016), insofar that LSAP ultimately result 
in larger not smaller Treasury term premia. This I explain from the second-round 
effect that the extra liquidity injections associated with LSAP have in 
eliminating systemic risks and so reducing investors’ demands for safety.  
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The existence of D-star motivates a new term structure decomposition that makes it 
easier to track-down the influence of quantities on current and future interest rates. I 
conclude that the possible scarcity and duration effects from LSAP in reducing the 
effective supply of safe assets are overwhelmed by stronger confidence effects, 
signalled by ‘forward guidance’ and extra liquidity. These second-round influences are 
based on lower perceived systemic risks, given that Treasuries are held as safe assets by 
many investors. Thus, I use this risk-taking transmission channel to argue, contrary to 
most recent event studies, that LSAP ultimately result in higher (not lower) Treasury 
term premia, steeper (not flatter) yield curves and higher (not lower) long-term yields. 
Hanson, Lucca and Wright (2017) explain this same phenomenon using a slow-moving 
arbitrage capital model which allows the demand curve for maturity to become more 
elastic over-time. My different explanation is that the cash injections associated with the 
LSAP cause the demand curve for maturity (with respect to yields) to shift backwards. 
Moreover, my model is also able to rationalise the apparent negative correlation 
between corporate debt spreads (risk assets) and Treasury (safe assets) term premia. 
This result is likely time consistent with policy-makers original intentions to encourage 
greater risk-taking, following the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The existence 
and measurement of D-star facilitate this re-interpretation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background: The Expectations Hypothesis, Duration, 
Immunization, Safe Assets and the Empirical Term 
Structure Literature 
 
 
2.1 The Expectations Hypothesis 
 
This chapter provides background information on the standard expectations hypothesis 
model of the term structure and reviews the recent empirical term structure literature. It 
also defines duration and immunization and what constitute safe assets, concepts that 
later feature as factors that influence investors’ demand for bond maturity. 
 
The term structure of interest rates, or yield curve, traditionally expresses the spot yield 
on a default-free government bond across a cross-section of horizons that describe the 
notional maturity date of each bond
2
. The spot yield is the redemption yield
3
 of a zero-
coupon bond. It comprises the product of one-period forward rates, i.e. the discount rate 
of a single cash flow from a zero-coupon bond equivalent, over a fixed holding period. 
Each spot yield (yt
m
) comprises an expected real interest rate (Rt) plus an expected 
inflation rate (πt) over a holding period (m) plus a nominal term (or bond maturity risk
4
) 
premium (tpt
m
). Under the expectations hypothesis (EH), the nominal term premia are 
constant for all horizons (m). In the case of the pure expectations hypothesis (PEH), 
they are zero across all horizons (m). According to efficient markets theory, these risk 
premia should be negligible. The expectations theory of interest rates can be described 
from the following equation, after making the appropriate term premia assumptions: 
 
 
                                                          
2 US Treasury notes are issues with maturities of two, three, five, seven, and 10 years, while Treasury bonds have 
maturities of 20 and 30 years: the only difference between notes and bonds is the length until maturity. Treasury bills 
are short-term bonds that mature within one year or less from their time of issuance. 
3 Or yield-to-maturity 
4 Bond analysis involves several risk dimensions including illiquidity, default and duration. Traditionally, default-
free, liquid government bonds have a single risk or term premia, based on their period to redemption. 
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𝑦𝑡
𝑚 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+𝑖 +
𝑚−1
𝑖=0
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+𝑖 +
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑡𝑝𝑡
𝑚                                                      (1) 
 
where yt
m
 is the spot yield of a bond of maturity m at time t; Et denotes the expectations 
operator; Rt is the real interest rate; πt is the inflation rate; tpt
m 
represents the nominal 
bond term premium over a holding period m 
 
Although government bonds are typically assumed to be default-free, private sector 
bonds have associated default risks. The quality of these credits is evaluated by 
independent agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poors, who assign ratings to 
each bond (e.g. AAA, B, etc). Junk bonds are considered to have a CCC-rating or 
above, and investment grade bonds a BBB-rating or better
5
. So-called high yield bonds 
have a B-rating. The yield spreads between these different bonds measure their risk 
premia. These can set either against default-free government bonds or higher quality 
equivalent private bonds, e.g. BBB less B. 
 
2.2 Review of the Empirical Term Structure Literature 
 
The recent empirical term structure literature broadly divides into two branches and 
from there splits into a number of sub-branches. The first branch describes attempts to 
reduce the dimensionality of the term structure data, while the second investigates the 
two-way relationship between bond yields and macro-economic variables. The former, 
in turn, can be divided into three: (a) factor models, such as Litterman and Scheinkman 
(1991) and Ilmanen (1995); (b) parametric models, such as Nelson and Siegel (1987); 
Diebold and Li (2006), and BIS (2005), and (c) affine-type models (a constant plus 
linear function of latent factors), which impose no-arbitrage conditions, and their 
antecedents, such as the Vasicek (1977) single-factor model and the multi-factor 
approaches of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Dai and Singleton (2000), where 
tractability arguably comes at the cost of poor empirical prediction (Duffee, 2002). 
However, the affine approach of Kim and Wright (2005) is favoured by Swanson, 
Rudebusch and Sack (2007) as a way of extracting historic term premia. The second 
                                                          
5 The Moody’s ‘Baa’ investment grade is equivalent to S&P’s ‘BBB’ rating. 
8 | P a g e  
 
branch can, in turn, be sub-dived into analyses of the effect of: (a) yield curve factors on 
macro-economic variables, such as Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Moench (2012) and 
Tobin (1958, 1969) and (b) macro-economic factors on the yield curve, such as 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966), Vayanos and Vila (2009), Greenwood and Vayanos 
(2009), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Ang and Piazzesi (2001), 
Diedold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006), Ludvigson and Ng (2009) and Fontaine and 
Garcia (2011). Although my research has affinities with this second branch, by 
attempting to extract a fourth yield curve parameter from the term structure data and 
improve factor modelling, it properly belongs to the first sub-group of the first branch. 
 
The traditional level, slope and curvature decomposition of the yield curve is often 
derived from principal components and forms part of the arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) literature (see Ross, 1976). Principal components are eigenvectors that seek to 
establish independent clusters of common variation. According to Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (2005), the first three principal components explain over 99% of the variation 
across the term structure. Following Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), these 
components are intuitively interpreted as level, slope and curvature because of the 
pattern of their loadings. However, Lord and Pelsser (2007) argue that in circumstances 
common to bond markets, this interpretation is an artefact of the data and not 
necessarily robust. It is far from certain that the three components correspond to their 
eponymous labels, since, for example the first principal component will include effects 
from the joint correlations between slope and level and between curvature and level. 
Disaggregating the data sample by decade, shows that although the absolute size of the 
three principal component loadings are remarkably constant, the slope loadings alter 
their signs, perhaps signalling changes in the slope of the yield curve, while the peak 
curvature loading switches between maturities. Through the 1946-49 immediate post-
war years, the one-year bond enjoyed the largest loading; during the 1950s and 1960s as 
economies strengthened, the third principal component was most heavily loaded on to 
the five-year maturity; in the 1970s credit boom this had moved out to the seven-year 
maturity, but through the 1980s, the loading on the three-year bond was heaviest; the 
1990s saw a return to the five-year maturity; it rose to seven years in the 2000s, but then 
dropped back to the three-year maturity after 2010, in the wake of the Great Recession. 
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Hanson, Lucca and Wright (2017) similarly conclude that these principal components 
are unstable over time. 
 
According to the literature, the yield curve is typically upward-sloping and, contrary to 
the expectations hypothesis (Lutz, 1940), has a time-varying ex post term premia on 
longer-dated bonds (Fama and Bliss, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Cochrane and 
Piazzesi, 2005). It finds this difficult to justify economically (Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1997), because the standard yield curve is ideally constructed under 
assumptions of supply and demand elasticity; market clearing; perfect substitutability 
between bonds of different maturities; full arbitrage and with homogeneous investors 
(see Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985, among others). In addition, the method of Treasury 
financing is assumed to have no impact on consumption for Ricardian reasons; hence it 
cannot affect the future interest rate path. The term structure is then entirely determined 
by the current level and expected path of the policy rate, with quantities and the 
maturity composition of Treasury supply having no significant effect on yields. Non-
price factors, namely maturity, duration and quantity effects, comprise part of the 
growing literature on financial frictions that originated with liquidity preference (Hicks, 
1946) and market segmentation (Culbertson, 1957), but they do not feature in standard 
yield curve models. 
 
2.3 Duration 
 
Duration is a concept taken from finance. It measures the effective life-span of a capital 
project from its expected pay-off structure, usually expressed in years. In contrast to 
maturity, which only considers the final payment from an investment, duration gives 
weight to all cash flows received (paid-out), e.g. coupons, over the entire life of the 
asset (liability), taking into account both size and frequency of payment. These cash 
flows need to be evaluated in similar terms and so it seems correct to use present value 
calculations and to focus on actual or expected cash payments in a common currency. 
When calculating this investment time horizon, it makes economic sense to include all 
future cash payments over the life of each project and not just the final payment, as with 
maturity data. The resulting payment patterns need not be smooth, but they should have 
10 | P a g e  
 
a finite or limiting sum and possess an expected value. When the present values of these 
cash payments are used to weight time periods one gets Macaulay duration, a concept 
related to semi-elasticity in economics (Macaulay, 1938) and to modified duration (see 
Appendix A). It can be formally defined: 
Definition  Macaulay duration: the cash flow-weighted average time period 
(usually measured in years) to receive (or pay-out) all future cash flows, 
including dividends, coupons and capital repayments.  
For any asset this is: 
𝑀𝐷𝑡 =
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝜏 ∙  𝐶𝑡+𝜏
(1 + 𝑘𝑡+𝜏)𝑡+𝜏
]𝜏=𝑀𝜏=1
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
 𝐶𝑡+𝜏
(1 + 𝑘𝑡+𝜏)𝑡+𝜏
]𝜏=𝑀𝜏=1
                                                                (2) 
where Et(.) is the expectations operator; MDt is Macaulay duration in period t; M is 
maturity and for many assets this is unbounded, so M=∞; Ct+τ the net cash receipt in 
period t+τ and kt the discount rate, and kt=rt+ht, where rt denotes the risk-free rate at 
period t and ht is the term premium
6
. 
 
The expression can be re-written as a weighted average of future time periods extending 
over a horizon M, where the weights are the proportions of total present value that occur 
in each period.  
Thus: 
𝑀𝐷𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑡+𝜏  ∙
𝜏=𝑀
𝜏=1
𝜏 
where 
𝑤𝑡+𝜏 = 𝐸𝑡 [
 𝐶𝑡+𝜏
(1 + 𝑘𝑡+𝜏)𝑡+𝜏
∑
 𝐶𝑡+𝜏
(1 + 𝑘𝑡+𝜏)𝑡+𝜏
𝜏=𝑀
𝜏=1
] 
                                                          
6 In practice, changes in k only have a small effect on the value of bond duration (MD), so that it is typically taken as 
a constant. 
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And the weights sum to one: 
∑ 𝑤𝑡+𝜏
𝜏=𝑀
𝜏=1
= 1 
 
In the case of a very long-term bond, the importance of the distant maturity date on the 
duration value may be small or even negligible. For example, a 3.5% coupon bond, 
yielding 6% to maturity and with as long as 100 years until its redemption date has 
duration of only 16.8 years
7
. It can be shown that a perpetual bond has duration equal to 
(1+kt)/ kt. Duration is a particularly useful life-span measure for securities other than 
bonds that have no fixed, no finite and no certain repayment schedule and typically may 
also have no legal obligation to return the principal. Duration is always bounded from 
above by maturity and it is similar to the concept of 'useful life' implemented by tax 
authorities to measure economic depreciation schedules for productive assets, where 
economic life is linked to the likely period of greatest revenue generation. The US IRS, 
for example, deems airplanes and computers to have six year working lives for tax 
purposes, whereas water utilities can be written-off over 50 years.  
 
Although Macaulay (1938) originally devised his duration measure to calibrate and 
compare US railroad bonds of different credit qualities, duration is most often 
calculated for individual bonds where the cash flows (Ct) and the discount factors (kt) 
are known over time. Consequently, duration (Dt) for these individual securities is 
typically thought of as a fixed number. However, for portfolios and for the entire 
economy, not only will cash flows and discount factors vary over time, but so will the 
mix of instruments. This makes aggregate asset duration for both portfolios of securities 
and for the entire economy potentially variable from differences in: (1) cash flow 
timing; (2) cash flow uncertainty (i.e. discount factor) and (3) the mix of assets in the 
portfolio. These duration differences can be seen from Figure 1, which depicts the 
present value cash flow patterns of three assets A, B and C. The sum of the respective 
present values defines each asset value (denoted in Figure 1 by ∑PVA,t = A, etc). Each 
                                                          
7
 Macaulay duration: take the example of a par bond yielding an annual $10 coupon. Assume it is 
redeemed in three years and the annual discount rate is 8%. The present value (PV) of cash receipts is 
10+10/(1.08)+110/(1.08)
2
 and the time-weighted present value (TPV) is 1∙10+2∙10/(1.08)+3∙110/(1.08)2. 
The ratio of these sums (TPV/PV) gives Macaulay duration of 2.74 years (=311.44/113.57).
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of the assets have different durations DA, DB and DC, but assets A and B share the same 
time to maturity, M. By measuring the average timing of cash payments and cash 
receipts, duration is closely related to liquidity, which I here define as the ability to meet 
all contractual obligations as they fall due. Illiquidity, therefore, implies a duration mis-
match between assets and liabilities. Liquidity is a more exacting condition than 
solvency since some agents can be solvent overall, but still illiquid in specific periods. 
Unanticipated cash payouts can often pose a threat and an appropriate cushion of liquid/ 
zero duration assets, such as US Treasuries, may need to be held to mitigate this risk. 
 
2.4 Immunization and the Demand for Safe Assets 
 
Duration can be aggregated in a straightforward way across assets to give portfolio 
duration and, under certain assumptions about investors’ preferences, across their 
liabilities to give a duration target for a group (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2011). Investors 
may not view displacements away from this duration target equally. At different times, 
deviations below the duration target may be viewed more favourably than deviations 
above it. For example, it is known from the literature (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) that 
low duration investments, such as cash, may be more valued when the marginal utility 
of money is high, such as in a recession. Assets are held to meet future liabilities. When 
asset (DA,t) and prospective liability duration (DL,t) are matched at this preferred habitat 
point, liabilities are said to be immunized
8
. I assume that this point represents an 
equilibrium, where the investor faces no duration risk, no illiquidity risk and no re-
investment risk
9
. Wachter (2003) confirms that ten-year bonds are safer than one-year 
bonds for risk-averse investors with ten-year investment horizons. Equilibrium is 
restored following shocks by an incentive not to incur the costs of any duration 
mismatch, such as a short-fall of asset values following a change in discount rates. 
Immunization is akin to avoiding a maturity mis-match between assets and liabilities, 
                                                          
8 The literature contains two definitions of immunization: (1) partial, where the interest rate sensitivities of assets and 
liabilities are matched, and (2) complete, where the cash flow needs of liabilities are matched by the investments. 
Modified duration (Dt) is traditionally used to partially immunize portfolios. Dt (1+kt)=MDt See Appendix A. 
9 Re-financing risk, which measures the ability to roll-over positions, is also termed liquidity risk in the literature and 
can describe a safety channel of monetary transmission. CFOs responding to the Graham and Harvey survey cited 
‘refinancing in bad times’ a major reason for extending debt maturity. Duration risk measures the aggregate 
sensitivity of bond values to interest rate shocks and it rises in proportion to duration. 
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such as that frequently faced by banks, but recast more generally for all investors and 
for all assets, not just zero-coupon bonds, in terms of duration.  
 
In a World of complete markets and perfect foresight, duration risk should not matter 
because agents facing future known liabilities are able to purchase notional zero coupon 
assets that mature with certain payment on the specified dates. In other words, these 
agents are always perfectly immunized, indifferent to volatility and unaffected by 
discount rate shocks. However, where there are incomplete markets, including a lack of 
securities with the appropriate durations, or frictions, such as transactions costs, and 
when liability duration is either uncertain or itself likely to change, then discount rate 
shocks matter and duration management becomes important. This explains the 
commercial existence of a large and active duration management industry. Impetus to 
immunize assets also comes from the US Pension Protection Act of 2006, which 
requires more frequent assessments of funding shortfalls, and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) ruling that any funding shortfall in US corporate pension plans 
must be reflected in a lower reported balance sheet net worth.  
 
Figure 1: Present Value Cash Flow Profiles of Three Assets and Their Durations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram shows the theoretical present values of cash inflows for three assets: A, B and C. The sums 
of present values are equal for each asset. The maturity of assets A and B are also the same, but asset C 
has a longer maturity. The durations reflect the ‘centre of gravity’ of each present value distribution. 
These differ for each asset as shown. 
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Safe assets can be defined as assets that fulfil these immunization needs, while 
simultaneously meeting minimum liquidity requirements. According to the IMF (2012), 
a safe asset is a financial instrument that provides: (1) low market and credit risks; (2) 
high market liquidity; (3) limited inflation risks; (4) low exchange rate risks and (5) 
limited idiosyncratic risks. It will likely correlate negatively with investors’ risk 
appetite. The canonical safe asset is the 10-year US Treasury note, but the list includes 
all assets that are used in an information-insensitive fashion (Gorton et al, 2012). The 
supply of these assets is not perfectly elastic and may have an associated cost similar to 
the ‘Triffin Dilemma’ (Portes, 2013). Supply shortages of safe assets can occur because 
of regulation, Central Bank LSAP, credit rating agency downgrades and falls in 
investors’ risk appetite. It is suggested in the literature that shortages in the supply of 
safe assets lead to macroeconomic disequilibria and greater financial stress (Caballero, 
2006). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) specifically claim that the 
increasing supplies of US Treasuries reduce the probability of financial crises. 
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Appendix: Decomposing the Yield Curve 
 
I use an established method to factorise the yield curve. See, for example, Ilmanen 
(1995). Let y1 denote one period spot rates; yt is the spot rate in period t; hn is the one 
period holding period return of an n-year bond; rpn the risk premium for an n-period 
bond; fn-1,n the one period forward rate between n-1 and n; Pn,t is the price on an n period 
bond; Pn,t+1 denotes the price next period; Dn represents duration for an n-period bond; 
Cvxn is convexity and V  denotes volatility. 
 
One period holding period returns for an n-period zero coupon discount bond are: 
 
ℎ𝑛 =
𝑃𝑛−1,𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡,𝑛
𝑃𝑛,𝑡
 
This can be re-written: 
 
ℎ𝑛 =
(𝑃𝑛−1,𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑛−1,𝑡) + (𝑃𝑛−1,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑛,𝑡)
𝑃𝑛,𝑡
 
 
Dropping the time period subscripts for convenience, this becomes: 
 
ℎ𝑛 = (
∆𝑃𝑛−1
𝑃𝑛−1
∙
𝑃𝑛−1
𝑃𝑛
) +
(𝑃𝑛−1 − 𝑃𝑛)
𝑃𝑛
                                                       (𝐴1) 
            
By definition: 
 
𝑃𝑛−1
𝑃𝑛
=
(1 + 𝑦𝑛)
𝑛
(1 + 𝑦𝑛−1)𝑛−1
= 1 +  𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛                                                    (𝐴2) 
            
The percentage change in the bond price can be approximated by a Taylor expansion: 
  
∆𝑃𝑛
𝑃𝑛
=  −𝐷𝑛 ∙ (∆𝑦𝑛) +  0.5 ∙ 𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛 ∙ (∆𝑦𝑛)
2                                          (𝐴3) 
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Where modified duration (D) and convexity (Cvx) are, respectively, defined as: 
 
𝐷 =  
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑦
∙  
1
𝑃
 
 
Note: Modified duration (Dn) for an n-period bond is related to Macaulay duration 
(MDn), where ytmn is the yield to maturity, or in this case the spot yield (yn) by: 
 
𝐷𝑛 = (1 + 𝑦𝑡𝑚𝑛)𝑀𝐷𝑛 = (1 + 𝑦𝑛)𝑀𝐷𝑛 
 
And:  
𝐶𝑣𝑥 =  
𝑑2𝑃
𝑑𝑦2
∙  
1
𝑃
 
Which is often written as: 
 
𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛 = 𝐷𝑛
2  −
𝑑𝐷𝑛
𝑑𝑦𝑛
 
 
Combining equations A1, A2 and A3 gives: 
 
 ℎ𝑛 ≈ 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 + (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [−𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ (∆𝑦𝑛−1) + 0.5 ∙ 𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1 ∙ (∆𝑦𝑛−1)
2]
  
 
Taking expectations of both sides and noting that for volatility (V): E(Δyn)
2
 ≈ V(Δyn)
2
: 
 
 𝐸(ℎ𝑛) ≈ 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 + (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [−𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑛−1) + 0.5 ∙ 𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1 ∙
(𝑉(𝑦𝑛−1))
2]  
 
The one period forward rate equals the zero’s rolling yield. In turn, this consists of the 
running yield plus the, so called, roll-down return that comes from the maturity-driven 
period-to-period fall in yields.  Thus, the above expression shows that the one period 
holding period return can be broken down into: (a) the running yield; (b) the roll-down 
return plus the duration impact of the interest rate view, and (c) the value of convexity. 
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Subtracting the one period riskless rate (y1) from both sides defines the bond risk 
premium: 
 
𝐸(ℎ𝑛 − 𝑦1) ≈
(𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 − 𝑦1) + (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [−𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑛−1) + 0.5𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1(𝑉(𝑦𝑛−1))
2] 
  
Rearranging this expression shows that the steepness of the one year forward curve 
(Fwspn) comprises (a) the bond risk premium (rpn); (b) the duration impact of the rate 
view and (c) a convexity effect: 
 
𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 − 𝑦1 ≈ 𝐸(ℎ𝑛 − 𝑦1) − (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [−𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑛−1) + 0.5𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1
∙ (𝑉(𝑦𝑛−1))
2] 
 
Or: 
𝐹𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑛 ≈  𝑟𝑝𝑛 + (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑛−1) − 0.5 ∙ 𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑉(𝑦𝑛−1))
2]   
 
And where: 
𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 ≈
𝑛 ∙ 𝑦𝑛 − (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑦𝑛−1
𝑛 − (𝑛 − 1)
 
 
𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 ≈ 𝑛 ∙ 𝑦𝑛 − (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑦𝑛−1 
 
The risk premium shown above is also called the bond term premia. It can be variously 
defined in terms of yields, forwards or expected returns, although each is connected. It 
is conventional to think of the risk premium as the difference between the expected one 
period holding period return from an n-term investment and cash (or here a one-year 
spot yield, y1,t): 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(ℎ𝑛,𝑡+1) − 𝑦1,𝑡 
𝑥𝑟𝑛,𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑛,𝑡+1 − 𝑦1,𝑡 
 
and when expectations are realised, Et(hn,t+1)=hn,t+1, then xrn,t+1 = rrpn,t where rrpn,t is 
the return risk premium. 
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The yield risk premium can be equivalently expressed as a sum of excess returns of 
declining term, which can be seen to be the average of expected future return risk 
premia per period: 
 
𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑛,𝑡 −
1
𝑛
𝐸𝑡(𝑦1,𝑡 + 𝑦1,𝑡+1 + ⋯ + 𝑦1,𝑡+𝑛) 
 
𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
[𝐸𝑡(ℎ𝑛,𝑡+1 − 𝑦1,𝑡+1) + 𝐸𝑡(ℎ𝑛−1,𝑡+2 − 𝑦1,𝑡+2) + ⋯
+ 𝐸𝑡(ℎ2,𝑡+𝑛−1 − 𝑦1,𝑡+𝑛−1)] 
 
𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
[𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑟𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑟𝑛−1,𝑡+2) + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡(𝑥𝑟2,𝑡+𝑛−1)] 
 
𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
[𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑛,𝑡) + 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑛−1,𝑡+1) + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑝2,𝑡+𝑛)] 
 
the mean of expected excess returns or the mean of expected future return risk premia, 
where yrpn,t denotes the yield risk premium on an n-term security at time t; yn,t is the 
spot yield for a n-period security at time t and xrn,t is the excess return on an n-period 
security at time t. Et(..) represents the expectations operator. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A New Preferred Habitat Yield Curve Parameter 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Fixed income investors are concerned with the size of yields at various maturities and 
their associated term premia – the excess yields required to commit to holding long-
term bonds instead of a series of shorter-term bonds (see Chapter 2 Appendix for 
definition). These result from the interaction of the supply and demand for maturity at 
each point on the yield curve and they can significantly influence its shape. I argue that 
the position of the term structure’s traditional hump along the maturity axis contains 
new information that is not captured by the standard level, slope and curvature factors. 
For the pure expectations hypothesis (PEH) model, the maturity where curvature is 
greatest represents the time horizon where forward rates peak. In the more general case 
of varying term premia, this point may also reflect compensation for expected volatility 
and/or changing demands and supplies of bonds. Different investor types are known to 
favour different tenors (i.e. preferred habitats exist) and their preferences vary over 
time. Excess demands at any maturity will lower local term premia, assuming limits to 
arbitrage. Although attention is already paid to the size of these term premia (Adrian 
and Shin, 2010; D’Amico et al., 2011; Borio and Zhu, 2012), market participants rarely 
consider their pattern. Therefore, a key research question is whether the cross-sectional 
distribution of bond term premia by tenor can also help to explain macro-finance 
variables, such as future business activity, risk appetite and corporate credit spreads? 
Does a skew in these term premia towards a shorter average time horizon tell us 
something different from a distribution that is biased towards longer time horizons? 
 
This chapter introduces a new yield curve parameter that helps to describe the 
distribution of term premia using a statistic, labelled D-star
10
. This characterises the 
lateral position of the traditional hump in the term structure of interest rates along the 
                                                          
10 The ‘D’ in D-star relates to the distance of the hump along the maturity axis 
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maturity axis. Without actual term premia data and with reliable estimates not always 
available
11
, for simplicity, I use spot yields to calculate D-star. D-star complements the 
traditional level, slope and curvature parameters, but it is also independent of them by 
construction, because standard measures of these other parameters net out from the 
calculation. Moreover, D-star contains no forward-bias because it is constructed using 
only current information. I argue below that the demand for maturity is a derived 
demand based on the desire for specific government bond duration and that imbalances 
between the supply and demand for maturity can explain changes in the position of D-
star. Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 summarise my key estimation results. 
 
Table 1: Cross-Correlation Coefficients between Yield Curve Factors, 1987-2016 
(Monthly) 
 Slope Curvature ‘Real’ Term 
Premium 
D-star 
Slope 1.00    
Curvature 0.718 1.00   
‘Real’ Term Premium 0.647 0.664 1.00  
D-star 0.643 0.078 0.095 1.00 
Sources: Federal Reserve, New York Federal Reserve and Adrian et al. (2014). Comment: The slope 
factor (10 year less 1 year yield) correlates closely with the other factors. Curvature correlates closely 
with the inflation-adjusted term premia, but has virtually no association with D-star. Equally, D-star 
seems unrelated to the level of the ‘real’ term premium. The ‘real’ term premium is the residual from a 
regression between the nominal term premium and US three-year trend inflation. It seems reasonable that 
D-star is not strongly related to either the size of the curvature parameter or the size of the term premium. 
 
In practice, the interest rate term structure is more often characterised by its other 
parameters. The term structure is typically upward-sloping and concave to the maturity 
axis (see Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright, 2006). Curvature can be explained from the 
‘roll-down effect’ as time elapses, where a 10-year bond, say, becomes a 9-year bond 
with a lower yield after 12 months (see Appendix A). Since the capital gains that derive 
from these yield falls are greatest at longer maturities, mid-duration bonds require a 
yield premium to equalise expected horizon returns [duration effect]. There may also be 
a yield premium (discount) caused by excess supply (demand) at different maturities 
                                                          
11 The New York Federal Reserve and Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) publish estimates for the US Treasury 
market, but term premia are not always readily available and even in these cases they are estimated with sizeable 
errors and turn out to be highly collinear across maturities, with the largest premium often associated with the longest 
maturity. 
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[preferred habitat effect]. On top, greater interest rate uncertainty will boost the implied 
option value of longer-dated bonds [uncertainty effect]
12
. This premium is linked to 
yield curve slope since extreme curve steepness can mean either short-dated yields rise 
and/ or long-dated yields fall, but in both cases higher yield volatility increases the size 
of this uncertainty effect. 
 
Table 2: Cross-correlations (15 months ahead) and Granger Causality Tests (12 months) 
between US Financial Stress Index and High Yield Spread with various Yield Curve 
Factors, 1987-2016 (Monthly) 
 Financial Stress Index High Yield Spread 
Slope -0.479 (p=0.047,0.017) -0.401 (p=0.059, 0.039) 
Curvature -0.339 (p=0.592,0.116) -0.205 (p=0.383,0.000) 
‘Real’ Term Premium -0.212 (p=0.794,0.007) -0.042 (p=0.011,0.043) 
D-star -0.539 (p=0.027,0.915) -0.563 (p=0.020,0.981) 
Comment: Both the financial stress index (using the first principal component of the published national 
FSIs) and the high yield spread (B less BBB-rated) show greatest correlation with D-star 15 months 
earlier. The slope factor demonstrates some influence. However, Granger causality tests demonstrate 
strong one-way causation for D-star in both cases and in the correct direction. This is not true of any of 
the other factors. The first p-value in brackets tests whether we can reject causation from each yield curve 
factor, and the second figure to the factor. 
 
I argue that risk appetite is a key influence behind the demand for government bonds 
because US Treasury notes are the canonical safe assets for many investor types. 
Investors’ demand for safety is often driven by a more uncertain and increasingly less 
favourable economic outlook beyond the investment time horizon characterised by D-
star. Assuming that the position of the yield curve hump delineates regimes, a hump 
which occurs at a near-term maturity describes a less attractive approaching business 
outlook than a hump that occurs at a longer maturity. In the absence of full data on 
portfolio composition D-star also helps to identify the preferred habitat of investors 
through its connection to this safety dimension. The preferred habitat model of the term 
structure implies that the demand curve is relatively inelastic around the targeted time 
horizon. Shifts in these preferred habitats and short-term changes in the supply of bonds 
will together change prices and term premia at each specific tenor. I show below, in 
Section 3.3, that the greater the importance of a preferred habitat, the more movements 
                                                          
12 Known by market participants as convexity bias. It operates through the square of duration. See Chapter 2 
Appendix. 
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in supply will impact bond yields. Periods of excess demand (supply) for maturity will 
push yields at that tenor lower (higher). The position of the hump in the yield curve 
along the maturity axis (D-star) may therefore mark the boundary of the preferred 
habitat: in other words, beyond this horizon there is an excess demand for safe assets at 
all subsequent future maturities, less appetite for risk and lower Treasury term premia. 
Expansions and contractions in D-star tell us that the time horizon of investors is 
changing. These changes to investors’ time horizons are transmitted through portfolio 
reallocations between risky and safe assets that result in, respective, excess demands 
and supplies. Longer investment horizons (larger D-star), therefore, may be associated 
with greater risk-seeking, more roundabout capital structures and, hence, higher 
productivity, faster business activity and lower credit risk. Similarly, vice versa. 
 
Adding impetus to this search for more yield curve parameters, recent empirical studies 
increasingly question the validity of the conventional three-parameter decomposition, 
comprising level, slope and curvature (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005 and Adrian, Crump, 
Mills and Moench, 2014). Adrian, Crump, Mills and Moench, for example, replace the 
three-parameter yield curve model with a five-parameter alternative, justified following 
a Wald test on the rank of the factor matrix. The existence of D-star motivates an 
alternative yield curve decomposition. This new decomposition makes it easier to track 
down the influence of quantities on the shape of the term structure. It is, therefore, 
linked to the recent literatures on the effects of quantities on interest rates and on the 
supply of safe assets, such as government bonds, following LSAP
13
. A unique time-
series of US D-star values that average 6.3 years (1946-2016), with a 10-month standard 
deviation, is derived and reported in Section 3.7 below. The results reported in Table 1 
indicate the relationship between the standard factors and my estimates of D-star (see 
below). D-star is positively correlated with the yield curve slope (10-year less 1-year 
spread), but it is not strongly correlated with either the curvature (1-5-10 year butterfly 
spread
14
) or with the level of the Adrian et al. (2014) estimated 10-year nominal term 
premia, trend-adjusted for inflation to make it stationary. The more extensive
15
 
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) term structure data also confirm that a high (low) 
                                                          
13 Large-scale Asset Purchases (LSAP). Federal Reserve Balance Sheet rose 5 times to US$4.5 trillion from end-
2007-16. 
14 The yield spread between a duration-matched 5-year bullet and a 1-year plus 10-year barbell 
15 The Adrian et al (2014) data contain cross-sectional annual tenors up to 10-years. 
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value of D-star is positively correlated (0.309) with a negative (positive) skew in the 
distribution of bond term premia. Table 2 shows the strong one-way Granger causality 
15-months ahead between D-star and both the US high yield corporate bond spread (B-
BBB
16
) and an index of US financial stress
17
. The close correlation between the future 
high yield spread and D-star is illustrated in Figure 2. A shorter horizon preferred 
habitat is implicitly linked to rising default risks over coming months because the B-
BBB spread is a risk premia that is specifically associated with the incremental default 
probability of poorer quality corporate credits. D-star appears to one-way Granger cause 
movements in this spread around one-year ahead (p=0.020, 0.981): in comparison, the 
traditional yield curve slope (p=0.059, 0.039) and the Adrian et al. (2014) inflation-
adjusted US Treasury 10-year term premia (p=0.011, 0.043) are far less effective 
predictors. It can be shown that 52% of the time over the sample period D-star moves 
oppositely to the direction of the average level of the US Treasury term premia. 
 
Figure 2: D-Star (Position of Curvature Peak in Years, 6-month CMA, Advanced 15 
months and Inverted) and B-BBB Corporate Credit Spread, 1987-2016 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: The position of the curvature peak (D-star) advanced by 15 months and inverted predicts 
future movements in the US corporate high yield spread between single B and BBB bonds. The negative 
correlation between the two series is minus 0.563 and D-star is strongly one-way Granger causal.  
 
When D-star is included alongside measures of the three standard yield curve 
parameters, the regression results compare favourably with the principal components 
                                                          
16 The Moody’s ‘Baa’ investment grade is equivalent to S&P’s ‘BBB’ rating. 
17 This index is constructed from the first principal component of the various national US financial stress indexes 
(FSIs), backfilled to 1987 using their major subcomponents, e.g. corporate credit spreads and the CBOE VIX 
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decomposition. D-star contains additional information that, as I later show in Chapter 4, 
can help to predict a number of macro-finance variables besides those already 
mentioned, such as the ISM index of US business activity and popular measures of 
investors’ risk appetite. D-star falls ahead of major recessions and predates periods of 
financial turmoil. For example, according to estimates derived from generic Treasury 
yield data, D-star dropped significantly from a local peak of 7.45 years in December 
2005 to 4.41 years in September 2007 ahead of the 2007/08 Financial Crisis and Great 
Recession. It has since rebounded to a current reading of around 7 years. These 
forewarnings do not occur because fixed income investors are any more prescient or 
better informed than others, but because it is easier to extract forward-looking 
information from the Treasury yield curve. These signals also may be purer because 
government bonds are less distorted by other factors, such as illiquidity and default risk. 
Long-dated government bonds constitute safe assets for several key investors types and, 
therefore, the demand for bond duration is, at the same time, often a demand for safe 
assets at that horizon. This, in turn, reflects a corresponding fall in investors’ overall 
risk appetite that will itself have future implications for the real economy.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the recent preferred habitat 
and institutional finance literature. Section 3.3 examines the importance of duration 
management. In Section 3.5 I use the quadratic yield curve example to explain D-star, 
intuitively. Section 3.4 defines my measure of D-star. Section 3.6 describes the data and 
Section 3.7 provides monthly estimates for the position of the hump (D-star), using both 
security-level data from 1995-2016 and generic US Treasury spot yields over 1946-
2016. Section 3.8 checks robustness. It compares the four parameter decomposition 
with principal components and estimates D-star directly from a Kalman filter technique. 
Section 3.9 concludes. 
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3.2 Review of the Preferred Habitat and Institutional Finance 
Literature  
 
Term premia are assumed to be negligible under the pure expectations hypothesis 
(PEH), so rising interest rates rather than positive excess returns should follow periods 
of curve steepness (Fama and Bliss, 1987). Yet, it is well-documented (Ilmanen, 1995) 
that, in practice, three-month ahead excess returns (ex post) correlate with curve 
steepness (0.118). In addition, over the long-term when the mean-reverting behaviour of 
the yield curve washes out, the term structure still retains its concave shape. Thus, the 
return difference between a duration-matched bullet and barbell, i.e. the yield carry of a 
curve steepening strategy, earns an excess return, much like other examples of ‘carry’ in 
financial markets. Across four major bond markets – US, Germany, Japan and UK – the 
1-5-10 year butterfly spread averaged +7bp (1986-2016) and +10bp (2000-16), showing 
that investors often pay premium prices for longer duration pay-offs. This contradicts 
the equality of horizon returns implicit in the PEH. 
 
A mathematical analysis of these contributions (see Appendix A) shows how they can 
arise from: (1) the expectations of falling policy rates; (2) the excess demand for safe 
assets and (3) greater interest rate uncertainty. Each factor could be synonymous with 
sub-par future economic activity and a lower risk appetite among investors. These 
factors also affect the lateral position of the hump in the spot curve along the maturity 
axis. This position tells us the investment horizon where forward rates (and by 
implication expected policy rates) reach their maximum. This is explained (see Chapter 
2 Appendix) because the duration-adjusted period change in spot yields is identically 
equal to the forward rate. When the hump occurs at shorter maturities, the economic 
outlook may be less favourable than normal and risk appetite low, while a hump 
positioned at an unusually long maturity could indicate risk-seeking behaviour and 
predate a future business cycle expansion. In cases where the PEH is superseded by the 
introduction of other factors into the pricing equation (e.g. the excess supply and 
demand for different maturities and/ or the option value of expected interest rate 
volatility), the position of the hump is also affected by the excess demand for safe assets 
and by the effects of greater interest rate uncertainty
18
. Ilmanen (1995) shows that, in 
                                                          
18 This is derived mathematically in Appendix A 
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practice, excess supply and demand factors often dominate because the above butterfly 
spread measure of yield carry only shows a modestly positive correlation with ex post 
volatility (0.114).  
 
The standard yield curve model is augmented to explain how these supply and demand 
factors influence US Treasury term premia. Tobin (1969) describes a portfolio balance 
mechanism that adjusts the overall quantity of duration, liquidity and credit risk in 
response to shocks to the relative supplies of money (the zero duration asset) and other 
securities. Additional frictions are introduced by the preferred habitat hypothesis 
(Modigliani and Sutch, 1966 and Vayanos and Vila, 2009) which opens up the 
possibility of market segmentation; through the importance of key investors in 
institutional finance models with non-standard stochastic discount functions for asset 
pricing (Adrian, Etula and Muir, 2010 and Haddad and Sraer, 2015) and with the 
existence of limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Modigliani and Sutch argue 
that bond interest rate risk should be measured relative to an investor's investment 
horizon, or preferred habitat, which vary by investor-type since different investors 
favour bonds of specific maturities. Investors’ desire to avoid risk: "...should lead them 
to hedge by staying in their maturity habitat, unless other maturities (longer or shorter) 
offer an expected premium sufficient to compensate for the risk and cost of moving out 
of [their] habitat." (Modigliani and Sutch, 1966, p184). This means that yields are 
determined by the local supply and demand conditions at each maturity. Adjacent 
securities in the maturity structure are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, with the 
inelasticity of yields directly related to the distance away from the preferred habitat, 
which helps to justify term premia. According to the preferred habitat view, the 
preference of investor clienteles for specific maturities becomes a significant 
determinant of bond yields, when the maturity structure of government debt supply 
changes (Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2009 & 2010; Guibaud et 
al. 2013). 
 
The finance literature already recognises that this maturity dimension is important. The 
position of the hump on the spot curve is similar in concept to the maturity defined by 
the Fama (1986) peak forward rate, although he applied it to the money market curve. 
Fama’s factor is also dependent on the level, slope and curvature of the term structure, 
and since it is expressed through forward rates it cannot define a unique point on the 
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spot curve. The popular Nelson-Siegel-Svensson term structure model also contains a 
fourth parameter
19
 that positions the hump and helps to determine the shape of the yield 
curve. Yet, this parameter is typically treated as a constant to expedite yield curve 
estimation despite strong evidence that it is time-varying. In other words, the tenor at 
which the curvature parameter is maximized plus the speed that the slope parameter 
decays are implicitly constant over time because they both only depend on this fixed 
‘shape’ parameter. Koopman, Mallee and van der Wel (2007) and the published daily 
estimates by Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) for the US; by the Bundesbank 
(German data), and by the ECB (Eurozone data) all show that this fourth parameter 
changes significantly over time. Based on monthly reported estimates from 1980-2016 
and acknowledging the potential identification issues, the German yield curve’s tau1 
‘shape’ parameter has averaged 3.90, with a standard deviation of 4.40. According to 
daily estimates, the Eurozone yield curve’s equivalent tau1 parameter has averaged 3.92 
since September 2004, with a standard deviation of 4.08. Similarly, the US tau1 
parameter has a mean of 2.39 and a standard deviation of 3.19, based on monthly data 
from 1961. Notwithstanding, Diebold and Li (2006) assume a constant ‘shape’ 
parameter that fixes the position of the Treasury yield curve hump at 2.5 years, while 
Diebold et al. (2006) state that this ‘shape’ parameter has: “... no obvious economic 
interpretation.” (p3). In contrast, Fama (1986) uses information from the position of the 
hump to derive an alpha-generating strategy for the money market curve. He selects the 
maturity where the forward rate is highest because that maximises the roll-down returns 
from a portfolio, given that the forward rate defines the duration-adjusted change in the 
spot rate between two maturities. 
 
Adrian, Etula and Muir (2010), Domanski, Shin and Sushko (2015) and Haddad and 
Sraer (2015) all demonstrate the importance of specific financial intermediaries for asset 
pricing. Domanski, Shin and Sushko study the insurance sector and note that European 
companies consciously run wide duration gaps between their assets and liabilities of 5-
10 years. They show empirically that a greater net demand for duration leads to lower 
government bond yields and they conclude that a ‘hunt for duration’ among risk averse 
investors may often dominate the traditional search for yield, notably though an 
amplification mechanism when yields themselves are falling. Leibowitz, Bova and 
                                                          
19
 Traditionally termed tau, or tau1 when a fifth parameter tau2 is included. 
28 | P a g e  
 
Kogelman (2014), argue that duration targeting drives the portfolio rebalancing of 
institutional bond and bond mutual funds. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) 
confirm this for corporate financial managers. They also argue that corporations have 
more flexibility over issuance, although, in practice, Treasury debt managers look to do 
the same. 
 
3.3 Duration Management and the Demand and Supply for Maturity 
 
This section extends the preferred habitat hypothesis to asset duration and considers the 
effects of imbalances between the supply and derived demand for maturity on the shape 
of the yield curve. Bonds are supplied at certain maturities, but are demanded, in part, 
for their durations. Duration, which is defined in Chapter 2, is widely-used as a portfolio 
target by many investors. It follows that the demand for specific maturities is a derived 
demand. However, actual data on the maturity structure of asset holdings by investor 
type are hard to find. Recent investor surveys by Asset International show the evolution 
of liability duration and fixed-income portfolio duration across a sample of major US 
pension funds. Only six years of data exist, but they appear to be consistent with these 
observations, showing broadly stable levels of liability duration of around 14 years; 
positive co-movements between asset and liability duration, and a duration gap between 
fixed-income assets and liabilities that averages 2-3 years. See Figure 3. 
 
Therefore, in practice, many long-term funds are concerned with the duration of their 
liabilities as well as the volatility of their assets. This opens up the possibility that the 
aggregate supplies of bonds at certain maturities may not align with these aggregate 
demands derived from duration targets. Not surprisingly, recent LSAP policies have 
focussed more attention on potential imbalances between the supply and demand for 
maturity. Prior to the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Reinhart and Sack (2000) 
found bond yields to be negatively related to the size of the fiscal surplus. The period 
since the GFC has seen significant increases in Treasury issuance (+105%, 2008-16) 
and in the size of holdings of Treasury securities on the US Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet (+330%, 2008-16) as part of LSAP policies. In addition, there have also been 
deliberate attempts by policy-makers to target an increase in the average maturity of 
29 | P a g e  
 
outstanding debt. According to official data, the average maturity of the stock of US 
Treasuries reveals significant variation over time, as shown in Figure 4. Average debt 
maturity fell from a peak of 10.35 years at end-1946 to a low of 2.41 years at end-1975, 
and currently stands at 5.74 years (end-2016). The duration of the Thomson Reuters US 
government bond index shows similar movements (correlation 0.759) and in the 2008-
12 period that characterised LSAP it rose from 4.66 to 11.03 years. Using monthly data 
since year 2000, increases in the proportion of US Treasuries supplied in the 5-10 year 
maturity band positively correlate (0.55) with higher relative yields, as measured by the 
spread between 10-year bonds and an average of 5-and 20-year bonds. Greenwood, 
Hanson and Stein (2016) argue that supply shortages at the front-end of the money 
market curve, measured by the ratio of outstanding Treasury bills to GDP, depress bill 
rates disproportionately. Greenwood and Vayanos (2009) find that falls in the value of 
maturity-weighted debt to GDP lower long-term yields. Similar results can be found in 
UK gilt data and for Japan (Iwata and Fueda-Samikawa, 2013).  
 
Alongside this jump in the volume of Treasury issuance, the LSAP enacted following 
the GFC and, in particular, the Federal Reserve’s Maturity Extension Programme 
(MEP), or so-called Operation Twist 2 policy
20
, explicitly attempted to alter the term 
structure of US interest rates via a duration channel. By substantially raising the average 
maturity of their US Treasury SOMA holdings
21
 towards a target of 10 years
22
 policy-
makers sought to push down longer-term interest rates and so deliver a boost to the 
sluggish American economy. Gagnon (2016) summarises recent empirical studies to 
show that a 50bp fall in 10-year Treasury yields is the median response to a LSAP 
equivalent to 10% of GDP. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) find that the 
announcement effect of the MEP lowered US 30-year yields by some 40bp and raised 
3-year yields by around 10bp. D’Amico et al. (2012) suggest each one-year decline in 
average Treasury maturity pushes down medium duration US yields by 100bp. Chada 
(2014) shows a like-sized effect of 120-180bp for long-term yields. The near-two year 
                                                          
20 Operation Twist 2 was instituted in two parts. The first ran from September 2011 through June of 2012, and 
involved the redeployment of $400 billion in Fed assets. The second ran from July 2012 through December 2012, and 
encompassed a total of $267 billion. Operation Twist 1 occurred in 1961: Fed estimates suggest it lowered long-
yields by  a small 14bp 
21 System Open Market Account (SOMA) 
22 On average through 2005 SOMA maturities averaged around 4.56 years. LSAP1 (11/25/2008 to 3/31/2010) raised 
this to 6.6 years; LSAP2 (11/3/2010 to 6/30/2011) maintained this at 6.13 years and LSAP3 (9/13/2012 to 
12/18/2013) pushed this out to 8.03 years. The LSAP is more popularly known by the QE acronym.  
30 | P a g e  
 
fall in average US Treasury maturity between 2001 and 2009 could, therefore, explain 
as much as 300bp of the decline in US long-term Treasury yields over the period. 
 
Figure 3: Liability Duration and Fixed Income Portfolio Duration – Sample of Major 
US Pension Funds, 2011-16 (Annual) 
 
Source: Asset International; Comment: Six years of annual survey data for a sample of major US pension 
schemes appear to show co-movement between average fixed income asset duration and liability 
duration, with the latter around 2-3 years higher. 
 
Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2009) show the conditions 
necessary for these supply and demand imbalances to be arbitraged away. Greenwood, 
Hanson and Stein (2010) build on this work, using a 'gap-filling' model of corporate 
debt issuance to show how these imbalances also affect quantities in the long-term. 
Their model is adapted in equation (3) to demonstrate the theoretical effect of supply 
and demand imbalances in pushing Treasury yields at any maturity away from a PEH 
benchmark. The model assumes: (1) partially segmented markets, featuring preferred 
habitat investors, such as pension funds that demand long-term assets; (2) Treasury 
supply shocks that are large relative to the supply of arbitrage capital, and (3) risk-
averse and capital-constrained arbitrageurs, such as hedge funds
23
, that attempt to 
enforce the expectations hypothesis as best they can. These arbitrageurs incorporate 
short-term interest rate expectations into bond prices and bring bond yields into line 
with each other by buying and selling across the different maturities and smoothing 
local supply and demand pressures, thereby enforcing an arbitrage-free term structure. 
                                                          
23
 The capital of Fixed Income (US$684 billion) and Global Macro (US$511 billion) hedge funds exceeded US$1 
trillion in 2014, equivalent to around 7% of outstanding bonds. Source: Hedge Fund Research. 
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They demand higher bond term premia as their exposure to duration increases because 
they are risk-averse. Without these arbitrageurs, each bond tenor would constitute a 
separate market, with its yield determined by the investor cohort for that specific 
maturity. Factors that cause supply and demand imbalances; uncertainty, and factors 
that alter the strength of arbitrage activity will raise the term premium on long-term 
government bonds of m years maturity and so affect the shape of the yield curve across 
each tenor, resulting in a term structure that could be increasing, decreasing, humped, or 
even of an irregular shape. An excess supply (demand) denoted by Gm>Lm (Gm<Lm) 
drives yields at each maturity, m, higher (lower): 
 
𝑃𝑚
∗−1 − (1 + 𝑟1)(1 + 𝐸[𝑦𝑚]) =  
(1 + 𝑟1)
2𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑦𝑚]
𝛾
(𝐺𝑚 − 𝐿𝑚)               (3) 
 
 
where r1 represents short-term interest rates in period one and ym denotes spot yields 
over the periods two to m. r1 is known and ym randomly distributed with mean E[ym] and 
variance Var[ym]; Pm
*
 denotes the market-clearing default-free bond price at maturity m; 
γ is the risk tolerance of arbitrageurs, γ >0; Gm is long-term government bond issuance 
and Lm is the demand for long-term bonds of maturity m by preferred habitat investors. 
 
Imbalances can arise from both investor demand (Lm) and/ or from government supply 
(Gm) for any of three reasons: (1) over-issuance of a specific maturity (Gm), net of any 
LSAP, and low demand (Lm) for that tenor, in turn, because of (2) liability duration and/ 
or (3) investors’ risk appetite24. From equation (3), a rise in average Treasury maturity 
increases Gm at longer maturities, pushes up term premia and so lengthens D-star. In 
turn, an increase in D-star, independent of the supply of maturity, indicates less excess 
demand for long maturity bonds, i.e. a fall in Lm. This increases term premia around and 
beyond the maturity m. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 According to Gai and Vause (2006), risk aversion is a characteristic of underlying utility functions, whereas risk 
appetite results from the interaction between risk aversion and the macro-economic background. 
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Figure 4: The Average Maturity of US Treasury Securities Outstanding, 1946-2016; the 
Average Maturity of Federal Reserve Holdings, 2003-16 and Duration of Aggregate US 
Treasury Bond Index, 1980-16  (Years, Monthly) 
 
Source: US Treasury, Federal Reserve, Thomson Reuters; Comment: The average maturity of the 
outstanding stock of US Treasuries show significant variation over time. It reached a low in the high 
inflation, mid-1970s and is currently close to a 65-year peak. Duration of the Thomson Reuters US 
Treasury bond index has already peaked. (The series have a 0.759 correlation coefficient). The average 
maturity of US Federal Reserve Treasury holdings is also shown. Taking into account their recent jump, 
this points to a lesser rise in the effective maturity of outstanding Treasuries held by the private sector 
 
This preferred habitat model reduces to the pure expectations hypothesis (PEH) when 
the right-hand side of equation (3) is zero. This requires that: (a) the supply and demand 
imbalances do not persist, such that government supplies of long-term bonds match 
preferred habitat demand (Gm – Lm=0); (b) arbitrageurs face no interest rate risk 
(Var[ym] =0), and/ or (c) there is non-strict market segmentation, allowing sufficient 
buyers and sellers of bonds flexibility to alter their investment horizons and so arbitrage 
away anomalies. In theory, this requires that γ is infinitely large, so that arbitrageurs are 
risk-neutral. In practice, rather than extreme segmentation, it is more likely that the 
active arbitrageurs transmit local shocks on to nearby maturities, subject to their risk 
tolerance and their access to funding. These latter two factors probably fluctuate over 
time, thereby raising and lowering the intensity of arbitrage activity (γ). For example, 
business cycle and monetary policy shocks may reduce arbitrageurs’ risk appetite and 
limit arbitrage, so amplifying the effect of any imbalances and suggesting that preferred 
habitat models are well-suited to turbulent times (Strohsal, 2013). Equally, abundant 
liquidity may permit an increase in arbitrage that drives up their risk tolerance 
parameter (γ) thereby reducing the impact of any quantitative imbalance on prices. 
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From equation (3), term premia will also vary positively by maturity according to the 
degree of yield volatility (Var[ym]). Volatility, in turn, is affected both by changes in the 
riskiness of investments and by fluctuations in general investors’ risk appetite (Gai and 
Vause, 2006). Cieslak and Povala (2014) among others note that the term structure of 
yield volatility has lately flattened. For example, since end-2007, the annualised 
monthly volatility of one-year US Treasury yields has averaged 1.95%; five-year, 
2.32%; 10-year, 2.48% and 20-year, 2.75%.  Prior to 2008 yield volatility across the 
term structure averaged 10.16%, compared to 2.16% since. Applying this fact to 
equation (3), it follows that changes in the distribution of term premia will largely 
depend upon the excess supply and demand for maturity. However, fluctuations up and 
down in the level of the volatility term structure and changes in the intensity of arbitrage 
activity can both still affect the average size of bond term premia across the yield curve. 
During such times, changes in the term structure of term premia, as measured by D-star, 
give a truer measure of the excess supply and demand for maturity and general 
investors’ risk appetite than the level of term premia. This provides a rationale for its 
calculation and may also explain why D-star has a low correlation with the level of term 
premia. 
 
3.4 An Intuitive Explanation of D-star Using the Quadratic Yield 
Curve  
 
What is going on may be better understood from the quadratic yield curve. Here, the 
single hump is symmetric and its position can be unambiguously measured by its point 
of peak curvature along the maturity axis. As illustrated in Figure 5, D-star (Dt
*
) 
coincides with the maturity of the largest absolute perpendicular distance between 
different points along the yield curve and the average slope between a short-term bond 
(e.g. one year) and a very long-term bond (e.g. 20 years). In the special case of the 
quadratic, D-star is directly related through differentiation to the ratio between the slope 
parameter and the curvature parameter of the yield curve. When these two other 
parameters move together (1946-2016 correlation between curvature and slope is 
positive 0.786), the position of peak curvature is unaffected. Larger proportionate 
movements in the slope extend the position of the curvature peak further along the 
maturity axis. It follows that a steepening curve with unchanged curvature has a 
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curvature peak at ever-lengthening horizons. Abstracting for a moment from the effects 
of excess demand, the yield curve slope indicates the trend in interest rates, while the 
degree of curvature implies the likelihood of future mean-reversion in rates and/ or 
interest rate uncertainty. Hence, a steeply-sloped, near-linear yield curve suggests that 
interest rates move to a permanently higher level, consistent with a stronger economy. 
Equally, a flat, bulging yield curve suggests persistent cyclicality in both interest rates 
and in the real economy. Intuitively, D-star should take the larger value in the former 
case.  In the case of the quadratic it does, because a high (low) slope to curvature ratio 
corresponds to a high (low) D-star value. 
 
Figure 5: Yield Curve – Level, Slope, Curvature and Position 
 
Comment: Schematic breakdown of term structure into four parameters: level, slope curvature and 
position 
 
This new parameter helps to explain why some market participants read steep yield 
curves with less curvature favourably – indicating future economic strength, and flat, 
bulging curves unfavourably – as future economic warning signs. Consider three 
examples: (i) between 1996-97 and again through 2011-12 the US Treasury yield curve 
slope flattened significantly, but since its curvature dropped pari passu there were no 
recession warnings; (ii) the slope was also below average throughout most of the 1961-
70 decade, but confirmation of the coming 1970 recession required the rise in curvature 
in 1969, and similarly (iii) the drop in slope through 2005-07 only constituted a 
recession warning when curvature failed to match the drop and actually rose in 2007.  
Level (e.g. y1)
Position
(i.e. D-star (D*))
Curvature (e.g. y10 – (y20 + y1)/2)
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D-star is therefore related to yield curve slope movements, conditional on non-matching 
moves in curvature. In general, thinking of D-star as a non-linear transformation of the 
slope, where the non-linearity is driven by the curvature, links it to the evidence given 
by Moench (2012), who shows that curvature has predictive content for the business 
cycle. Other papers emphasise the slope (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991): both are 
partly right, but confusion comes from the non-linear link between slope and curvature. 
Paradoxically, D-star alters most when the paths of the slope and curvature diverge, 
rather than when they move together. 
 
In summary, there is information contained in the yield curve slope; information in the 
curvature of the term structure and information in their non-linear combination, which 
for the quadratic describe the positions of the curvature peak and D-star. In cases other 
than the quadratic function, such as non-parametric yield curves, the position of the 
curvature peak is harder to calculate from analytical methods and may have less 
meaning. I, therefore, propose a general estimation method to identify the position of 
the hump. This weighted-average of standard geometric distance measures is derived in 
the next section. Its calculation is straightforward; independent of the method of yield 
curve estimation, yet specific to each term structure. 
 
3.5 D-star: Measuring the Position of the Yield Curve Hump 
 
This section describes a general, non-parametric measure for the lateral position (m0) of 
the hump in the term structure that is independent of the mathematical formulation used 
to generate the yield curve. It uses a standard geometric measure of the perpendicular 
distance (dm0) from a point (m0, ym0) to a line, as defined by: 
  
𝑦𝑚 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑚 
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where m denotes maturity and ym is the spot yield for that maturity. Let the 
perpendicular intersect the line at another point (p, q). Then, the distance dm0 between 
these points is: 
 
𝑑𝑚0 = √(𝑝 − 𝑚0)2 + (𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)2 
 
 
The values of m0, ym0, a and b are known. Squaring both sides and multiplying by 
(b
2
+1) to eliminate the two unknown values p and q, gives: 
 
(𝑏2 + 1)[(𝑝 − 𝑚0)
2 + (𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)
2] = 
(𝑝 − 𝑚0)
2 − 2𝑏(𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)(𝑝 − 𝑚0) + 𝑏
2(𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)
2 + 
𝑏2(𝑝 − 𝑚0)
2 + 2𝑏(𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)(𝑝 − 𝑚0) + (𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)
2 
(𝑏2 + 1)𝑑𝑚0
2 = [𝑏(𝑝 − 𝑚0) + (𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)]
2 + [(𝑝 − 𝑚0) − 𝑏(𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑞)]
2  
 
And since if follows that q = a + bp and b= (p – m0)/(ym0 – q), this can be rewritten as: 
 
= (𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚0)
2 + 0 
 
Therefore, dividing both sides by (b
2
+1) defines an expression for distance at each 
tenor: 
(p,q)
(m0, ym0) 
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𝑑𝑚0
2 =
(𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚0)
2
(𝑏2 + 1)
 
 
Or, taking the square root and re-expressing in absolute terms: 
 
𝑑𝑚0 =
|𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚0|
√(𝑏2 + 1)
 
  
At each point in time (t), there exist distance measures for each maturity m = 0,…,n. 
The distance-weighted average of these maturities
25
 describes the position of the hump 
(Dt
*
):  
 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ =
∫ 𝑚 ∙ 𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑛
𝑚=0
∫ 𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑛
𝑚=0
 =       ∫ 𝑤𝑚,𝑡
𝑛
𝑚=0
 ∙ 𝑚                                                       
 
where wm,t = dm,t/∫dm,t is the weighting factor for each tenor, m 
 
This expression describes the maturity of the average curvature and defines D-star (Dt
*
). 
The expression is positive by definition because maturity (m) exceeds zero and the 
weights used to calculate the average comprise individual distances (dm,t) measured in 
absolute terms. It can be calculated for different shaped interest rate term structures, 
including multiple-humps, convex humps, inverted and partially-inverted structures. D-
star can be defined in the case of an inverted term structure because absolute distance 
measures are used. Equally, the aggregation of these distance measures over the cross-
section of maturities means that D-star can be calculated for term structures with 
multiple humps. It may or may not coincide with the point of peak curvature along the 
maturity axis, which is defined as the horizon (m) with the greatest distance measure 
(dm,t). When curvature is symmetric with a single hump, these measures should align, 
                                                          
25 Market participants might describe this as the ‘duration-weighted average butterfly spread across tenors’. 
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but when curvature is positively (negatively) skewed the average maturity reading will 
lie above (below) the peak curvature. 
 
In practice, like the similar measures of level (e.g. y1,t), slope (e.g. y10,t – y1,t) and 
curvature (e.g. y5,t – (y10,t + y1,t)/2), the value of D-star depends upon which bond 
maturities are included in the calculation. Correspondingly, it is inappropriate to 
compare a D-star value calculated over a maturity range of 20-years with one measured 
over 10-years. Another issue is continuity. Bonds are often issued at specific maturities 
(and generic US Treasury yields are published at 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30 years), 
which means that this statistic will take discrete and possibly non-unique values at each 
sampling point. Therefore, in order to estimate D-star, I approximate it using the 
discrete time horizons m = 1,…,n, for each monthly data point as: 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ ≈
∑ 𝑚 ∙ 𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑛
𝑚=1
∑ 𝑑𝑚,𝑡
𝑛
𝑚=1
                                                               (4) 
 
where m = 1,….,n, dm,t ≥0, for all m.  
 
3.6 Data Description 
 
I test two different data sets. First, I take the redemption yields and Macaulay durations 
of all extant US Treasury securities
26
. The prices, coupons and other features of these 
bonds were down-loaded from Bloomberg for each month-end, starting in January, 
1989. Securities with call features and all securities with durations below one-year were 
eliminated from the sample to avoid liquidity and negative yield questions. The 
Bloomberg data is less populated in its early years, because securities that were issued 
prior to the electronic platform’s start date in 1989 are not included. Thus, a 20-year 
bond issued in, say, 1988 is not logged by the database. Consequently, I mainly rely on 
data from January, 2000 onwards, which is the date from when there is a minimum 
sample size of at least 110 securities and from where the traditional level, slope and 
curvature parameters of the overall yield curve more closely align with the generic 
                                                          
26 It is conventional to construct a security-level yield curve using duration not maturity. 
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counterparts calculated by the Federal Reserve. Over the 2000-2016 period, the sample 
contains an average of 167 Treasury securities for each month. Appendix B provides the 
data for 30
th
 December 2012. 
 
In order to lengthen the sample span before 2000, this security-level data is 
complemented by generic spot yield data for US Treasury notes and bonds of 1-,2-,3-,5-
,7-,10- and 20-year constant maturities, all sourced from the US Treasury and published 
in the Federal Reserve’s H15 release. These monthly data, chosen for their long history, 
are calculated as the average of nominal daily yields and they begin in April 1953, 
although 2-year notes only start from June 1976. To further increase the sample size, I 
also take zero coupon US Treasury yields covering the earlier
27
 period 1946-1953 from 
Shiller (1990) and splice these on to the official US Treasury series. The data sample 
extends through to December 2016. The US Treasury, in addition, publishes yield data 
for 30-year bonds starting from February 1977. However, the 30-year bond is typically 
less liquid than some of the earlier maturities, such as the 10-year note, and between 
March 2002 and January 2006 new issuance of 30-year bonds halted altogether
28
. This 
creates potential estimation problems because the 30-year is only available for roughly 
half the entire data period. In addition, the typical yield curve flattens noticeably beyond 
the 15-20 year maturities, which makes calculating a consistent statistic difficult. 
Consequently, I consider maturities that terminate with the 20-year Treasury note.  
 
These officially published daily generic yields are themselves interpolated by the US 
Treasury from a fitted yield curve of actual issued bonds, using a spline-based model 
described in BIS (2005) and summarised in Appendix D. These latest mathematical 
techniques involve the fitting of piecewise polynomial splines to different parts of the 
coupon curve, that, in turn, ensure continuity and smooth joins. The resulting 
bootstrapped forward curves are then used to consistently interpolate zero coupon bond 
yields at specific maturities. Since the yield curve data are calculated for zero coupon 
bond equivalents, maturity (Mt) and duration (Dt) are identical, i.e. D1,t=M1,t=1; 
D2,t=M2,t=2, etc. There are two alternative choices of dataset: (1) Gurkaynak, Sack and 
                                                          
27 The Third Liberty Bond Act, passed at the end of WW1, set a yield ceiling of 4¼% on all new issues of longer than 
seven years maturity, and until the 1951 Accord, the Fed was de facto under US Treasury control and expected to 
maintain a 2½% Treasury yield ceiling. 
28 Traditionally, US Treasury bond maturities between 11-29 years are considered the least liquid. 
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Wright (2006) report the Federal Reserve’s own internal estimates, starting from 1981 
and based on a fitted Nelson-Siegel-Svensson curve that interpolates between the 
standard maturities from one to 20-years. And (2) the Fama-Bliss CRSP, which creates 
zero coupon yields at fixed maturities up to 5-years using unsmoothed forward rates. In 
practice, the differences between these yields and the US Treasury’s own calculations 
are moderate-to-small, averaging 14bp across the curve with an average 14bp standard 
deviation at each maturity, or some 1.8%. 
 
The US Treasury also publishes data on the average
29
 maturity of the outstanding stock 
of Treasury securities. Similar data on the average maturity of Federal Reserve Treasury 
holdings can be calculated from the published breakdown of Treasury holdings in the 
SOMA by broad maturity. I use these estimates to adjust the published Treasury series 
in order to estimate the effective supply of maturity to the private sector. 
 
3.7 Estimation of D-star 
 
I apply the curvature position measure (D-star) in equation (4) from Section 3.5, which 
defines the maturity of the average curvature at each cross-section, to the two US 
Treasury data sets described in Section 3.6. As a cross-check, I also calculate the point 
on the maturity axis where the curvature peaks (D-peak). As expected, this turns out to 
be a jumpy time series because it can only take discrete values (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 
20 years for the generic Treasury data).  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics – Various Estimates D-Star, 1946-2016 (Monthly) 
 Mean Mean (CS) StdDev Min Max Sample 
D-starg 6.27 6.48 0.84 3.35 8.40 1946-2016 
D-stars 5.46 5.46 1.64 2.32 8.75 1989-2016 
D-peakg 6.53 6.80 2.37 1.00 10.00 1946-2016 
D-peaks 4.97 4.96 3.29 0.03 10.93 1989-2016 
The subscripts g and s refer, respectively, to the generic Treasury and security-level data sets. D-star is 
the maturity or Macaulay duration of the average curvature. D-peak is the maturity or Macaulay duration 
of the peak curvature. CS denotes common sample. StdDev is the standard deviation.  Comment: the 
means of the generic Treasury and security-level coupon data appear to be close. 
                                                          
29 I acknowledge that the mean is an inappropriate measure when there are perpetuities. Here, the median (or 
duration) would provide a less ambiguous estimate of the ‘age’ of the outstanding Treasury stock. 
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Appendix B reports the underlying calculations behind D-star for the US Treasury term 
structure as of 30
th
 December 2012, based on all 265 outstanding US Treasury coupon-
paying securities. On this date, D-peak is measured as 10.22 years and D-star as 8.26 
years. Note that the generic and security-level data are not strictly comparable. The 
generic data implicitly assumes an equal number of securities available at each maturity 
and so it is unaffected by differences in the distribution of issuance. Thus, the average 
Macaulay duration of the generic yield data is a constant 6.86 years and 4.87 years (30
th
 
December, 2012) for the individual security data. Like the traditional level, slope and 
curvature parameters, the D-star measures are specific to each data set.  
 
Figure 6: Maturity of Average Curvature (D-star) – Security-level and Generic US 
Treasury Yields, 2000-2016 (Monthly, Years) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; Comment: The chart reports estimates of D-star – the average position of 
the hump in years along the maturity axis – for the security-level and generic Treasury data. The two 
series show correlation of 0.708, although I acknowledge they are not strictly comparable. Macaulay 
duration replaces maturity for the security-level data. 
 
Table 3 reports the means and dispersion for the two D-star and D-peak measures. 
Figure 6 compares the D-star values for the generic yield data and the security-level 
data since year 2000. The common-sample average values of D-star for the generic 
Treasury curve (6.48) and the security-level data (5.46) look similar and, according to 
Table 4, they correlate closely (0.529). The monthly estimates of D-star and D-peak for 
the generic Treasury data (0.751) and security level data (0.858) are also highly 
correlated. I will focus on D-star and favour the generic Treasury data largely because, 
unlike the security-level data, they are unaffected by changes in the distribution of 
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outstanding bonds at each maturity and they provide a much longer time-series 
spanning nearly 70 years. Since my aim is to measure the effect of changes in the 
distribution of maturity on the shape of the curve, the raw security-level data would be 
inappropriate without the sample being stratified. 
 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients –Estimates D-Star and D-Peak, 1989-2016 (Monthly, 
Common Samples) 
 D-starg D-stars D-peakg D-peaks 
D-starg 1.000    
D-stars 0.529 1.000   
D-peakg 0.751 0.403 1.00  
D-peaks 0.610 0.858 0.508 1.00 
The subscripts g and s refer respectively to the generic Treasury and security-level data sets. D-peak is the 
maturity or Macaulay duration of the peak curvature. D-star is the maturity or Macaulay duration of the 
average curvature. Comment: D-peak and the D-star appear to correlate closely for both datasets. 
 
For the generic Treasury data, Table 3 shows that over 1946-2016 D-star averages 6.27 
years, with a 0.84 year (10 month) standard deviation and a range of 3.4 to 8.4 years. 
The data are stationary at the 1% level according to adjusted Dickey-Fuller tests, and 
persistent, with a positive 0.769 autocorrelation coefficient on the preceding month. 
They have a negative skew and exhibit non-normality according to a Jarque-Bera test. 
Figures 7 and 8 show, respectively, that D-star has a high positive correlation with the 
yield curve slope (0.577) and a more modest positive correlation with curvature (0.142). 
From the charts, D-star (6-month centred moving average) appears to frequently move 
independently of each parameter. Yet, a multiple regression of D-star on the slope and 
curvature parameters gives a high R-squared (0.601), with a positive loading on the 
slope parameter and a negative loading on curvature (consistent with the earlier 
‘quadratic’ interpretation) and with both being significant at the 1% level (using Newey-
West adjusted standard errors). D-star rises fastest when the slope increases and 
curvature falls. Thus, upward-sloping, linear yield curves are associated with large D-
star values, and flat, bulging yield curves align with low D-star readings. This can also 
be seen from Table 5, which pigeon-holes the data into each of three groupings, 
depending on whether slope and curvature are within or outside one-half standard 
deviation of their period means. Term structures with steep, linear slopes on average 
have the highest D-star readings (7.48), whereas flatter and bulging yield curves have 
lower readings. This seems plausible because, as noted in Section 3.5 above, a near-
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linear, upward-sloping spot curve implies that forward rates rise to a new, permanently-
higher level. In contrast, a flat, bulging curve is consistent with more cyclicality and a 
high degree of uncertainty about future interest rates. 
 
Table 5: US Treasury Yield Curve Classified by Slope, Curvature and D-star, 1946-
2017 (Monthly) 
  
High 
Slope 
Average 
 
Low 
High 17.9% 
6.54 years 
6.9% 
5.92 years 
0.0% 
N/A 
Curvature   Average 6.3% 
7.29 years 
27.5% 
6.16 years 
10.7% 
5.65 years 
Low 2.0% 
7.48 years 
7.6% 
7.15 years 
21.1% 
6.39 years 
The sample is segmented into two sets of three buckets by slope (10 year less 1 year yield) and curvature 
(1-5-10 year butterfly spread), according to whether the parameter values were above(‘high’), below 
(‘low’) or within (‘average’) one-half standard deviation of the period mean. The upper number in the 
table refers to the percentage of the sample data in that category. The lower number refers to the average 
D-star value. The data show that D-star consistently rises as the slope steepens and as the curvature falls. 
 
As a robustness check, the distribution of estimated Treasury term premia
30
 is 
negatively (positively) skewed (correlation coefficient 0.309) when the value of D-star 
is high (low). D-star also correlates positively with the yield difference between the 1-2-
3 and 7-10-20 year butterfly spreads (0.562). This should approximate a more distant 
yield curve hump because it identifies greater curvature at longer horizons. Moreover, 
this correlation grows tighter over time (0.694, 1990-2016) and, noticeably so since the 
2007/08 Financial Crisis (0.763, 2009-2016). According to equation (2), increases in the 
supply of long-dated Treasuries raise risk premia at longer maturities as these safe 
assets become more abundant, and because investors in general take-on more duration 
risk (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). D-star includes the effects of 
supply. Published supply data on the average maturity of outstanding US Treasury 
bonds (see Figure 4) reveal a long-run positive correlation with D-star (0.381). This is 
consistent with an upward-sloping demand curve for maturity (versus yields) and an 
                                                          
30
 Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) term structure data 
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assumption that issuers tend to be opportunistic and relatively unconstrained in the 
maturities they choose to supply over the long-term.  
 
Figure 7: D-star (6-month CMA) and Yield Curve Slope (10-1 year), 1946-2016 
(Monthly) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and Federal Reserve; Comment: The chart reports the correlation between 
6-month centred moving average (CMA) estimates of D-star – the position of the hump in years along the 
maturity axis – and the 10-year less 1-year Treasury yield curve slope. The correlation coefficient is high 
and positive at 0.577, but there are lengthy periods, such as the mid-1980s and early-1990s when the D-
star data was less volatile. Ahead of recessionary periods, D-star moves more sharply lower. 
 
I also take some additional cross-checks on the consistency of D-star using more 
familiar yield curve factors from the literature. D-star correlates negatively (-0.198) 
with the bond forecasting factor devised by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006), which seems 
plausible.  Although theoretically related to the forward rate identified by Fama (1986), 
neither D-star measure is strongly positively correlated with this peak forward rate 
(0.228 and 0.209, using daily data)
31
. Pace the concerns  of Gilli, Grosse and Schumann 
(2010) about the robustness of empirical estimates of the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield 
curve parameters, D-star positively correlates, as expected, with the tau1 ‘shape’ 
parameter (0.163, 1961-2016, rising to 0.306 for the recent period since 2000) as 
estimated by Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006). Fontaine and Garcia (2011) calculate 
the price of funding liquidity using ‘on/ off-the-run’ Treasury data, while Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) estimate equity market liquidity from regression analysis (see 
                                                          
31 Using the Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) term structure data 
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Brunnermeier, 2008). D-star shows a modest correlation with the Fontaine-Garcia 
factor, with an expected negative sign (-0.154) indicating that tighter liquidity 
conditions reduce investment horizons and should lead to a flatter yield curve. 
However, D-star correlates positively with the Pastor and Stambaugh measure of equity 
market liquidity (0.190) and shows one-way Granger causality (p=0.037, 0.478) 
fourteen months ahead. This is consistent with the interpretation that a more favourable 
future economic outlook, signalled by a longer investment horizon and larger D-star, 
will encourage a switch into equities and other long duration assets, including capital 
equipment. In fact, D-star also positively correlates with the US ISM Purchasing 
Managers’ Index for manufacturing, a popular measure of business activity, 15-months 
ahead (0.230) and shows one-way Granger causality one-year ahead (p=0.044, 0.333). 
Similarly, D-star negatively correlates with the Bank of America/ Merrill Lynch high 
yield credit spread (B-BBB) 15-months ahead (0.563) – as reported earlier in Figure 2 – 
and again shows one-way Granger causality one-year ahead (p=0.020, 0.981). 
 
Figure 8: D-star (6-month CMA) and Curvature (10-5-1 year), 1946-2016 (Monthly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and Federal Reserve; Comment: The chart reports the correlation between 
6-month centred moving average (CMA) estimates of D-star – the position of the hump in years along the 
maturity axis – and the 10-year, 5-year, 1-year butterfly spread on the US Treasury yield curve. The 
correlation coefficient is moderately positive at 0.142. Again there are lengthy periods, such as the late-
1960s, mid-1980s and early-1990s when the D-star data was less volatile. Ahead of recessionary periods, 
D-star moves more sharply lower. 
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Lower investor demand for safe asset duration is also implied by the positive correlation 
between D-star and: (1) the annual growth rate of the US monetary base (0.317) and (2) 
movements in the absolute size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (0.389) through 
the period of the GFC and the subsequent LSAP (2007-15). While Federal Reserve 
Treasury purchases directly reduce duration risk, the greater supply of the zero duration 
asset, i.e. cash, reduces systemic risks and therefore allows investors to cut back on their 
demands for safe assets, such as 10-year Treasury bonds. The supply and demand for 
maturity may consequently be linked. With larger cash holdings, investors can lengthen 
their existing asset duration through net purchases of riskier assets, such as equities, 
corporate debt or ultra-long maturity Treasuries, and still match the duration of their 
liabilities. To the extent that Federal Reserve LSAP reduces the effective supply of 
longer-dated debt and boosts cash holdings, term premia should generally fall, but the 
effect on D-star is not certain because it depends on the pattern and not just the level of 
term premia. The maturity of bonds demanded and supplied matters for D-star and 
Section 3.3 showed that these two effects can counterbalance at different tenors. This 
may be another reason why the data only show a modest positive correlation between 
D-star and the average level of the Treasury term premia over the period 1961-2016 
(0.197, rising to 0.337 since year 2000), based on the calculations of Adrian et al. 
(2014), after normalising for the effects of inflation
32
. The two series only rise and fall 
together 48% of the time and in 26% of cases D-star expands (contracts) while average 
term premia fall (increase).  
 
3.8 A Comparison With Principal Components & Kalman Factors 
 
The principal components decomposition of the term structure also provides a 
benchmark against which to test the efficacy of D-star in explaining the structure of 
yields. I compare regression results using the first three principal components, 
calculated from 1-year through 20-year monthly Treasury yields over the 1954-2016 
period, with an alternative decomposition that takes the 1-year spot rate, the 10-year less 
1-year forward spread (slope); the 1-5-10 year forward butterfly spread (curvature); D-
star (position of the hump) and the maturity of the outstanding stock of US Treasuries 
                                                          
32 This eliminates inflation effects from the nominal term premia to create a stationary series for the ‘real’ term 
premia 
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held by the private sector, as a measure of supply. Because some of these factors 
include 1, 5 and 10-year yields, regression comparisons are not performed for these 
maturities: 
 
𝑦𝑚,𝑡 = 𝐵0
𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚𝑦1,𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑚(𝑦10,𝑡 − 𝑦1,𝑡) + 𝛽3
𝑚 (𝑦5,𝑡 − (𝑦10,𝑡 + 𝑦1,𝑡)) + 𝛽4
𝑚𝐷𝑡
∗
+ 𝛽5
𝑚𝑀𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where ym,t is the spot yield for maturity m at time t; Dt
*
 is D-star; Mt is the average 
maturity of the outstanding stock of Treasuries held by the private sector; εt is a random 
error term, and the βm‘s are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
Table 6: Regression of Selected US Treasury Yields on Various Yield Curve Factors, 
1954-2016 (Monthly) 
 3 x Principal 
Components 
5-Factor Alternative Decomposition 
(level, slope, curvature, hump position & supply) 
Maturity R
2
  
(BIC) 
R
2
 {BIC ex.all} 
(BIC) [BIC +D
*
] 
D-star 
Loading 
Maturity Supply 
Loading 
y2 0.9996 
(-2.504) 
0.9991  {-1.595} 
(-1.729) [-1.675] 
-0.076
***
 
(0.022) 
0.029
***
 
(0.010) 
y3 0.9997 
(-3.028) 
0.9995  {-2.305} 
(-2.341) [-2.320] 
-0.034
**
 
(0.016) 
0.013
*
 
(0.007) 
y7 0.9998 
(-3.680) 
0.9997  {-3.230} 
(-3.244) [-3.224] 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.010
**
 
(0.005) 
y20 0.9997 
(-3.408) 
0.9943  {-0.315} 
(-0.299) [-0.306] 
0.039 
(0.045) 
0.010 
(0.027) 
y30 0.9978 
(-1.074) 
0.9986  {-1.446} 
(-1.492) [-1.491] 
0.068
***
 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
Source: Regression estimates; Comment: Estimated with constant term included, but not shown. Figures 
in brackets beneath loadings are adjusted standard errors. Single, double, triple asterisks refer, 
respectively, to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. D
*
 is a 6-month centred moving average of raw 
data. Figures in curly brackets refer to the BIC without D-star and maturity supply. Figures in square 
brackets refer to the BIC with D-star, but without maturity supply. BIC is the Bayesian Information 
Criteria. y2 denotes the spot yield of the 2-year maturity; y3 that of the 3-year maturity, etc. 
 
The results of a regression of Treasury spot yields on these various factors are 
summarised in Table 6. They generally show that the alternative decomposition 
performs nearly as well as the principal components, and in the case of the ‘out-of-
sample’ 30-year bond it outperforms, based on BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria). R-
squared is shown for reference alongside. The inclusion of D-star also improves the BIC 
statistic (i.e. lowers it) compared to 3-factor level, slope and curvature model in three 
cases and slightly worsens the BIC for the 7-year and 20-year bonds. The inclusion of 
the maturity supply factor marginally improves the BIC, suggesting 4-factors are 
sufficient. Apart from the 7-year and 20-year bond, the D-star factor is significant at the 
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5% level and for the 2 and 30-year bond it is significant at the 1% level. The signs on 
the estimated D-star coefficients seem plausible. They rise progressively from a 
negative loading on the 2-year bond to a positive loading on the 30-year bond and 
approximately sum to zero. This says that as D-star lengthens it raises yields on longer-
dated bonds and reduces yields on shorter-dated bonds: each one year extension in D-
star subtracts around 7-8bp from 2-year yields and adds the same to 30-year yields. 
Therefore, the yield curve steepens as D-star lengthens: a result consistent with the 
interpretation that a longer D-star precedes an improving economic outlook, 
characterised by a different preferred habitat.  
 
Assuming a downward-sloping maturity supply curve (with respect to yields), this 
suggests that expansions in D-star cause the demand curve for longer maturities (e.g. 
10-year Treasuries) to decrease (shift leftwards) and the demand curve for shorter 
maturities to increase (shift rightwards). This reduced demand for safe asset Treasuries 
and corresponding increase in their holdings of long-duration risky assets is consistent 
with an improvement in investors’ risk appetite. The table also shows that loadings on 
the supply variable (Mt) are positive at every tenor, consistent with an upward-sloping 
demand curve (with respect to yields), although they are only significant at lower 
maturities. Other things being equal, a greater supply of maturity should generally raise 
yields because the overall quantity of duration risk has increased.  
 
As a final consistency check, I use a different method to estimate D-star by filtering 
factors from a standard affine yield curve model. The model specification is 
parsimonious, with only four parameters in the market price of risk and 13 parameters 
in total, and the parameter matrix is diagonal, allowing the identification of principal 
components. I compare a 6-month, centred moving average of the D-star data with the 
fourth Kalman factor. This Kalman factor closely correlates (0.503) with D-star, while 
the other three Kalman factors show significant correlations with the traditional level 
(0.940); slope (-0.777) and curvature (0.305) measures. Full results for 1946-2016 are 
reported in Appendix C. Over the more recent period since Volcker’s Great Experiment 
(1979-82) with high real US interest rates, the correlation between D-star and the 
Kalman factor tightens to 0.729 (1982-2016). See Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: D-star (6-month CMA) and a Fourth Kalman Factor Filtered from Affine 
Yield Curve, 1982-2016 (Monthly)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations; Comment: I take a 6-month centred moving average (CMA) of the generic 
D-star estimates and plot this against a fourth Kalman factor (KF1) filtered from the US term structure 
modelled from an affine yield curve model. The three other Kalman factors correlate closely to the 
traditional level, slope and curvature measures. The correlation between D-star and the Kalman factor is 
0.777 (0.503, 1946-2016). 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focuses on the quantities of maturity implicitly held by different investors 
across the Treasury yield curve. It proposes a new decomposition of the interest rate 
term structure that includes an additional fourth factor, D-star, which is related to these 
quantities. D-star complements the traditional level, slope and curvature factors. It 
defines the position of the hump in the yield curve along the maturity axis. When the 
yield curve is symmetric and with a single hump, this is the investment time horizon 
associated with the maximum curvature. The new parameter is time-varying and is 
determined by the pattern rather than the prevailing level of term premia. A yield curve 
hump positioned at longer maturities implies lengthier time horizons of investors and 
may be consistent with more risk-seeking behaviour. Greater curvature at any point 
could derive from a lower term premium at longer maturities associated with a greater 
demand for safety at those tenors. D-star is straightforward to calculate for traditional 
coupon bond and zero-coupon yield curves. I estimate a 6.3 year average and a range of 
between 3.5 years and 8.5 years (US, 1946-2016). 
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D-star is closely connected with recent preferred habitat, limits to arbitrage and 
institutional finance models that emphasise maturity, duration and quantity effects, and 
it makes it easier to identify their impact on the term structure. Although these various 
effects are excluded from traditional term structure models, they have recently become 
prominent because of the LSAP and debt management operations enacted since the 
2007/08 Financial Crisis, notably the attempts by policy-makers to lengthen the average 
maturity of the Federal Reserve’s Treasury holdings. D-star may tell us something about 
investors’ future outlook from imbalances between the supply and demand for maturity. 
This forward-looking information spans key macro-finance variables, such as corporate 
credit spreads and general investors’ risk appetite. An increase in D-star may not mean a 
greater demand for bond duration, but it is consistent with more demand for overall 
asset duration and with a rise in the implied risk appetite of investors. Shifts in 
investors’ risk appetite are better captured by expansions and contractions in D-star than 
by movements in the average level of bond term premia, whose message can be 
distorted by market volatility and by changes in the intensity of arbitrage activity. These 
movements in D-star measure reshufflings in the demand for different bond maturities 
and in the maturity mix or preferred habitat. The D-star data can also offer another 
interpretation of the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession because the 
position of the hump on the US Treasury yield curve contracted sharply inwards from 
7.5 years to 4.4 years several months before. This implies that investors’ narrowed their 
time horizons ahead of the Crisis, consistent with a lower risk appetite, a preferred 
habitat at shorter maturities and greater demand for safe asset duration. Alongside, there 
occurs an associated shift of assets from, say, equities and capital goods (including 
unfinished projects) into long maturity Treasury bonds. The reduction in capital 
spending adversely affects economic activity with a lag and leads to higher default risk 
in the corporate bond market, which is expressed through wider credit spreads. 
Essentially, contractions (expansions) in investment time horizons are transmitted 
through an asset allocation shift between risky and safe assets, resulting in an excess 
demand for (supply of) safety and a fall (rise) in D-star. 
 
D-star may, therefore, be a candidate for inclusion in the array of predictive variables 
monitored to ensure system-wide financial stability. But what exactly determines D-
star; its transmission process following shocks; the subsequent interaction with other 
macro-finance variables and comparisons of D-star across the major international bond 
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markets are areas I leave for further research. However, I conjecture that if this 
curvature position measure can identify a preferred habitat, then it should, in turn, be 
related to the same factors that determine this point, such as the underlying duration of 
investors’ liabilities and their risk appetite. This could open up additional research 
possibilities by allowing a comparison between measures of asset and liability duration, 
identifying possible mismatches and modelling the subsequent adjustment process. 
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Appendix 3A: An Interpretation of the Position of the Yield Curve 
Hump 
 
The economic meaning of the position of the yield curve hump can be understood from 
a second decomposition of the yield curve, based on Ilmanen (1995), which explains the 
sources of fixed-income returns by adding the effects of curve reshaping and convexity 
on returns: (1) risk premia (hn – y1), or what I earlier describe as the preferred habitat 
effect; (2) the duration impact of expected interest rates [ibidem duration effect] and (3) 
convexity bias, so-called, or the option value of implied volatility [ibidem uncertainty 
effect]. Chapter 2 Appendix derives this decomposition for the steepness of the one year 
forward curve (fn-1,n – y1) as an example. Time period subscripts have been dropped for 
convenience: 
 
 
𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 − 𝑦1 ≈ 
 
𝐸(ℎ𝑛 − 𝑦1) − (1 + 𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛) ∙ [−𝐷𝑛−1 ∙ 𝐸(∆𝑦𝑛−1) + 0.5𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑉(𝑦𝑛−1))
2]   
  
 bond risk premium                       duration impact             convexity bias 
      of the interest rate view       
where: 
𝑓𝑛−1,𝑛 ≈ 𝑛 ∙ 𝑦𝑛 − (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑦𝑛−1 
and: 
 𝐶𝑣𝑥𝑛 = 𝐷𝑛
2  −
𝑑𝐷𝑛
𝑑𝑦𝑛
 
 
and let y1 denote one period spot rates; yt is the spot rate in period t; hn is the one period 
holding period return of an n-year bond; fn-1,n the one period forward rate between n-1 
and n; Dn represents modified duration for an n-period bond; Cvxn is convexity and V 
denotes volatility (or standard deviation), where E(Δyn)
2
 ≈ V(Δyn)
2
. 
 
These three components contribute in different ways to each of the traditional level, 
slope and curvature term structure factors. For example, a large curvature around the 
mid-duration years can arise because of the pattern of risk premia. Sizeable risk premia, 
in turn, may be justified by a preferred habitat argument when there is an excess supply 
of maturity in this area of the curve. (From equation (3), above.) Equally, the yield 
curve hump may be explained by the duration impact of expected interest rate changes, 
since a fall in yields will deliver greater capital gains for longer duration bonds and, in 
order to equalise holding period returns, investors in shorter duration bonds will need to 
be compensated by a yield premium pick-up
33
. Consider four bonds with durations of 2, 
                                                          
33 The capital gain on a bond of maturity m-years is approximately equal to %Δpm = -Dm.Δym, where Dm is modified 
duration, pm is the price of the bond and ym its yield. The impact of yield shocks increases with duration. 
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5, 7 and 10 years. Assume that 2 and 5 year interest rates remain unchanged and that 
rates at 7 and 10 years fall by 50bp, generating   capital gains of 3.5% and 5%, 
respectively. For holding period returns to be equalised, the 2-year and 5-year bonds 
will each require an additional yield premium of 5%, and the 7-year bond an additional 
premium of 1.5%. This makes the yield curve more humped up to the 5-year duration. 
A third reason is convexity bias, which adjusts for expected volatility. The standard 
yield curve’s mid-duration hump can be explained by the option value of implied 
volatility, which is significantly greater for longer-dated bonds since it acts through the 
square of duration (Cnxn). For example, the implied value of a given volatility is four 
times greater at 10-years duration than at 5-years, which suggests that the 10-year bond 
should sell at a higher price (lower yield). Therefore, a larger-than-normal sized hump 
may result because investors expect relatively more volatility from longer dated bond 
yields. This, in turn, could describe a more uncertain future interest rate outlook. 
 
In summary, a hump at any point on the maturity axis suggests a more uncertain and 
increasingly less favourable forward-looking economic outlook for all future maturities 
beyond that time horizon. In other words, D-star describes a boundary where there is an 
excess demand for duration at longer horizons, involving some combination of (1) 
greater rate uncertainty; (2) the likelihood of falling future yields and/ or (3) a desire for 
longer-dated safe Treasury bonds (Caballero, 2006), as preferred habitat investors 
become less risk-seeking. Consequently, this curvature peak is likely to incorporate 
larger term premia and expectations of subsequent falls in forward rates. Beyond this 
horizon, the greater demands for safety result in lower term premia. It may also follow 
that, when Treasury supply comprises relatively longer maturities, financial systems are 
less vulnerable to risk than if positions have to be more frequently refinanced and so 
potentially clashing with private sector funding needs. The reverse arguments should 
explain a more linear yield curve, which by implication points towards a more certain 
and favourable future economic outlook characterised by rising short-term interest rates 
and low volatility. Therefore, if the position of the hump delineates these regimes, a 
hump which occurs at a near-term maturity describes a less attractive approaching 
business outlook than a hump that occurs at a longer maturity. It follows that the 
investment time horizon should lengthen (contract) pari passu with increases 
(decreases) in the position of the curvature peak. More distant values of this peak may 
be associated with a larger risk appetite among investors. 
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Appendix 3B: US Treasury Term Structure 30/12/2012 
D-star and D-peak are calculated for all 265 outstanding US Treasury issues on 
30/12/2012 using equation (4) as described in section 3.4. These securities are a mixture 
of on-the-run and off-the-run coupon bonds with an average duration of 4.87 years and 
an average yield of 82bp. Figure B1 plots the data and the following table reports the 
corresponding redemption yields and Macaulay durations, and the contributions of each 
to D-star. The Treasury term structure in the chart is upward sloping with a mid-
duration hump. The curvature peak occurs at a duration of 10.55 years and D-star is 
positioned at 8.26 years. 
Figure B1: US Treasury Term Structure, 30
th
 December, 2012 
 
From section 3.4, the distance measure (dm0) for each time-horizon (m0) is defined as: 
𝑑𝑚0 =
|𝑦𝑚0 − 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚0|
√(𝑏2 + 1)
 
where y=a +b.m is a line joining the extremes of the yield curve, and, D-star (Dt
*
), the 
distance-weighted average of these time horizons is calculated from: 
𝐷𝑡
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Treasury Issues Outstanding 30/12/2012 Duration 
(m, 
years) 
Yield 
(%) 
dm m*dm 
US TREASURY 1985 10 5/8% 15/08/15 2015 - RED. YIELD 2.311 0.349 0.036 0.083 
US TREASURY 1985 11 1/4% 15/02/15 2015 - RED. YIELD 1.900 0.299 0.028 0.053 
US TREASURY 1985 9 7/8% 15/11/15 2015 - RED. YIELD 2.579 0.373 0.050 0.130 
US TREASURY 1986 7 1/2% 15/11/16 2016 - RED. YIELD 3.463 0.513 0.037 0.128 
US TREASURY 1986 7 1/4% 15/05/16 2016 - RED. YIELD 3.054 0.442 0.049 0.151 
US TREASURY 1986 9 1/4% 15/02/16 2016 - RED. YIELD 2.749 0.389 0.058 0.160 
US TREASURY 1987 8 3/4% 15/05/17 2017 - RED. YIELD 3.795 0.577 0.020 0.076 
US TREASURY 1987 8 7/8% 15/08/17 2017 - RED. YIELD 3.917 0.633 0.017 0.068 
US TREASURY 1988 9 1/8% 15/05/18 2018 - RED. YIELD 4.515 0.770 0.069 0.312 
US TREASURY 1988 9% 15/11/18 2018 - RED. YIELD 4.883 0.855 0.101 0.494 
US TREASURY 1989 8 1/8% 15/08/19 2019 - RED. YIELD 5.401 1.008 0.180 0.970 
US TREASURY 1989 8 7/8% 15/02/19 2019 - RED. YIELD 4.995 0.910 0.140 0.698 
US TREASURY 1990 8 1/2% 15/02/20 2020 - RED. YIELD 5.708 1.112 0.239 1.362 
US TREASURY 1990 8 3/4% 15/05/20 2020 - RED. YIELD 5.924 1.154 0.250 1.481 
US TREASURY 1990 8 3/4% 15/08/20 2020 - RED. YIELD 6.006 1.214 0.297 1.785 
US TREASURY 1991 7 7/8% 15/02/21 2021 - RED. YIELD 6.436 1.313 0.335 2.155 
US TREASURY 1991 8 1/8% 15/05/21 2021 - RED. YIELD 6.646 1.362 0.354 2.351 
US TREASURY 1991 8 1/8% 15/08/21 2021 - RED. YIELD 6.720 1.406 0.387 2.599 
US TREASURY 1991 8% 15/11/21 2021 - RED. YIELD 6.985 1.456 0.399 2.786 
US TREASURY 1992 7 1/4% 15/08/22 2022 - RED. YIELD 7.477 1.583 0.455 3.399 
US TREASURY 1992 7 5/8% 15/11/22 2022 - RED. YIELD 7.665 1.613 0.457 3.506 
US TREASURY 1993 6 1/4% 15/08/23 2023 - RED. YIELD 8.284 1.768 0.523 4.335 
US TREASURY 1993 7 1/8% 15/02/23 2023 - RED. YIELD 7.812 1.669 0.492 3.843 
US TREASURY 1994 7 1/2% 15/11/24 2024 - RED. YIELD 8.873 1.914 0.585 5.186 
US TREASURY 1995 6 7/8% 15/08/25 2025 - RED. YIELD 9.327 2.023 0.628 5.860 
US TREASURY 1995 7 5/8% 15/02/25 2025 - RED. YIELD 8.887 1.947 0.616 5.470 
US TREASURY 1996 6 1/2% 15/11/26 S - RED. YIELD 10.223 2.168 0.645 6.594 
US TREASURY 1996 6 3/4% 15/08/26 2026 - RED. YIELD 9.911 2.136 0.657 6.515 
US TREASURY 1996 6% 15/02/26 2026 - RED. YIELD 9.838 2.099 0.631 6.210 
US TREASURY 1997 6 1/8% 15/11/27 20-2027 - RED. YIELD 10.873 2.279 0.663 7.211 
US TREASURY 1997 6 3/8% 15/08/27 S - RED. YIELD 10.553 2.245 0.675 7.118 
US TREASURY 1997 6 5/8% 15/02/27 S - RED. YIELD 10.219 2.190 0.667 6.819 
US TREASURY 1998 5 1/2% 15/08/28 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 11.375 2.347 0.660 7.505 
US TREASURY 1998 5 1/4% 15/11/28 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 11.717 2.370 0.634 7.430 
US TREASURY 1999 5 1/4% 15/02/29 2029 - RED. YIELD 11.745 2.381 0.641 7.526 
US TREASURY 1999 6 1/8% 15/08/29 AUGUST - RED. YIELD 11.680 2.377 0.646 7.548 
US TREASURY 2000 6 1/4% 15/05/30 MAY 203 - RED. YIELD 12.135 2.407 0.611 7.415 
US TREASURY 2001 5 3/8% 15/02/31 FEBRUAR - RED. YIELD 12.739 2.460 0.578 7.369 
US TREASURY 2003 3 5/8% 15/05/13 B-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.367 0.166 0.057 0.021 
US TREASURY 2003 3 7/8% 15/02/13 A-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.123 0.190 0.116 0.014 
US TREASURY 2003 4 1/4% 15/08/13 D-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.608 0.181 0.038 0.023 
US TREASURY 2003 4 1/4% 15/11/13 E-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.860 0.210 0.031 0.027 
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US TREASURY 2004 4 1/4% 15/08/14 E-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.558 0.240 0.038 0.059 
US TREASURY 2004 4 1/4% 15/11/14 F-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.810 0.269 0.044 0.080 
US TREASURY 2004 4 3/4% 15/05/14 C-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.332 0.230 0.015 0.020 
US TREASURY 2004 4% 15/02/14 B-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.094 0.224 0.012 0.013 
US TREASURY 2005 4 1/2% 15/11/15 F-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.717 0.350 0.093 0.252 
US TREASURY 2005 4 1/4% 15/08/15 E-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.473 0.347 0.061 0.151 
US TREASURY 2005 4 1/8% 15/05/15 C-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.270 0.323 0.056 0.127 
US TREASURY 2005 4% 15/02/15 B-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.029 0.287 0.058 0.117 
US TREASURY 2006 4 1/2% 15/02/16 B-2016 - RED. YIELD 2.912 0.403 0.068 0.199 
US TREASURY 2006 4 1/2% 15/02/36 FEBRUAR - RED. YIELD 15.579 2.677 0.392 6.106 
US TREASURY 2006 4 5/8% 15/11/16 F-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.595 0.524 0.045 0.160 
US TREASURY 2006 4 7/8% 15/08/16 E-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.323 0.486 0.043 0.144 
US TREASURY 2006 5 1/8% 15/05/16 C-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.130 0.447 0.055 0.171 
US TREASURY 2007 4 1/2% 15/05/17 C-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.025 0.606 0.024 0.098 
US TREASURY 2007 4 1/4% 15/11/17 F-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.469 0.688 0.006 0.027 
US TREASURY 2007 4 3/4% 15/02/37 FEBRUAR - RED. YIELD 15.848 2.706 0.382 6.058 
US TREASURY 2007 4 3/4% 15/08/17 E-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.180 0.640 0.012 0.051 
US TREASURY 2007 4 5/8% 15/02/17 B-2017 - RED. YIELD 3.774 0.560 0.034 0.128 
US TREASURY 2007 5% 15/05/37 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 15.929 2.710 0.375 5.975 
US TREASURY 2008 1 1/2% 31/12/13 T-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.993 0.204 0.007 0.007 
US TREASURY 2008 2 1/2% 31/03/13 H-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.244 0.140 0.050 0.012 
US TREASURY 2008 2 3/4% 28/02/13 G-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.159 0.190 0.111 0.018 
US TREASURY 2008 2 3/4% 31/10/13 R-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.823 0.203 0.030 0.024 
US TREASURY 2008 2 7/8% 31/01/13 F-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.082 0.173 0.105 0.009 
US TREASURY 2008 2% 30/11/13 S-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.907 0.210 0.025 0.023 
US TREASURY 2008 3 1/2% 15/02/18 B-2018 - RED. YIELD 4.710 0.747 0.018 0.084 
US TREASURY 2008 3 1/2% 31/05/13 L-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.411 0.144 0.030 0.012 
US TREASURY 2008 3 1/8% 30/04/13 K-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.326 0.143 0.041 0.013 
US TREASURY 2008 3 1/8% 30/09/13 Q-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.737 0.180 0.019 0.014 
US TREASURY 2008 3 1/8% 31/08/13 P-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.655 0.209 0.059 0.039 
US TREASURY 2008 3 3/4% 15/11/18 F-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.351 0.882 0.061 0.329 
US TREASURY 2008 3 3/8% 30/06/13 M-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.493 0.156 0.030 0.015 
US TREASURY 2008 3 3/8% 31/07/13 N-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.570 0.157 0.021 0.012 
US TREASURY 2008 3 7/8% 15/05/18 C-2018 - RED. YIELD 4.917 0.802 0.044 0.216 
US TREASURY 2008 4 1/2% 15/05/38 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 16.672 2.755 0.314 5.238 
US TREASURY 2008 4 3/8% 15/02/38 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 16.524 2.751 0.332 5.479 
US TREASURY 2008 4% 15/08/18 E-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.072 0.823 0.043 0.216 
US TREASURY 2009 1 3/4% 31/01/14 G-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.068 0.212 0.004 0.005 
US TREASURY 2009 1 3/4% 31/03/14 J-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.230 0.222 0.009 0.011 
US TREASURY 2009 1 7/8% 28/02/14 H-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.144 0.217 0.002 0.002 
US TREASURY 2009 1 7/8% 30/04/14 L-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.311 0.224 0.019 0.025 
US TREASURY 2009 2 1/4% 31/05/14 M-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.393 0.238 0.016 0.023 
US TREASURY 2009 2 1/8% 30/11/14 T-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.879 0.262 0.061 0.114 
US TREASURY 2009 2 3/4% 15/02/19 B-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.652 0.955 0.091 0.513 
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US TREASURY 2009 2 3/4% 30/11/16 R-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.737 0.521 0.068 0.253 
US TREASURY 2009 2 3/8% 30/09/14 R-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.709 0.237 0.062 0.106 
US TREASURY 2009 2 3/8% 31/03/16 H-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.121 0.422 0.079 0.245 
US TREASURY 2009 2 3/8% 31/08/14 Q-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.627 0.250 0.037 0.060 
US TREASURY 2009 2 3/8% 31/10/14 S-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.794 0.264 0.047 0.085 
US TREASURY 2009 2 5/8% 29/02/16 G-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.028 0.396 0.091 0.276 
US TREASURY 2009 2 5/8% 30/04/16 J-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.192 0.432 0.078 0.250 
US TREASURY 2009 2 5/8% 30/06/14 N-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.473 0.229 0.036 0.053 
US TREASURY 2009 2 5/8% 31/07/14 P-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.539 0.242 0.033 0.051 
US TREASURY 2009 2 5/8% 31/12/14 U-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.957 0.254 0.080 0.156 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/2% 15/02/39 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.690 2.811 0.225 3.986 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/4% 30/06/16 L-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.331 0.457 0.073 0.244 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/4% 31/05/16 K-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.249 0.447 0.072 0.235 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/4% 31/07/16 M-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.367 0.468 0.068 0.228 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/4% 31/12/16 S-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.793 0.536 0.061 0.232 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/8% 15/05/19 C-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.842 0.992 0.100 0.587 
US TREASURY 2009 3 1/8% 31/10/16 Q-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.633 0.516 0.058 0.211 
US TREASURY 2009 3 3/8% 15/11/19 F-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.223 1.123 0.176 1.097 
US TREASURY 2009 3 5/8% 15/08/19 E-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.934 1.061 0.156 0.925 
US TREASURY 2009 3% 30/09/16 P-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.547 0.495 0.066 0.235 
US TREASURY 2009 3% 31/08/16 N-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.464 0.495 0.055 0.190 
US TREASURY 2009 4 1/2% 15/08/39 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.045 2.784 0.290 4.947 
US TREASURY 2009 4 1/4% 15/05/39 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.274 2.786 0.260 4.494 
US TREASURY 2009 4 3/8% 15/11/39 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.384 2.796 0.254 4.414 
US TREASURY 2010 1 1/4% 30/09/15 R-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.695 0.338 0.102 0.274 
US TREASURY 2010 1 1/4% 31/08/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.613 0.334 0.094 0.245 
US TREASURY 2010 1 1/4% 31/10/15 S-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.780 0.344 0.108 0.300 
US TREASURY 2010 1 1/8% 15/06/13 S - RED. YIELD 0.452 0.125 0.005 0.002 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/4% 15/04/13 X-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.285 0.139 0.043 0.012 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/4% 31/07/15 P-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.511 0.329 0.084 0.211 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/8% 15/01/13 S - RED. YIELD 0.038 0.061 0.000 0.000 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/8% 15/02/13 V-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.123 0.146 0.073 0.009 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/8% 15/03/13 S - RED. YIELD 0.200 0.136 0.051 0.010 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/8% 15/05/13 Y-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.367 0.133 0.025 0.009 
US TREASURY 2010 1 3/8% 30/11/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.857 0.362 0.100 0.286 
US TREASURY 2010 1 7/8% 30/06/15 N-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.444 0.318 0.085 0.209 
US TREASURY 2010 1 7/8% 30/09/17 Q-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.549 0.682 0.023 0.106 
US TREASURY 2010 1 7/8% 31/08/17 S - RED. YIELD 4.466 0.661 0.032 0.144 
US TREASURY 2010 1 7/8% 31/10/17 R-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.633 0.696 0.021 0.099 
US TREASURY 2010 1% 15/07/13 AA-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.531 0.145 0.014 0.007 
US TREASURY 2010 1/2% 15/10/13 AD-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.784 0.168 0.001 0.001 
US TREASURY 2010 1/2% 15/11/13 AE-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.869 0.189 0.009 0.008 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/2% 30/04/15 L-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.264 0.309 0.069 0.156 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/2% 30/06/17 M-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.288 0.628 0.039 0.169 
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US TREASURY 2010 2 1/2% 31/03/15 J-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.182 0.279 0.087 0.191 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/4% 30/11/17 S - RED. YIELD 4.680 0.694 0.030 0.139 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/4% 31/01/15 G-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.026 0.278 0.066 0.135 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/8% 31/05/15 M-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.356 0.319 0.072 0.170 
US TREASURY 2010 2 1/8% 31/12/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.916 0.369 0.102 0.298 
US TREASURY 2010 2 3/4% 31/05/17 L-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.187 0.612 0.041 0.173 
US TREASURY 2010 2 3/4% 31/12/17 S - RED. YIELD 4.719 0.706 0.024 0.112 
US TREASURY 2010 2 3/8% 28/02/15 H-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.100 0.284 0.071 0.148 
US TREASURY 2010 2 3/8% 31/07/17 S - RED. YIELD 4.335 0.649 0.025 0.110 
US TREASURY 2010 2 5/8% 15/08/20 E-2020 - RED. YIELD 6.930 1.288 0.240 1.664 
US TREASURY 2010 2 5/8% 15/11/20 F-2020 - RED. YIELD 7.180 1.328 0.244 1.753 
US TREASURY 2010 3 1/2% 15/05/20 C-2020 - RED. YIELD 6.602 1.220 0.219 1.444 
US TREASURY 2010 3 1/4% 31/03/17 J-2017 - RED. YIELD 3.985 0.578 0.046 0.183 
US TREASURY 2010 3 1/8% 30/04/17 K-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.076 0.601 0.036 0.148 
US TREASURY 2010 3 1/8% 31/01/17 G-2017 - RED. YIELD 3.832 0.550 0.053 0.203 
US TREASURY 2010 3 5/8% 15/02/20 B-2020 - RED. YIELD 6.339 1.175 0.212 1.342 
US TREASURY 2010 3 7/8% 15/08/40 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.949 2.835 0.213 3.822 
US TREASURY 2010 3% 28/02/17 G-2017 - RED. YIELD 3.918 0.578 0.036 0.143 
US TREASURY 2010 3/4% 15/08/13 AB-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.617 0.139 0.004 0.002 
US TREASURY 2010 3/4% 15/09/13 AC-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.702 0.164 0.009 0.006 
US TREASURY 2010 3/4% 15/12/13 S - RED. YIELD 0.951 0.204 0.012 0.012 
US TREASURY 2010 4 1/4% 15/11/40 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.880 2.821 0.208 3.724 
US TREASURY 2010 4 3/8% 15/05/40 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.578 2.808 0.238 4.190 
US TREASURY 2010 4 5/8% 15/02/40 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.157 2.791 0.281 4.817 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/2% 30/06/16 Z-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.410 0.450 0.091 0.311 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/2% 31/07/16 AA-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.470 0.463 0.087 0.302 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/2% 31/08/18 P-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.428 0.876 0.045 0.242 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/4% 15/02/14 S - RED. YIELD 1.113 0.214 0.000 0.000 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/4% 15/03/14 X-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.189 0.225 0.001 0.001 
US TREASURY 2011 1 1/4% 15/04/14 Y-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.274 0.229 0.008 0.010 
US TREASURY 2011 1 3/4% 31/05/16 Y-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.316 0.448 0.081 0.268 
US TREASURY 2011 1 3/4% 31/10/18 R-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.560 0.903 0.052 0.291 
US TREASURY 2011 1 3/8% 30/09/18 Q-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.529 0.890 0.044 0.243 
US TREASURY 2011 1 3/8% 30/11/18 S-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.696 0.932 0.062 0.356 
US TREASURY 2011 1% 15/01/14 S - RED. YIELD 1.030 0.186 0.017 0.017 
US TREASURY 2011 1% 15/05/14 S - RED. YIELD 1.358 0.218 0.031 0.042 
US TREASURY 2011 1% 30/09/16 AC-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.668 0.493 0.086 0.316 
US TREASURY 2011 1% 31/08/16 AB-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.586 0.479 0.088 0.315 
US TREASURY 2011 1% 31/10/16 AD-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.762 0.506 0.086 0.323 
US TREASURY 2011 1/2% 15/08/14 AC-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.610 0.235 0.050 0.081 
US TREASURY 2011 1/2% 15/10/14 AE-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.777 0.247 0.061 0.109 
US TREASURY 2011 1/4% 15/09/14 AD-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.699 0.220 0.077 0.131 
US TREASURY 2011 1/4% 15/12/14 AG-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.947 0.250 0.083 0.161 
US TREASURY 2011 1/4% 30/11/13 AS-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.911 0.195 0.009 0.009 
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US TREASURY 2011 1/4% 31/10/13 AR-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.829 0.177 0.004 0.003 
US TREASURY 2011 1/8% 30/09/13 AQ-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.744 0.165 0.003 0.002 
US TREASURY 2011 1/8% 31/08/13 AP-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.662 0.170 0.020 0.013 
US TREASURY 2011 2 1/4% 31/03/16 V-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.127 0.400 0.101 0.316 
US TREASURY 2011 2 1/4% 31/07/18 N-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.241 0.853 0.048 0.254 
US TREASURY 2011 2 1/8% 15/08/21 E-2021 - RED. YIELD 7.882 1.500 0.315 2.485 
US TREASURY 2011 2 1/8% 29/02/16 U-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.051 0.390 0.101 0.307 
US TREASURY 2011 2 3/4% 28/02/18 H-2018 - RED. YIELD 4.823 0.749 0.005 0.022 
US TREASURY 2011 2 3/8% 30/06/18 M-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.197 0.830 0.032 0.164 
US TREASURY 2011 2 3/8% 31/05/18 L-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.114 0.811 0.025 0.126 
US TREASURY 2011 2 5/8% 30/04/18 K-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.003 0.797 0.026 0.133 
US TREASURY 2011 2 5/8% 31/01/18 S - RED. YIELD 4.759 0.739 0.003 0.015 
US TREASURY 2011 2 7/8% 31/03/18 J-2018 - RED. YIELD 4.894 0.767 0.012 0.059 
US TREASURY 2011 2% 15/11/21 F-2021 - RED. YIELD 8.169 1.554 0.328 2.679 
US TREASURY 2011 2% 30/04/16 X-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.220 0.434 0.081 0.259 
US TREASURY 2011 2% 31/01/16 S - RED. YIELD 2.978 0.382 0.097 0.290 
US TREASURY 2011 3 1/8% 15/05/21 C-2021 - RED. YIELD 7.470 1.436 0.310 2.316 
US TREASURY 2011 3 1/8% 15/11/41 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 19.375 2.904 0.079 1.540 
US TREASURY 2011 3 3/4% 15/08/41 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 18.454 2.867 0.173 3.197 
US TREASURY 2011 3 5/8% 15/02/21 S - RED. YIELD 7.121 1.374 0.298 2.124 
US TREASURY 2011 3/4% 15/06/14 AA-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.445 0.219 0.042 0.061 
US TREASURY 2011 3/4% 31/03/13 AJ-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.244 0.141 0.050 0.012 
US TREASURY 2011 3/8% 15/11/14 AF-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.863 0.251 0.069 0.129 
US TREASURY 2011 3/8% 30/06/13 AM-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.493 0.125 0.001 0.001 
US TREASURY 2011 3/8% 31/07/13 AN-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.577 0.135 0.003 0.002 
US TREASURY 2011 4 3/4% 15/02/41 S - RED. YIELD 17.448 2.813 0.262 4.568 
US TREASURY 2011 4 3/8% 15/05/41 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 17.964 2.834 0.209 3.760 
US TREASURY 2011 5/8% 15/07/14 AB-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.523 0.228 0.045 0.068 
US TREASURY 2011 5/8% 28/02/13 AH-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.159 0.127 0.048 0.008 
US TREASURY 2011 5/8% 30/04/13 AK-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.326 0.109 0.007 0.002 
US TREASURY 2011 5/8% 31/01/13 AG-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.082 0.133 0.066 0.005 
US TREASURY 2011 7/8% 30/11/16 AE-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.852 0.516 0.089 0.344 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/2% 31/03/19 J-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.967 0.995 0.087 0.516 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/4% 30/04/19 K-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.091 1.020 0.093 0.567 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/4% 31/01/19 G-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.848 0.950 0.058 0.339 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/4% 31/10/19 R-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.554 1.139 0.145 0.953 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/8% 31/05/19 L-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.198 1.041 0.099 0.616 
US TREASURY 2012 1 1/8% 31/12/19 T-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.746 1.186 0.165 1.116 
US TREASURY 2012 1 3/4% 15/05/22 C-2022 - RED. YIELD 8.664 1.660 0.363 3.146 
US TREASURY 2012 1 3/8% 28/02/19 H-2019 - RED. YIELD 5.903 0.973 0.073 0.432 
US TREASURY 2012 1 3/8% 31/12/18 T-2018 - RED. YIELD 5.780 0.937 0.055 0.317 
US TREASURY 2012 1 5/8% 15/08/22 E-2022 - RED. YIELD 8.890 1.712 0.382 3.399 
US TREASURY 2012 1 5/8% 15/11/22 F-2022 - RED. YIELD 9.132 1.760 0.395 3.610 
US TREASURY 2012 1% 30/06/19 M-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.302 1.068 0.111 0.698 
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US TREASURY 2012 1% 30/09/19 Q-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.521 1.119 0.130 0.851 
US TREASURY 2012 1% 30/11/19 S-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.688 1.163 0.151 1.008 
US TREASURY 2012 1% 31/03/17 W-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.156 0.578 0.071 0.295 
US TREASURY 2012 1% 31/08/19 P-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.444 1.106 0.128 0.827 
US TREASURY 2012 1/2% 31/07/17 AB-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.526 0.646 0.055 0.250 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/01/15 V-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.029 0.265 0.080 0.162 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/02/15 W-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.114 0.269 0.088 0.186 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/05/15 Z-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.357 0.297 0.094 0.222 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/07/15 AB-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.525 0.317 0.098 0.247 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/08/15 AC-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.610 0.323 0.105 0.273 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/09/15 AD-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.686 0.332 0.106 0.285 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/10/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.771 0.333 0.117 0.324 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 15/12/15 AG-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.938 0.356 0.118 0.347 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 28/02/14 AJ-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.156 0.207 0.013 0.016 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 30/04/14 AL-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.323 0.220 0.024 0.032 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 30/06/14 AN-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.490 0.230 0.037 0.056 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 30/09/14 AR-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.738 0.239 0.064 0.112 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 30/11/14 AT-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.905 0.250 0.077 0.146 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 31/01/14 AH-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.079 0.192 0.017 0.019 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 31/03/14 AK-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.241 0.218 0.014 0.018 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 31/05/14 AM-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.408 0.222 0.034 0.048 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 31/08/14 AQ-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.661 0.238 0.054 0.090 
US TREASURY 2012 1/4% 31/10/14 AS-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.823 0.239 0.076 0.139 
US TREASURY 2012 1/8% 31/07/14 AP-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.579 0.233 0.048 0.076 
US TREASURY 2012 1/8% 31/12/13 AT-2013 - RED. YIELD 0.996 0.195 0.003 0.002 
US TREASURY 2012 1/8% 31/12/14 AU-2014 - RED. YIELD 1.991 0.261 0.078 0.156 
US TREASURY 2012 2 3/4% 15/08/42 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 20.036 2.939 0.021 0.412 
US TREASURY 2012 2 3/4% 15/11/42 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 20.266 2.951 0.000 0.000 
US TREASURY 2012 2% 15/02/22 B-2022 - RED. YIELD 8.339 1.608 0.358 2.982 
US TREASURY 2012 3 1/8% 15/02/42 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 19.335 2.910 0.091 1.758 
US TREASURY 2012 3% 15/05/42 BONDS O - RED. YIELD 19.726 2.925 0.050 0.992 
US TREASURY 2012 3/4% 30/06/17 AA-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.427 0.624 0.063 0.279 
US TREASURY 2012 3/4% 31/10/17 AE-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.746 0.689 0.044 0.209 
US TREASURY 2012 3/4% 31/12/17 AG-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.913 0.730 0.027 0.134 
US TREASURY 2012 3/8% 15/03/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.188 0.284 0.083 0.182 
US TREASURY 2012 3/8% 15/04/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.272 0.296 0.083 0.189 
US TREASURY 2012 3/8% 15/06/15 S - RED. YIELD 2.439 0.310 0.093 0.228 
US TREASURY 2012 3/8% 15/11/15 AF-2015 - RED. YIELD 2.848 0.344 0.117 0.334 
US TREASURY 2012 5/8% 30/09/17 AD-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.674 0.605 0.117 0.548 
US TREASURY 2012 5/8% 30/11/17 AF-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.841 0.704 0.043 0.207 
US TREASURY 2012 5/8% 31/05/17 Z-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.355 0.602 0.075 0.325 
US TREASURY 2012 5/8% 31/08/17 AC-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.598 0.651 0.061 0.280 
US TREASURY 2012 7/8% 28/02/17 V-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.082 0.563 0.075 0.305 
US TREASURY 2012 7/8% 30/04/17 Y-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.249 0.592 0.070 0.298 
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US TREASURY 2012 7/8% 31/01/17 U-2017 - RED. YIELD 4.005 0.550 0.077 0.309 
US TREASURY 2012 7/8% 31/07/19 N-2019 - RED. YIELD 6.386 1.085 0.116 0.739 
US TREASURY 2012 7/8% 31/12/16 AF-2016 - RED. YIELD 3.937 0.531 0.086 0.340 
      
AVERAGE 4.870 0.822 0.128 1.055 
D-peak, maximum dm 10.553  0.675  
D-star    8.260 
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Appendix 3C: The Affine Term Structure Model 
 
Estimation of an affine term structure model follows Cieslak and Povala (2014). The 
parameters of the following state-space representation are estimated using maximum 
likelihood based on the Kalman filter. The state equation is a first-order Gaussian VAR: 
 
 
𝑧𝑡+1 = Φ𝑧𝑡 + Ω
1/2𝜀𝑡,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝜀𝑡+1~𝑁𝐼𝐷(0, 𝐼𝑘) 
 
where the state variables are four unobservable term structure factors labelled zt, Φ is a 4 
× 4 autoregressive matrix and Ω is a 4 × 4 matrix. 
 
The stochastic discount factor is log-normally distributed of the form: 
 
𝑀𝑡+1 = exp (−𝑟𝑡 −
Λ𝑡
′ Λ𝑡
2
− Λ𝑡
′ 𝜀𝑡+1) 
 
where the risk-free interest rate (rt) and the ‘price of risk’ (Λt) are affine in the state 
variables: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟 + 𝛾
′𝑧𝑡 
Λ𝑡 = 𝜆 + 𝛽𝑧𝑡 
 
The measurement equation in the n-period zero coupon yield is: 
 
𝑠𝑡
𝑛 = −
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑛
𝑛
= −
𝐴𝑛
𝑛
−
𝐵𝑛
′
𝑛
𝑧𝑡 + 𝜐𝑡
𝑛 ,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜐𝑡
𝑛~𝑁𝐼𝐷(0, Η) 
 
Where bond prices are also affine functions of the state factors: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝑛 = 𝐴𝑛 + 𝐵𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑡 
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And where the parameters An and Bn can be obtained from solutions to the recursive 
difference equations shown below:  
 
𝐴𝑛 = −𝑟 + 𝐴𝑛−1 − 𝐵𝑛−1
′ Ω1/2𝜆 +
𝐵𝑛−1
′ Ω𝐵𝑛−1
2
 
𝐵𝑛
′ = −𝛾′ + 𝐵𝑛−1
′ (Φ − Ω1/2𝛽) 
 
Table C1: Affine Model Parameter estimates   
Φ matrix C1 C2 C3 C4 
R1 -0.01316 - - - 
R2 - -2.47404 - - 
R3 - - -0.18785 - 
R4 - - - -0.56723 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The upper panel shows the estimated parameters in the diagonal 4 x 4 Φ matrix that enters in the state 
equation. The lower panel reports the other parameter estimates for the risk-free interest rate and price of 
risk equations. Sigma is the Kalman implied measurement error 
 
The model is estimated monthly over the 1946-2016 period using maximum likelihood. 
It is parsimonious, with only four parameters in the market price of risk and 13 
parameters in total. The parameter estimates are reported in Table C1. The parameter 
matrix (Φ) is diagonal, which may allow the identification of the principal components. 
The four Kalman factors extracted from the model are shown in Figures C1 and, with 
more recent detail, in C2 alongside the four term structure factors – level, slope, 
convexity and position, i.e. D-star (D
*
t) based on cross-correlations. The third Kalman 
factor closely correlates with D-star (0.503, 0.728 1982-2016) and particularly over the 
period following Volcker’s Great Experiment with high real US interest rates. The other 
three Kalman factors show significant correlations with the traditional level (0.940, 
0.967 1982-2016); slope (-0.777, -0.871 1982-2016) and curvature (0.305, 0.633 1982-
2016) measures.  
 
 
 Value 
R 0.01941 
γ1 0.008927 
γ2 0.025488 
γ3 0.012064 
γ4 0.014629 
λ1 0.274211 
λ2 -1.20668 
λ3 -1.09619 
λ4 0.804236 
sigma 2.11E-07 
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Figure C1: Kalman Factors Aligned to Term Structure Parameters, 1946-2016 
(Monthly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The charts show, respectively, each of the four estimated Kalman factors aligned with four yield curve 
parameters – level, slope, convexity and position, i.e. D-star (D*t)  – on the basis of correlation over the 
period 1946-2016. The third Kalman factor closely correlates (0.503) with D-star, with the other three 
showing significant correlations with the traditional level (0.940); slope (-0.777) and curvature (0.305) 
measures. 
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Figure C2: Kalman Factors Aligned to Term Structure Parameters, 1982-2016 
(Monthly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The charts show, respectively, each of the four estimated Kalman factors aligned with four yield curve 
parameters – level, slope, convexity and position, i.e. D-star (D*t)  – on the basis of correlation over the 
period 1982-2016. The third Kalman factor closely correlates (0.729) with D-star, with the other three 
showing significant correlations with the traditional level (0.967); slope (-0.871) and curvature (0.633) 
measures.  
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Appendix 3D: US Treasury Yield Curve Methodology 
The Treasury's yield curve is derived using a quasi-cubic hermite spline function. The 
inputs are the Close of Business (COB) bid yields for the on-the-run securities. Because 
the on-the-run securities typically trade close to par, those securities are designated as 
the knot points in the quasi-cubic hermite spline algorithm and the resulting yield curve 
is considered a par curve. However, the Treasury may input additional bid yields if there 
is no on-the-run security available for a given maturity range as they deem necessary for 
deriving a good fit for the quasi-cubic hermite spline curve. For example, they use 
composites of off-the-run bonds in the 20-year range reflecting market yields available 
in that time tranche. Prior to May 26, 2005, a rolled-down 10-year note with a 
remaining maturity nearest to 7 years was also used as an additional input. The current 
inputs are the most recently auctioned 4-, 13-, 26-, and 52-week bills, plus the most 
recently auctioned 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year notes and the most recently auctioned 30-
year bond, plus the composite rate in the 20-year maturity range. The quotes for these 
securities are obtained at or near the 3:30 PM close each trading day. The inputs for the 
four bills are their bond equivalent yields. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Using the New Yield Curve Parameter to Predict Future 
Financial Stress 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Identifying approaching periods of financial stress and forecasting future financial crises 
has not proved straightforward. This chapter proposes and tests a new measure of 
investors’ risk appetite34 extracted from the interest rate term structure and applied as a 
forward-looking indicator of shocks to the financial sector. These financial shocks form 
part of the so-called risk-taking policy transmission channel (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; 
Borio and Zhu, 2012, and Bruno and Shin, 2014). Recent experience warns that they 
pose significant adverse implications for the real economy. The unexpected bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, for example, and the surprising near-failure of the American 
International Group (AIG) in 2008 had far-reaching effects on the international 
economy through falling asset prices and turmoil across key credit market spreads. The 
probability that financial instability leads on to macro-economic instability is known as 
“systemic risk.” Many national policy-makers now have a formal mandate to avoid 
systemic risk and prevent financial instability from negatively affecting economic 
growth. In the United States, this role is established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.  
 
In the previous chapter, I argue that D-star implicitly measures the shape of the 
distribution of implied term premia across the interest rate term structure. These can 
provide additional information about the future path of macro-finance variables, such as 
the ISM index of US business activity and the high yield credit spread. This follows 
because the distribution of implied term premia indicates the excess demand for safe 
assets. Government bonds across different durations serve as safe assets for many 
investors and credit providers and these holdings of safe assets will likely correlate 
negatively with their risk appetite at each tenor. I define a safe asset as an instrument 
                                                          
34 According to Gai and Vause (2006), risk appetite is determined by macroeconomic conditions and the risk aversion 
inherent in utility functions. This combines with measures of asset riskiness to generate risk premia. 
68 | P a g e  
 
that offers liquidity, stability of value, use as collateral, immunization
35
 and low default 
risk (see also IMF, 2012). The canonical safe asset is the 10-year Treasury note
36
, but 
the list includes all assets that are used in an information-insensitive fashion (Gorton et 
al, 2012). Their supply is not perfectly elastic. Supply shortages of safe assets can occur 
because of regulation, Central Bank LSAP, credit rating agency downgrades and falls in 
investors’ risk appetite. Based on Walras’ Law, shortages in the supply of safe assets 
can lead to macroeconomic disequilibria and greater financial stress (Caballero, 2006). 
Policy-makers are alert to the threat to the global financial system of a structural 
shortage of these safe assets (IMF, 2012). Their fears seem well-founded, since 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) show empirically that the decreasing 
supplies of US Treasuries raise the probability of financial crises.  
 
In Chapter 3, I adapt the Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) preferred habitat 
model
37
 to show that D-star may help to identify the changing sentiment of investors. In 
other words, when D-star extends (retracts), it indicates risk-seeking (risk-avoiding) 
investor behaviour and a lengthening (shortening) of their investment time horizons. 
This follows from the fact that a greater curvature of the term structure, at any given 
maturity, could derive from the lower term premia that are associated with an excess 
demand for safety at more distant tenors. I make use of the fact that there is a related 
distribution of implied forward rates behind the distribution of spot rates, each of which, 
in turn, is made up from a short-period policy rate component and a term premium. 
Although D-star captures the pattern of these expected policy rates and term premia 
across tenors, it does not necessarily correlate with their average size, because these 
levels are unrelated to the point where the term structure has the largest curvature. I 
acknowledge that these changes to curvature could also reflect fluctuations in investors’ 
demand for Treasuries from a duration effect, following a fall in interest rate 
expectations, and from the recognition of a larger implied option value given greater 
interest rate volatility (Ilmanen, 1995). Yet, all three reasons are synonymous with more 
uncertain times and often with economic recessions. Thus, falls in D-star may indicate 
an excess demand for safe assets at longer time horizons and so warn of upcoming 
                                                          
35 The ability to match the duration of liabilities. 
36 Safety is measured relative to the profile of expected liabilities. See Chapter 2. For example, I consider a risk-
seeking investor as a long-term fund that moves away from a duration targeted position in, say, 10-year Treasuries 
and into equities or real assets, rather than an investor moving from cash into 10-year notes.  
37 This, in turn, is influenced by Vayanos and Vila (2009) 
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financial stress. This motivates a key research question: does the implied distribution of 
these expected policy rates and term premia and, hence, D-star matter for financial 
stability and for the future path of the economy? 
 
The following sections first describe the benchmark risk data and then outline four 
different types of tests between D-star and the above list of macro-finance variables: 
Section 4.2 explains the financial stress and risk appetite data series. Section 4.3 
considers Granger causality, compared to the slope and curvature factor alternatives. 
Section 4.4 focuses on BIC comparisons over different future horizons, against various 
benchmark alternatives. Section 4.5 reports two out-of-sample tests. The following 
Section 4.6 examines whether D-star offers any insight into the Y2K Bubble period and 
the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Financial Stress Indexes and Risk Appetite Data 
 
Financial regulators are incorporating demands for such forward-looking risk measures 
into new legislation, such as the European Union’s UCITS IV (Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) Directive and AIFMD (Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive). Yet, financial stress cannot be quantified in the 
same way as many other economic indicators (e.g., industrial output and employment), 
which count tangible objects. This has encouraged economists to develop new statistical 
indicators designed to provide a continuous signal of general financial stability. These 
indicators are collectively termed financial stress indexes (FSIs). They try to capture, 
among other things, the liquidity across financial markets and they may help to forecast 
potential changes in real economic conditions. FSIs frequently measure the underlying 
behaviour of investors from price volatility and risk premia data across several assets 
and they are often built using sophisticated statistical techniques. In the USA, official 
FSIs are regularly published by the Chicago, Cleveland
38
, Kansas and St Louis Federal 
Reserve districts. For example, the Kansas Federal Reserve’s monthly FSI comprises 
normalised measures of credit spreads (e.g. TED, 2-year swap spread, quality and high 
yield credit spreads) and market volatility (e.g. VIX, volatility of bank share price 
returns, correlation between equities and bonds). Similarly, the Chicago Federal 
                                                          
38 Publication of the Cleveland FSI was temporarily ‘suspended’ in May 2016 for refinement and recalibration. 
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Reserve’s National Financial Conditions Index (CFFCI) is a higher frequency, weekly 
measure of US financing conditions in money markets, debt and equity markets and the 
traditional and ‘shadow’ banking systems. It comprises a weighted average of 105 
measures of financial activity, covering spreads, asset prices, volatility, liquidity ratios 
and opinion surveys, each expressed relative to their sample averages and scaled by 
their sample standard deviations. Consequently, FSIs are typically expressed as N(0,1) 
z-scores. These indexes are likely to move pro-cyclically with investors’ risk aversion 
and with asset market riskiness. (see Hakkio and Keeton, 2009 and Kliesen, Owyang 
and Vermann, 2012). However, a major practical limitation is that FSIs remain 
barometers of current financial market stress that largely change contemporaneously 
with events. This provides added motivation to test my alternative approach to detect 
risk-avoiding behaviour at an earlier stage and so help to warn in advance of upcoming 
deteriorations in FSIs. 
 
I use monthly estimates of D-star, taken from the US Treasury term structure (1954-
2016) and investigate whether they can warn of upcoming periods of financial market 
stress. The construction of D-star in Chapter 3 recommends a 6-month centred moving 
average
39
 and, so, the following tests all begin, at least, 3-months forward. When a low 
D-star reading reflects an excess demand for safe Treasury assets, this should indicate 
risk-avoiding behaviour by investors and credit providers. This may be confirmed by 
broader measures of risk appetite (e.g. investor surveys). As Treasuries are bid away 
from the money market, the collateral pool diminishes, which, in turn, leads to declines 
in repo activity. Correspondingly, credit providers may become more cautious and 
tighten financial conditions. This results in greater market volatility (e.g. VIX and 
MOVE), widening credit spreads (e.g. B less Baa/ BBB
40
) as default risks rise, and, 
hence, to increases in published financial stress indexes. To the extent that tighter 
financial conditions and diminished risk appetites cause investment time horizons to 
shorten and capital spending to decline, the real economy will subsequently weaken and 
measures of consumer and business confidence will deteriorate. I check the robustness 
of D-star as a predictor by monitoring the underlying macro-finance variables that 
describe this transmission process: (1) major financial stress indexes (e.g. the Kansas 
Fed FSI and the first principal component of all current Fed FSIs); (2) the key sub-
                                                          
39 This is to reduce measurement error, but it also correlates closely with the Kalman estimate at this frequency. 
40 BBB is the S&P equivalent to Moody’s Baa investment grade rating  
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components of these FSIs (e.g. the ‘quality’ spread BBB-AAA grade; the ‘high yield’ 
spread B-BBB and the ‘junk’ spread CCC-B; the Merrill Lynch MOVE index of bond 
volatility; the CBOE VIX index of US equity volatility; US Treasury term premia 
estimates (Adrian et al, 2014)); (3) well-known indexes of economic activity (e.g. the 
US ISM and Philadelphia Fed indexes of manufacturing activity, University of 
Michigan consumer sentiment survey), which are likely affected later in the 
transmission process by adverse financial shocks, and (4) measures of investors’ risk 
appetite (e.g. the ECB global risk aversion indicator; the variance-based risk aversion 
component of the VIX and the CrossBorder Capital Risk Appetite series). Each of these 
latter three data series represents a different way to measure risk appetite: the first is 
asset price or yield spread-based; the second extracts information from implied 
volatility data and the third represents investors’ actual allocation decisions. The 
variance-based risk aversion
41
 is calculated after expected stock market volatility has 
been removed from the CBOE VIX index (see Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca, 2013). 
The ECB global risk aversion index comprises the first principal component of five 
widely-used, independent, but ex post risk appetite indicators, namely the Commerzbank 
Global Risk Perception, the UBS FX Risk Index, Westpac’s Risk Appetite Index, the 
BoA/ ML Risk Aversion Indicator and the Credit Suisse Risk Appetite Index. 
CrossBorder Capital’s World Risk Appetite Index measures the normalised deviations 
in actual asset allocation between risky (i.e. equities and corporate debt) and safe assets 
(i.e. cash and Treasuries). The ECB and CrossBorder Capital (www.liquidity.com) data 
series are available from their respective websites. All other data series were 
downloaded from the FRED database. 
 
4.3 Granger Causality Tests 
 
This section reports the results from a series of bi-variant tests, taken over different 
horizons of three months through 18-months that compare the efficacy of D-star – the 
position of the yield curve hump – in Granger causing the macro-finance variables 
described in Section 4.2. Two popular yield curve parameters are used as benchmark 
regressors against which to compare D-star: the slope of the US Treasury term structure 
                                                          
41 Variance risk premium(t)=VIXt
2–Et(σt+1
2), where σt is the realised return volatility on the S&P500 over 22 days 
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– measured by the 10-year less 1-year Treasury yield spread – and its curvature – 
measured by the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. I select a common monthly 
sample period covering 1990-2016, because this span embraces most of the data 
available for the selected series. Table 7 summarises the results. More detailed statistical 
tests are shown later in Tables A1-A13 in Appendix 4A. Across the thirteen series 
tested, the D-star variable demonstrates substantial Granger causality. The columns 
reported in the table indicate: (a) whether Granger causality between 12-18 months 
ahead is statistically significant at the 5% level; (b) whether or not this causation is one-
way; (c) although necessarily partly subjective, whether the D-star results are stronger 
than those obtained from using the other yield curve parameters, and (d) whether these 
conclusions carry over to a longer sample, when available. 
Taken overall, I cannot reject the hypothesis that D-star one-way Granger causes the 
financial stress indexes (FSIs) and their key components, and it seems to outperform the 
slope and curvature alternatives. D-star also appears to one-way Granger causes the US 
ISM and Philadelphia Fed business activity indexes and the 12-month change in the 
University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey, across both their shorter and longer 
sample periods. In contrast, the slope and curvature factors, for the most part, indicate 
either two-way causality or one-way reverse causality. An exception occurs with the 
Philadelphia Fed index over the shorter sample period, where both curvature and slope 
show evidence of one-way Granger causality at the 12-month and 18-month horizons. 
D-star also appears to Granger cause corporate credit spreads and both bond and equity 
volatility, key components of the FSIs. The US corporate ‘quality’ credit spread is 
defined as the Bank of America/ Merrill Lynch BBB less AAA rated corporate bond 
yields. The data show evidence that D-star one-way Granger causes this yield spread 
around 18 months ahead over both the 1970-2016 period and the shorter 1990-2016 
period. There is evidence of two-way causality for the yield curve and curvature factors 
over the longer sample, but they show little evidence of any causality in the recent 
1990-2016 period.  
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Table 7: Granger Causality Tests – Summary Results 
Indicator Significant GC 
12-18 months 
One-
way 
GC 
Outperforms 
Other YC 
Parameters 
Robustness Check 
Over Longer 
Sample 
PC1 FSI √ √ √  
Kansas Fed FSI √ √ √  
Quality Credit 
Spread BBB-
AAA 
√ √ √ √ 
High Yield 
Spread B-BBB 
√ √ √  
Junk Credit 
Spread CCC-B 
√ √ √  
MOVE Index √ √ √  
VIX Index √ √ √/o  
US ISM √ √ √ √ 
Philadelphia Fed 
Index 
√ √ √ √ 
U of M 
Consumer 
Sentiment(12m 
ch) 
√ √ √ √ 
ECB Global Risk 
Aversion 
√ x √/o  
Risk Aversion √ √ √/o  
CBC Risk 
Appetite 
√ x √/o √/o 
Comment: US ISM is the Institute of Supply Management national index of US manufacturing activity; 
Philadelphia Fed Index is a regional index of manufacturing activity; U of M Consumer Sentiment is the 
12 month change in the University of Michigan survey; the Quality, High Yield and Junk Yield Spreads 
are credit spreads; the MOVE index is the Merrill Lynch measure of US bond market volatility; VIX is 
the CBOE measure of US equity volatility; Risk Aversion is a variance-based measure derived from the 
VIX; ECB Global Risk Aversion is a composite index derived from other vendors summarising global 
risk aversion; CBC Risk Appetite refers to the CrossBorder Capital index based on actual asset holdings; 
Kansas Fed FSI is the financial stress index published by the Kansas Federal Reserve, and PC1 FCI is the 
first principal component of all published financial stress indexes by regional Federal Reserve districts. A 
√ denotes a positive; x denotes a negative and √/o signifies ‘at least as good as’. GC denotes Granger 
causality. 
 
The data show evidence of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the ‘high yield’ 
spread (single B less BBB) over all horizons during both sample periods. There is some 
evidence of two-way causality for the yield curve slope and curvature factors and 
evidence of one-way reverse causality from the high yield spread on to the yield curve 
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(1990-2016) and curvature (1970-2016). The results for the ‘junk’ credit market (CCC 
less single B) show evidence of one-way Granger causality of D-star over all horizons. 
There is some suggestion of one-way reverse causality from the high yield spread on to 
the yield curve and curvature. There is evidence of one-way Granger causality of D-star 
on the Merrill Lynch MOVE index of bond volatility at the 18-month horizon. 
Similarly, the data again suggest one-way reverse causality for the MOVE index on to 
the slope and curvature factors. The impact of D-star on equity market volatility is 
measured using the CBOE VIX index. D-star and the curvature factor both show one-
way Granger causality at the 12-month and 18-month horizons. The slope factor reveals 
evidence of reverse causality. 
 
I found no significant Granger causality in the variance-based risk aversion data, apart 
from the slope and D-star factors at the 18-month horizon. There is more compelling 
evidence that D-star Granger causes the overall FSIs, the CBC Risk Appetite series 
(two-way and in shorter sample) and the ECB global risk aversion data at six through 
18-month horizons. The data show mostly reverse causality for the slope factor and give 
only some evidence of Granger causality for the curvature factor at 12-months and 18-
months in the ECB global risk aversion case. In summary, the results from these 
Granger causality tests are encouraging for the D-star factor; mixed for the curvature 
factor and disappointing for the slope factor. 
 
4.4 Testing Prediction Using Bayesian Information Criteria 
 
This section employs further statistical tests to evaluate the economic and statistical 
importance of D-star as a predictor. I revert to individual data spans, widen the range of 
alternative regressors and adopt a different testing methodology, using Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) to discriminate between: (a) a benchmark model that predicts 
a target, e.g. FSI and US economic activity, using the first three principal components 
(PCs) of the Treasury term structure as regressors, and (b) a second model that includes 
D-star. For completeness, D-star is also tested alone in order to establish nested test 
results. This approach differs from testing for Granger causality. While the results tell 
us little about exogeneity, they allow the signs and strength of the coefficient loadings 
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to be checked for plausibility. In each case, I use monthly data, looking from three 
months to two years ahead to further assess robustness. The BIC tests are applied to the 
same set of macro-finance variables described in Section 4.1. 
 
Table 8: Regression of First Principal Component of Major US National Financial 
Stress Indexes on Principal Components of the US Treasury Yield Curve, with and 
without D-star, for various lead-times (3, 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18 months), 1994-2016 
(Monthly) 
 3m 6m 9m 12m 15m 18m 
BIC 3.850 3.846 3.806 3.735 3.658 3.559 
BIC (+D-
star) 
3.866 3.847 3.677 3.298 3.234 3.337 
BIC (D-star) 3.852 3.825 3.742 3.575 3.454 3.442 
R
2
 0.050 0.054 0.091 0.153 0.216 0.289 
R
2
 (+D-star) 0.054 0.071 0.217 0.464 0.497 0.443 
R
2
 (D-star) 0.007 0.034 0.111 0.247 0.333 0.341 
D-star 
(se) 
-0.175 
(0.125) 
-0.379
***
 
(0.124) 
-0.689
***
 
(0.119) 
-1.032
***
 
(0.110) 
-1.199
***
 
(0.103) 
-1.214
***
 
(0.103) 
Comment: BIC refers to the Bayesian Information Criteria reported for different time horizons from 3 
months to 18 months. The default reading shown is for the benchmark regression. A +D-star in brackets 
denotes the same regression, but including D-star as a second regressor. A D-star in brackets refers to the 
regression without the benchmark variable. The same applies to the R
2
 statistic. The D-star line reports 
estimated loadings on the D-star variable in the joint regression. se denotes the Newey-West adjusted 
standard error. One, two and three asterisks signify significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
Where appropriate, I also test two alternative benchmarks by substituting the Chicago 
Federal Reserve’s National Financial Conditions Index (CFFCI) and estimates of the 
US Treasury term premia (Adrian et al, 2014) in place of the principal components 
benchmark. Although the CFFCI is available for a shorter period than the PCs, it is a 
broadly-based basket of key financial variables, as previously described. The regression 
models take the form: 
 
𝑌𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑖
𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑡                                                                      (5) 
 
where Yt+k is the predicted factor k periods ahead, e.g. the ISM index of US 
manufacturing business activity; PCi,t represent the first three principal components of 
the US Treasury yield curve;  D
*
t is D-starav in period t, and εt is a random error term. α, 
76 | P a g e  
 
βi and γ are parameters to be estimated. The same structure is adopted for all predicted 
variables. The estimation uses the available monthly data over the period. The time 
horizon k takes the values 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 and 24 months. 
 
Figure 10: First Principal Component of Major Financial Stress Indexes (FSIs), 1994-
2016 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: BIC refers to the Bayesian Information Criteria reported for different time horizons from 3 
months to 24 months. B/M+D-star denotes the regression, but including D-star as a second regressor. D-
star refers to the regression without the benchmark variable. The same applies to the R
2
 statistic.  
 
Table 8 reports the BIC and R
2
 results and loadings on D-star for regressions using the 
first principal component of the US National FSIs. Three sets of BIC results are shown, 
with and without D-star. The BIC values for the benchmark decline smoothly as the 
forecast horizon extends. The inclusion of D-star noticeably lowers the BIC values over 
the 9-18 month horizons, with its major impact felt at 15 months, where D-star has a 
significant negative loading. According to the coefficient, the FSI is reduced by 1.2 
standard deviations for each additional year that the investment horizon extends. At the 
15 month horizon, the R
2
 of the regression is 0.497. The importance of D-star can be 
seen from a simple two-variable regression with the FSI. D-star actually outperforms 
the benchmark, over the 6-18 month horizon, and its inclusion significantly improves 
the BICs and R
2
 statistics. This result is shown graphically in Figure 10. Here, the 
broken lines depict the respective benchmarks and the solid lines show the results for D-
star alone (orange) and for the benchmark with D-star included (black).  
 
 
 
 
 
77 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 11: US Corporate Spreads, 1987-2016 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: 3x YC PCs denote the first three principal components of the Treasury yield curve using in the 
benchmark regression. BIC refers to the Bayesian Information Criteria reported for different time 
horizons from 3 months to 24 months. B/M+D-star denotes the regression, but including D-star as a 
second regressor. D-star refers to the regression without the benchmark variable. High yield (B-BBB or 
Baa) and Junk (CCC-B) refer to yield spreads between bonds of different credit quality  
 
Figures 11 and 12 cross-check the robustness of this result by splitting-out and re-
testing some of the key sub-components of the FSIs – credit spreads, bond volatility and 
term premia – and by comparing one of the published FSIs – the Kansas FSI – alone 
(i.e. not in principal component form). Figure 11 reports the results for the US High 
Yield (B less Baa/ BBB) and Junk (CCC less B) corporate credit spreads. The efficacy 
of D-star as a predictor can be seen in both cases, again around the 15-to-18 month 
horizon. The upper panel in Figure 12 reports the results for the MOVE index of bond 
volatility and for the US Treasury average term premia taken across the yield curve 
(Adrian et al, 2014). The lower panel compares the result for the Kansas FSI (left) with 
the first principal component of all FSIs. D-star appears to have a major negative effect 
on future bond volatility. The sign of the loading on D-star suggests that as investment 
horizons lengthen, so volatility progressively subsides. Term premia show a similar, but 
less emphatic result. Taken overall, falls in D-star appear to raise Treasury prices and 
increase bond market volatility 18-24 months ahead. Next, corporate credit spreads 
subsequently widen out 15-18 months ahead, so reinforcing the impact on FSIs. 
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Figure 12: Financial Stress Indexes (FSIs) and Bond Risks, 1994-2016 (Monthly) 
  
Comment: 3x YC PCs denote the first three principal components of the Treasury yield curve using in the 
benchmark regression. BIC refers to the Bayesian Information Criteria reported for different time 
horizons from 3 months to 24 months. B/M+D-star denotes the regression, but including D-star as a 
second regressor. D-star refers to the regression without the benchmark variable. FSIs describe financial 
stress indexes. MOVE is the Merrill Lynch index of bond volatility. US Treasury term premia are 
averages across the yield curve. 
 
Figure 13: University of Michigan US Consumer Sentiment Survey, 1985-2016 
(Monthly) 
 
Comment: US Consumer Sentiment is the University of Michigan monthly survey of consumer attitudes. 
3x YC PCs refers to the first three principal components of the Treasury yield curve. CFFCI is the 
Chicago Federal Reserve National Financial Conditions Index. BIC refers to the Bayesian Information 
Criteria reported for different time horizons from 3 months to 24 months. B/M+D-star denotes the 
regression, but including D-star as a second regressor. D-star refers to the regression without the 
benchmark variable. 
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I extend these results to the other macro-finance variables listed in Section 4.1. They 
generally show that the inclusion of D-star improves prediction. Moreover, the loadings 
on D-star seem plausible and they have the economically correct signs across each 
model. Figure 13 reports the BIC values for the 12 month change in the University of 
Michigan US Consumer Sentiment Survey, using the first three principal components of 
the Treasury yield curve (left-hand side) and the CFFCI (right-hand side). The 
introduction of D-star improves (i.e. reduces) the BIC statistic most around 15 months 
ahead, most noticeably for the CFFCI benchmark. A larger value of D-star leads to an 
increase in US consumer sentiment. A Bai-Perron test points to only one significant 
break-point in the regression model over the sample, which occurred just ahead of the 
recession in January 2001. For the two measures of US economic activity – the regional 
Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s Manufacturing Activity Index and the national ISM 
Purchasing Managers’ Index – their BIC values decrease around the 12-15 month future 
horizon when D-star is added. See Figure 14. Again a larger D-star value boosts 
economic activity, consistent with risk-seeking. The two upper charts report BIC results 
for the regional Philadelphia Fed activity index and the lower charts report the national 
ISM survey. The left-hand charts use the three yield curve factors (3x YC PCs) as their 
benchmark, while the right-hand charts introduce the Chicago Fed’s National Financial 
Conditions Index (CFFCI) as a benchmark. Although the CFFCI already incorporates 
information from a large number of variables, D-star incrementally improves the 
regression. 
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Figure 14: US Business Activity, 1954-2016 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: US Philadelphia Fed Business Activity Index and US ISM Manufacturing Survey are monthly 
barometers of US economic activity. 3x YC PCs refers to the first three principal components of the 
Treasury yield curve. CFFCI is the Chicago Federal Reserve National Financial Conditions Index. BIC 
refers to the Bayesian Information Criteria reported for different time horizons from 3 to 24 months. 
B/M+D-star denotes the regression with D-star as a second regressor. D-star refers to the regression 
without the benchmark variable. 
 
Figure 15: USM Index 1954-2016 and 2000-2016 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: US ISM Manufacturing Survey is a monthly barometer of US economic activity. 3x YC PCs 
denote the first three principal components of the Treasury yield curve. BIC refers to the Bayesian 
Information Criteria reported for different time horizons from 3 months to 24 months. B/M+D-star 
denotes the regression, but including D-star as a second regressor. D-star refers to the regression without 
the benchmark variable. The same applies to the R
2
 statistic. Two samples are reported: 1954-2016 (left) 
and 2000-16 (right). 
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Figure 16: BIC Tests on Risk Appetite Using Three Benchmarks, various time periods 
(LHS CFFCI, Middle 3xYC PCs, RHS Real Term Premia) 
Row 1: ECB Risk Appetite; Row 2: Risk Aversion from VIX; Row 3 CBC World Investors’ Risk 
Appetite 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations and Federal Reserve; Comment: The chart reports the BIC for regressions 
that include and exclude, where stated, the D-star variable. The left-hand column of three charts uses a 
benchmark based on the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index to predict three measures of 
risk appetite 3-to-24 months ahead: (a) ECB Global Risk Appetite (1996-2016); (b) Risk aversion from 
VIX variance premium (1984-2016) and (c) CBC World Investors’ Risk Appetite (1978-2016). The 
middle and final columns do the same, but with different benchmarks based, respectively, on the first 
three principal components of the Treasury yield curve and the real US Treasury average term premia. 
The introduction of D-star adds information, notably to the first two rows, which, respectively, show the 
ECB’s global appetite measure and a risk aversion measure based on the CBoE VIX index. 
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The charts in Figure 15 further test the robustness of D-star as a predictor of the ISM 
index by comparing two sample periods: 1954-2016 and the more recent 2000-2016. I 
use the principal components benchmark, because this offers the longer consistent 
history. The starting point for the more recent period is the new Millennium. Although 
it admittedly follows the late-1990s bubble period of inflated US asset prices, this 
period is deliberately chosen to evaluate the importance of D-star during the Global 
Financial Crisis and the Great Recession. The inclusion of D-star noticeably improves 
the BIC statistics for both periods, and, in fact, the relationship appears to strengthen 
during the latest years. For comparison, I also report R-squared statistics in the lower 
panels of Figure 15. These are not strictly comparable for the usual reasons, but they do 
offer a more intuitive measure of how the D-star variable performs: thus, it alone can 
explain almost half of the variation in the US ISM index over the 2000-2016 period. 
The loadings on the D-star factor (not shown) are significant at the 1% level for the 12, 
15 and 18-month forward-looking periods and they attain a positive peak value of 6.91. 
This suggests that each one year change in D-star is consistent with around a 15% swing 
in the ISM manufacturing activity index. Both sets of results also indicate that the 
impact of D-star is felt some 15 months ahead. Moreover, these results seem stable 
according to a Bai-Perron break-point test: the longer data sample highlights only one 
significant breakpoint in March 1978 – a time of some turmoil in the US economy and 
Treasury market during the stagflation and weak US dollar years of the Carter 
Presidency. 
 
Figure 16 tests the effect of D-star on three investor risk appetite measures: (1) the 
ECB’s published measure (1996-2016); (2) the variance premium (1984-2016), and (3) 
the CrossBorder Capital World Risk Appetite Index (1978-2016). As a further 
robustness check, I also include a third benchmark (shown as the third column of charts) 
based on average US Treasury term premia, using data from Adrian et al. (2014), but 
normalised by US CPI inflation
42
. Again the evidence seems to show that the addition 
of D-star improves the BIC statistics for the ECB and variance-based measures of risk 
aversion at the 12-15 month horizon. For the CBC risk appetite series, the improvement 
                                                          
42 The Adrian et al. (2014) data is not stationary and appears to be integrated of degree one. To eliminate the trend, I 
took an orthogonal regression between the published term premia series and the rolling three-year US CPI inflation 
rate.  
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is most evident at the shorter 9-month horizon. The results seem robust across each of 
the three benchmarks. 
 
4.5 Out of Sample Tests  
 
The results in Section 4.4 are all in-sample. In Figures 17 and 18, I use D-star to predict 
the US high yield credit spread (B-BBB) and the 12-month change in the University of 
Michigan US Consumer Sentiment Survey, out-of-sample. The justification for using 
credit spread data is that they correlate closely with financial stress indexes (0.882, with 
first PC), but they are available over a longer time span, starting in the late-1980s. 
Consumer sentiment is an example of widely-used economic data that is similarly 
available over a lengthy span. For both cases, an in-sample regression model was 
estimated using monthly data from 1987-2006. This found an optimal lead-time on D-
star of 17 months for the credit spread and 14 months for the change in consumer 
sentiment. The regression parameters were applied to estimated values of D-star, 
advanced respectively by these lead-times, over the subsequent out-of-sample period 
2007-2016 to predict the high yield spread and the change in consumer sentiment, and 
then to compare these results with the known outturns. The 10-1 year Treasury yield 
curve slope was incorporated into a similar regression model to benchmark both sets of 
results.  
 
The D-star model appears to perform better in each test. Figures 17 and 18 display the 
respective results. For the period January 2007 to June 2009, which contains the Global 
Financial Crisis, the credit spread benchmark yield curve model had a MSE
43
 of 2.99, 
compared to 2.45 for the D-star model. Over the same time-frame, the consumer 
sentiment benchmark yield curve model had a MSE of 14.03, compared to 12.17 for the 
D-star model. 
 
                                                          
43 MSE: mean-squared error 
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Figure 17: US High Yield Spread (B-BBB) – Actual and Out-of-Sample Forecasts, 2004-16 
(Monthly) 
 
Comment: The chart shows the out-of-sample results from two regression models used to predict the US 
high yield credit spread (B-BBB), using D-star (solid line) and the 10-1 year yield curve slope (broken 
line), with both lagged by a fixed 17 months. The models were estimated from 1987-2006 and used to 
predict forwards 2007-2016. The MSE of the D-star model is 2.45 and 2.99 for the yield curve model. 
 
Figure 18: US Consumer Sentiment (University of Michigan) – Actual 12 month change 
and Out-of-Sample Forecasts, 2004-16 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: The chart shows the out-of-sample results from two regression models used to predict the 12 
month change in US consumer sentiment, using D-star (solid line) and the 10-1 year yield curve slope 
(broken line). The models were estimated from 1987-2006 and used to predict forwards 2007-2016. The 
MSE of the D-star model is 12.17 and 14.03 for the yield curve model. 
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4.5 Event Studies – The Y2K Bubble and The Global Financial Crisis 
 
The previous three sections suggest that movements in D-star generally pre-date 
subsequent movements in risk appetite, risk spreads and business activity around 12-15 
months ahead. An alternative approach is to consider specific cases of financial 
turbulence and then test whether prior movements in D-star provide any forewarnings? 
For example, Figure 19 charts the ECB Global Risk Aversion measure
44
, over the 
period of the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis, with D-star advanced by 12 months and 
plotted inverted alongside. D-star seems to align with subsequent inflexion points in this 
risk aversion index and over the five year period the two series have a correlation 
coefficient of -0.507. In other words, contractions in D-star appear to warn of growing 
risk avoidance by investors, consistent with a decreased demand for risky assets and a 
heighted demand for safe assets that is subsequently confirmed by market action. 
 
Figure 19: Global Risk Appetite (ECB Measure) and D-star (inverted, advanced 12 
months), 2006-2010 (Monthly) 
 
Comment: D-star measures the lateral position of the hump in the US Treasury yield curve along the 
maturity axis. The chart shows the co-movement between the ECB’s Global Risk Aversion measure 
(broken line) and D-star (solid line). D-star has been advanced by 12-months and is shown inverted. 
 
                                                          
44 ECB Risk Aversion series starts in 1999 during the ‘Y2K Bubble’ period, so the GFC is its first effective test. 
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Figure 20: Y2K Bubble Finance Crisis – D-star (Advanced) and Selected Macro-
Finance Variables, 1999-2003 (Monthly)   
 
Comment: D-star measures the lateral position of the hump in the US Treasury yield curve along the 
maturity axis. It has been advanced by the number of months indicated to align with each of the other 
reference series in the chart panels. B-Baa refers to the corporate credit spread; ‘real’ TP10 is the nominal 
term premia of the 10-year US Treasury, with an inflation trend removed by orthogonal regression; FSI 
PC1 is the first principal component of published FSIs and USISM is the US purchasing managers’ index 
of business activity. In the 1999/ 2000 Y2K period, D-star appears to lead the credit and financial markets 
by around 9 months and the real economy by some 12-15 months. 
 
Figures 20 and 21 broaden this event study using some of the underlying drivers of the 
risk aversion data to analyse more deeply the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis and also 
adding the Y2K Bubble period at the end of the 1990s decade as a further robustness 
check. They report the values of D-star, advanced appropriately, to best align (using 
simple correlation coefficient values for each period), respectively, with turning points 
in the following macro-finance variables: (a) single B less Baa/ BBB corporate credit 
spread; (b) average Treasury term premium (across maturities), adjusted by an inflation 
trend; (c) first principal component of major published FSIs, and (d) US ISM 
(Purchasing Managers’) Index. The lead times vary, but, as before, they generally lie in 
the 9-15 month range. The lead times for the credit market and FSI are slightly longer in 
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the recent GFC case study. Apart from the 10-year real term premia (0.600, 0.467), the 
correlations with D-star are similar across the two case studies: FSIs (-0.698, -0.634); 
high yield spreads (-0.594, -0.537) and ISMs (0.809, 0.818). [The first number in round 
brackets refers to the correlation coefficient in the Y2K event study and the second 
number to the GFC study.] The unusual spike in term premia during the GFC could be 
explained by the sudden and specific need for cash as the repo and interbank markets 
disappeared. 
 
Figure 21: Global Finance Crisis – D-star (Advanced) and Selected Macro-Finance 
Variables, 2006-10 (Monthly)   
 
Comment: D-star measures the lateral position of the hump in the US Treasury yield curve along the 
maturity axis. It has been advanced by the number of months indicated to align with each of the other 
reference series in the chart panels. B-Baa refers to the corporate credit spread; ‘real’ TP10 is the nominal 
term premia of the 10-year US Treasury, with an inflation trend removed by orthogonal regression; FSI 
PC1 is the first principal component of published FSIs and USISM is the US purchasing managers’ index 
of business activity. In the 2007/08 GFC period, D-star appears to lead the credit and financial markets 
and the real economy by 12-15 months, but bond markets by significantly less. 
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The results suggest that as D-star extends (contracts), real Treasury term premia widen 
(narrow); high yield credit spreads narrow (widen); business activity increases 
(decreases) and financial stress indexes subside (rise). This interpretation is consistent 
with the intuition that D-star captures changes in investors’ risk appetite. Moreover, it 
also indicates that safe and risky asset prices negatively correlate: as risk appetite 
improves bond term premia rise, thereby pushing down Treasury prices, alongside 
credit spreads tighten, so pushing up corporate bond prices in relative terms. The results 
from these two event studies are fully in line with the previous time-series analysis and 
seem to confirm the 12-15 month lead-time between D-star and the various macro-
finance variables. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I try to show that D-star, a new yield curve parameter, contains 
information, beyond that obtained from the traditional and widely-used slope and 
curvature factors, that helps assess future financial risk, as summarised by published 
financial stress indexes (FSIs). D-star can be thought of as another measure of 
investors’ risk appetite that implicitly reflects the underlying excess demand for safe 
asset Treasury bonds. Shocks to risk appetite operate through the risk-taking policy 
transmission channel. I consider four ways of testing the effectiveness of this 
transmission process. D-star performs robustly in all cases: (1) it comfortably beats the 
traditional yield curve measures of slope and curvature in terms of Granger causality 
across a broad range of economic and financial variables; (2) it lowers the BIC statistic 
at a similar 12-15 month ahead horizon for this same variable set, compared to various 
benchmarks; (3) when applied as a forward-looking indicator, it beats an OOS yield 
curve-based future predictor of both credit spreads and US consumer sentiment over 10-
year horizons, and (4) according to event studies, it provides advance warnings of the 
Y2K and 2007/08 Crises. I have maintained the same pool of economic and financial 
variables throughout to avoid accusations of data-mining. These tests are broad, but 
they are not exhaustive and they provide no intuition as to why a 12-15 month time-
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scale seems to work. Notwithstanding, the results are sufficiently promising to suggest 
the monitoring of D-star and its possible inclusion in future FSIs. 
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Appendix: Granger Causality Test Results 
(a) Financial Stress Indexes (FSIs) 
 
Table A1: Granger Causality Tests – US FSI PC1, 1994-2016 
1994-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.4158 0.0179 0.0047 0.0015 
 0.7830 0.9164 0.8702 0.7189 
Slope 0.2856 0.6868 0.0225 0.1695 
 0.0000 0.0007 0.0004 0.0262 
Curvature 0.6687 0.8789 0.2760 0.3629 
 0.1055 0.0909 0.0058 0.0150 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the PC1 FSI index between 6-18 months over the 1990-2016 
period. There is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the US FCI on to the slope and curvature 
factors. 
 
Table A2: Granger Causality Tests – Kansas Fed FSI, 1990-2016 
1990-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.1610 0.0271 0.0188 0.0012 
 0.7303 0.8008 0.7300 0.4594 
Slope 0.0273 0.2854 0.0834 0.0885 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0027 0.0140 
Curvature 0.1555 0.2919 0.1437 0.0570 
 0.1428 0.3591 0.2712 0.2724 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the Kansas FSI index between 6-18 months over the 1990-
2016 period. There is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the US FCI on to the slope factor. 
Curvature gives no signal either way. 
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(b) Key Components of Financial Stress Indexes (FSIs) 
 
Table A3: Granger Causality Tests – US Baa-Aaa (BBB-AAA) Corporate Spread, 
1970-2016 
1970-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.1414 0.0343 0.1362 0.0088 
 0.8933 0.9817 0.4136 0.5063 
Slope 0.0005 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0004 0.0013 0.0022 0.0015 
Curvature 0.0040 0.0118 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0694 0.0077 0.0042 0.0064 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.3363 0.2291 0.1735 0.0431 
 0.5152 0.7172 0.7941 0.3593 
Slope 0.7140 0.1959 0.1870 0.2138 
 0.0208 0.0173 0.0541 0.0536 
Curvature 0.5999 0.0843 0.1870 0.2138 
 0.2634 0.1959 0.0541 0.0536 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the Baa-Aaa (BBB-AAA) corporate spread around 18 months 
ahead over both the 1970-2016 period and the shorter 1990-2016 period. There is evidence of two-way 
causality for the yield curve and curvature factors over the full-sample, but less evidence of any causality 
in the recent 1990-2016 period. 
 
Table A4: Granger Causality Tests – US B-Baa High Yield Corporate Spread, 1990-
2016 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.0252 0.0027 0.0001 0.0000 
 0.7097 0.7377 0.7216 0.8631 
Slope 0.0627 0.1777 0.1573 0.0527 
 0.0000 0.0002 0.0081 0.0158 
Curvature 0.0005 0.0015 0.0284 0.0484 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the high yield B-Baa/ BBB spread over all horizons during 
both sample periods. There is some evidence of two-way causality for the yield curve and curvature 
factors and even evidence of one-way reverse causality from the high yield spread on to the yield curve 
(1990-2016). 
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Table A5: Granger Causality Tests – US CCC-B Junk Spread, 1990-2016 
1990-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
     
D-star 0.0247 0.0580 0.0030 0.0000 
 0.6653 0.5638 0.8870 0.7453 
Slope 0.7227 0.6684 0.0810 0.1794 
 0.0121 0.2457 0.1790 0.1366 
Curvature 0.2634 0.7438 0.1970 0.4612 
 0.0779 0.2926 0.0610 0.0409 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread.  Comment: The data from these bi-
variant tests show evidence of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the junk yield CCC-B spread over 
all horizons. There is some evidence of one-way reverse causality from the junk spread on to the yield 
curve and curvature. 
Table A6: Granger Causality Tests – MOVE Index, 1990-2016 
1990-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.7306 0.5153 0.1497 0.0370 
 0.8679 0.4971 0.1219 0.0909 
Slope 0.9547 0.6005 0.0802 0.1470 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0206 
Curvature 0.1195 0.3000 0.1786 0.3708 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor. Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence of 
one-way Granger causality of D-star on the MOVE index at 18 months over the 1990-2016 period. There 
is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the MOVE index on to the slope and curvature factors. 
 
Table A7: Granger Causality Tests – CBoE VIX Index, 1990-2016 
1990-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.3895 0.0911 0.0353 0.0577 
 0.8696 0.7752 0.8114 0.5011 
Slope 0.9504 0.7380 0.0789 0.1985 
 0.0330 0.1335 0.0433 0.3329 
Curvature 0.6504 0.6486 0.0089 0.0014 
 0.3049 0.2280 0.0551 0.2301 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star and curvature on to the VIX index at 12 and 18 month horizons 
over the 1990-2016 period. There is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the VIX index on to the 
slope factor 
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(c) Measures of Business Activity 
Table A8: Granger Causality Tests – US ISM Index, 1970-2016 
1970-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.1021 0.0308 0.0221 0.0240 
 0.5376 0.6866 0.4843 0.5549 
Slope 0.0000 0.0003 0.0151 0.0003 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Curvature 0.0003 0.0012 0.0705 0.0045 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.0252 0.0027 0.0001 0.0000 
 0.7097 0.7377 0.7216 0.8631 
Slope 0.0627 0.1777 0.1573 0.0527 
 0.0000 0.0002 0.0081 0.0158 
Curvature 0.0005 0.0015 0.0284 0.0484 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the ISM index between 6-18 months over the 1970-2016 
period and one-way Granger causality over all spans during the shorter 1990-2016 period. There is 
evidence of two-way causality for the slope and curvature factors. 
Table A9: Granger Causality Tests – Philadelphia Fed Manufacturing Index, 1970-2016 
1970-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.0241 0.0387 0.0420 0.0357 
 0.3286 0.3603 0.3809 0.2299 
Slope 0.1265 0.3171 0.4632 0.5319 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0070 0.0404 
Curvature 0.0003 0.0137 0.0266 0.0185 
 0.0017 0.0266 0.1283 0.2205 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.0381 0.0867 0.0417 0.1093 
 0.1687 0.0564 0.4102 0.4384 
Slope 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0021 
 0.0233 0.0371 0.0798 0.1029 
Curvature 0.0000 0.0000 0.0062 0.0015 
 0.0399 0.0429 0.1636 0.1029 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the Philadelphia Fed index for all horizons over the 1970-2016 
period and over 3 and 12 month spans during the shorter 1990-2016 period. There is evidence of two-way 
causality for the slope and curvature factors, but curvature performs better at 12-18 months. In the 1970-
2016 period, slope shows reverse Granger causality. 
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Table A10: Granger Causality Tests – University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Survey  (12 month change), 1978-2016 
1978-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.1574 0.0444 0.2932 0.6482 
 0.5500 0.4555 0.5850 0.6778 
Slope 0.0825 0.2018 0.0551 0.2032 
 0.1088 0.0493 0.2552 0.5621 
Curvature 0.0127 0.0894 0.2254 0.8356 
 0.6829 0.3183 0.7673 0.9210 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.0165 0.0006 0.0052 0.0644 
 0.6974 0.4744 0.7485 0.6431 
Slope 0.1579 0.1389 0.1023 0.2226 
 0.0041 0.1737 0.5936 0.7594 
Curvature 0.2096 0.4339 0.8677 0.7865 
 0.0457 0.0483 0.2916 0.5632 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor.  Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence 
of one-way Granger causality of D-star on the change in consumer sentiment at 6 months over the 1970-
2016 period and one-way Granger causality over 3-12 month spans during the shorter 1990-2016 period. 
There is evidence of one-way causality for the curvature factor at 3 months in the longer sample. 
 
(d) Investors’ Risk Appetite 
 
Table A11: Granger Causality Tests – Variance-Based Risk Aversion, 1990-2016  
1990-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.5304 0.5027 0.1588 0.0223 
 0.3182 0.1547 0.2133 0.3037 
Slope 0.8145 0.6763 0.1222 0.0223 
 0.0868 0.0902 0.2434 0.4226 
Curvature 0.5105 0.7588 0.1390 0.0902 
 0.4083 0.1217 0.6002 0.6437 
P-values shown. 3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate 
significance at 5% level. D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury 
yield spread. Curvature is the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable 
measures Granger causality ‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse 
causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the factor. Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show little 
evidence of one-way or two-way Granger causality for any on the factors on the variance measure of risk 
aversion over the 1990-2016 period. At the 18 month horizon the D-star and slope factors show some 
evidence of one-way causality. 
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Table A12: Granger Causality Tests – ECB World Risk Aversion Measure, 1998-2016 
1998-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.2478 0.0234 0.0336 0.0048 
 0.4780 0.2137 0.0145 0.0356 
Slope 0.8673 0.4270 0.0910 0.2453 
 0.0166 0.0969 0.0228 0.0858 
Curvature 0.9550 0.0958 0.0307 0.0236 
 0.0765 0.1309 0.0897 0.0992 
3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate significance at 5% level. 
D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury yield spread. Curvature is 
the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable measures Granger causality 
‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the 
factor. Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence of one-way Granger causality of D-
star on the ECB Risk Appetite measure at 6 months over the 1998-2016 period and two-way causality at 
longer horizons. There is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the US FCI on to the slope factor. 
Curvature shows one-way causality at 12-18 months. 
 
Table A13: Granger Causality Tests – CrossBorder Capital Risk Appetite Index (12 
month change), 1978-2016 
1978-2016 3m 6m 12m 18m 
D-star 0.2698 0.1797 0.1186 0.0173 
 0.0946 0.0265 0.0011 0.0009 
Slope 0.5501 0.3977 0.0440 0.2069 
 0.0208 0.0258 0.4066 0.2502 
Curvature 0.7750 0.0261 0.0568 0.2271 
 0.0114 0.0083 0.0876 0.1112 
1990-2016     
D-star 0.0145 0.0115 0.0333 0.0452 
 0.0032 0.0022 0.0031 0.0181 
Slope 0.4528 0.2096 0.1254 0.0380 
 0.0218 0.0748 0.1233 0.3048 
Curvature 0.8322 0.0095 0.2759 0.0468 
 0.0002 0.0018 0.0039 0.0371 
3m, 6m, etc denotes the lead-time used to test Granger causality. Italics indicate significance at 5% level. 
D-star is the position of peak curvature. Slope is the 10 year-1 year Treasury yield spread. Curvature is 
the 1-5-10 year Treasury butterfly spread. The first row for each variable measures Granger causality 
‘from’ the factor ‘to’ the target, and the second row shows the reverse causality ‘from’ the target ‘to’ the 
factor. Comment: The data from these bi-variant tests show evidence of two-way Granger causality of D-
star on the CBC Risk Appetite measure over all horizons in the 1990-2016 sample and at 18 months in 
the longer sample. There is evidence of reverse one-way causality for the CBC index on to the slope 
factor and curvature factors at several horizons, but the slope shows one-way causality at 18 months in 
the shorter sample. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Do Central Bank Asset Purchases Drive Treasury Yields 
Higher or Lower?
 
– An Investigation of the Risk-Taking 
Policy Transmission Channel  
 
5.1 Large-Scale Asset Purchases and Risk Premia 
 
Financial shocks often alter the way that investors and credit providers assess risk. 
When this affects their willingness to take on risk exposures, it can lead to abrupt 
changes in both term and general risk premia. These effects are collectively called the 
risk-taking policy transmission channel (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; Borio and Zhu, 
2012, and Bruno and Shin, 2014). In this chapter, I explore this risk-taking channel 
from the recent experience of large-scale asset purchases, or LSAP
45
 (popularly known 
as QE1, QE2 and QE3), and, using a vector auto-regression model (VAR), I seek to 
better understand what factors drive Treasury term premia and corporate credit risk 
premia, and so govern their subsequent interaction. I introduce a new measure of risk 
appetite and integrate broad liquidity measures into asset pricing, taking into account 
the effects of shadow banks and foreign investors. I argue that many recent LSAP 
studies (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011 and Gagnon, 2016, for a 
summary) have flaws: for example, they ignore the substitution and dynamic effects that 
cause changes in the overall demand for safe assets, such as Treasury securities. 
Consequently, these event studies often reach perverse conclusions about asset prices 
and rarely acknowledge that the effectiveness of LSAP is typically conditional on the 
state of the economy, since consistent policy transmission crucially depends of the 
persistence of extant informational and market frictions. This implies that the efficacy 
of different LSAP will vary and it may explain why Martin and Milas (2012) find that 
the effects of QE1 on markets are larger than those of QE2. 
 
                                                          
45 Unconventional monetary policies are understood to largely comprise: (1) ‘forward guidance’ – the communication 
by the US FOMC about the likely future path of the Federal Funds rate over the next several quarters, and (2) ‘large 
scale asset purchases’ (LSAP), also known as QE (quantitative easing) – purchases by the Federal Reserve of 
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of longer-term assets, such as US Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). They also include the ‘floor system’ on interest rates paid on reserves and the Troubled Asset Relief 
Programme (TARP). Conventional monetary policies relate to interest rate setting to achieve inflation (and, in cases, 
unemployment) targets.  
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Hanson, Lucca and Wright (2017) pose this problem in a different way. They note that 
the positive correlation between short-term and long-term bond yields that was evident 
across both high and low-frequency samples prior to year 2000, has since fallen 
noticeably at low frequencies, overlapping the period of LSAP. According to the 
expectations hypothesis, there should anyway only be a limited relationship between 
short-term and long-term yields, unless policy interest rate shocks are considered to be 
persistent. Yet, the existence of institutional frictions provides plausible reasons for this 
positive relationship. These have been collectively termed amplification mechanisms by 
Shin (2017). They include the ‘reach for yield’, where certain agents with a preference 
for high coupon yields are forced to move further out along the yield curve, substituting 
high for low maturity bonds. Similarly, there are ‘hunt for duration’ (Domanski et al., 
2015) and ‘mortgage convexity’ effects, following pre-payments and loan re-financings. 
These lead to negative convexity in the term structure, when expectations of falling 
yields cause a greater demand for scarce duration, which, in turn, drive yields still 
lower. In addition, Cieslak and Povala (2014) observe that some investors trend-follow, 
while low (high) interest rates may themselves also induce a persistence in risk-seeking 
(risk-avoiding) behaviour. 
 
A puzzle is why this term premia effect should weaken over time and even reverse over 
longer horizons? Hanson, Lucca and Wright (2017) use a model with slow-moving 
capital to explain how the demand curve for maturity becomes progressively more 
elastic with respect to yields. My argument is different. LSAP policies effectively force 
the private sector to substitute cash for bonds. The reduction in the supply of bonds to 
the private sector decreases the amount of outstanding duration risk
46
 and, given 
preferred habitats, also creates scarcity effects that together lower term premia. 
However, the impact of the announcement of policy action, combined with the injection 
of more liquidity into markets, reduces perceived systemic risks, increases investors’ 
confidence and so encourages the private sector to cut its demand for safe assets, 
including Treasury bonds. This causes the demand curve for maturity to shift leftwards 
and so drive up term premia as investors become more risk-seeking. Indeed, Bhattarai 
and Neely (2016) acknowledge that “…LSAPs can also lead to lower investor risk 
                                                          
46 Duration is defined in Chapter 2. 
98 | P a g e  
 
aversion by generating expectations of improved financial and macroeconomic 
conditions.” 
 
Figure 22: US QE Periods, Nominal Term Premia and 10-Year Treasury Yield, 2007-16 
(Monthly)  
 
Source: FRBNY, FRB 
 
The chart shows the relationship between the US Treasury 10-year yield and the implied nominal term 
premia. Apart from 2007-mid-2008, the two series closely correlate and move together through the 
announced QE-periods, i.e. QE1, QE2 and QE3. Contrary to expectations, both series tend to rise through 
the QE-on period and fall in the QE-off periods, some 67% of the time. This appears inconsistent with 
event studies, but aligns with a credit/ risk-taking transmission process where more Fed liquidity lowers 
systemic risks. 
 
Put differently, the demand curve for maturity is conditional on the actions of policy-
makers, because US Treasury securities, which are a main instrument of these LSAP, 
serve as safe assets for many investor types. Treasuries are primarily demanded for 
safety reasons, because of their attributes of liquidity, low default risk, use as collateral, 
immunization and stable value. Like other assets, a decrease in the supply of Treasuries 
to the private sector will lead to upward pressure on their prices, assuming that the 
demand curve remains largely unaffected. Yet, the very act of purchasing Treasuries by 
the Federal Reserve results in a simultaneous increase in the supply of cash, another 
safe asset. This leads to an increase in the demand for Treasury substitutes (such as high 
quality, similar duration mortgage and corporate bonds), but it may also cause a parallel 
drop in the demand for Treasuries and other safe assets and increase investors’ appetite 
for riskier securities, to the extent that this direct supply of cash and the indirect 
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confidence effect from official actions succeed in reducing systemic risks. Thus, 
contrary to the standard narrative, Treasury term premia and yields could rise and 
correlate negatively with widespread falls in the risk premia and yields associated with 
more risky assets, such as corporate credits. 
 
While the existing finance literature provides plausible estimates of the size of US 
Treasury term premia (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright, 2006, and Adrian et al. 2014) and 
corporate credit spreads (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012), it is less able to explain the 
factors that drive them and so accurately forecast their future movements (Duffee, 
2012). In line with these concerns, term premia have lately moved in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by the experts by rising following LSAP rather than falling. A 
time-series plot of monthly US data covering the recent LSAP episodes in Figure 22 
shows that these quantitative easing policies appear to be consistent with rising, rather 
than falling US Treasury term premia and 10-year Treasury yields. In the six years 
following the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), US 10-year Treasury yields 
generally rose with term premia during ‘QE-On’ periods and fell with term premia 
during ‘QE-Off’ periods (correlation coefficient 0.257 to the binary event of a QE 
period and with common co-movements in 67% of months)
47
. This observation stands 
in direct opposition to the accepted view, articulated in many recent event studies 
(Gagnon, 2016), that the LSAP policy response (as detailed in Appendix 5A) to the 
GFC should lead to lower bond term premia.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section describes the empirical results 
from recent event studies. Section 5.3 reviews the transmission channel literature. 
Section 5.4 discusses the proposed VAR model. Section 5.5 describes the data and 
Bayesian VAR estimation. The resulting impact of liquidity and risk appetite on risk 
premia is summarised in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 The correlation between nominal term premia and 10-year yields jumped to 0.918 over the same period. In other 
words, changes in interest rate expectations apparently played little role. 
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5.2 Event Studies  
 
In their widely-quoted event study, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
examine the impact of unconventional monetary policies on US Treasuries and 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), concluding that the announcement effect of planned 
Federal Reserve buying raises government bond prices (decreases yields)
48
. Their event 
study covers QE1 (December 2008 – March 2010) and QE2 (November 2010 – June 
2011). It explores several transmission channels and extends the original insights made 
about portfolio balance effects by Tobin (1958 and 1969) to include the supplies of 
other securities, while acknowledging that US Treasuries have risk-free, or safety, 
attributes
49
. They assign most of the change in term premia to a, so-called, safety 
channel. Their approach fits in with the preferred habitat model (Modigliani and Sutch, 
1966; Vayanos and Vila, 2009), as applied to liability immunization (Bierwag and 
Kaufman, 1985, and Domanski, Shin and Sushko, 2015), and with the safe asset 
shortage argument of Caballero (2006). Their focus on a narrow window of 2-day price 
movements may explain why some of their conclusions appear to be reversed over the 
medium-term. Event studies have been criticised as myopic because they use high 
frequency data and do not look far enough ahead to capture the full dynamic impact of 
LSAP in reducing general credit risk, but they also fail to bring in effects from other 
domestic and foreign liquidity providers (Adrian, Moench and Shin, 2010; Rey, 2016 
and Hanson, Lucca and Wright, 2017). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen are not 
alone in making their claims as Table 9 shows. For example, a recent study by Swanson 
(2015), using principal components to identify and quantify the forward guidance and 
LSAP dimensions of Federal Reserve policy, similarly appears to show that FOMC 
announcements immediately push down both Treasury and corporate yields. (See also 
D’Amico, 2012; Neely, 2015; Gagnon et al. 2011, and Joyce et al. 2010). The former 
FOMC member Jeremy Stein (2012) is unequivocal: “…[it] seems clear from the data 
that if you buy a lot of long-term Treasury securities, this exerts significant downward 
pressure on their yields and term premiums …”  
 
 
                                                          
48 “…it is clear from this body of evidence that QE lowers medium- and long-term interest rates…”(p216). 
49 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) argue that Treasuries are ‘money-like’ and when their supply as % of 
GDP is low, the value assigned to their liquidity and safety attributes is relatively high (Aaa-Treasury spread). 
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Figure 23: US Treasury Nominal Term Premia and LSAP Announcement Effects, 2008-
2012 (Daily) 
 
Source: FRBNY, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
 
Comment: In five out of eight event studies Treasury term premia fell immediately following LSAP. 
However, in all eight cases these term premia subsequently rose in the following 3-6 months. 
 
Figure 24: US Corporate Credit Risk Premia (Junk CCC less High Yield Single B and 
High Yield (B) less Investment Grade (BBB)) and LSAP Announcement Effects, 2008-
2012 (Daily, Per Cent) 
 
Source: FRBNY, FRED, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
 
Comment: In general, the two credit risk premia – the junk spread and the high yield spread – move 
together. In two cases highlighted, the corporate credit spread immediately widened within 1-2 days of 
the announcement effects; in three cases they fell and in three other cases the evidence is mixed. 
However, looking 3-6 months further ahead, corporate spreads narrowed significantly, notably following 
QE1. 
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Table 9: Estimated Effects of Quantitative Easing (LSAP) on 10-year Bond Yields 
Study  Sample  Method Yield 
reduction 
(bps) 
United States 
Greenwood and Vayanos (2008)
a
  1952-2005 Time series 82 
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache & Sack (2011)  2008-09 Event study 78 
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache & Sack (2011) 1985-2007 Time series TP only 44 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)  2008-09 Event study 91 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 2010-11 Event study 47 
Hamilton & Wu (2012) 1990-2007  Affine model 47 
Swanson (2011)  1961 Event study 88 
D'Amico & King (2013)  2009-10 Micro event study 240 
D'Amico, English, Lopez-Salido & Nelson 
(2012) 
2002-08 Weekly time series  165 
Li & Wei (2012) 1994-2007  Affine model of TP 57 
Rosa (2012)  2008-10 Event study 42 
Neely (2012)  2008-09 Event study 84 
Bauer & Neely (2012) 2008-09 Event study 80 
Bauer & Rudebusch (2011)b 2008-09  Event study TP only 44 
Christensen & Rudebusch (2012)
b
  2008-09 Event study TP only 26 
Chadha, Turner & Zampolli (2013)  1990-2008 Time series TP only 56 
Swanson (2015)
b 
 2009-15 Yield curve TP only 40 
Christensen & Rudebusch (201d)
b
  2008-09 Event study TP only 15 
United Kingdom 
Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens & Tong (2011)  2009 Event study 78 
Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens & Tong (2011) 1991-2007 Time series  51 
Christensen & Rudebusch (2012)
b
 2009-11 Event study TP only 34 
Churm, Joyce, Kapetanios & Theodoris (2015 ) 2011-12  Intl. comparison 42 
Japan 
Fukunaga, Kato & Koeda (2015)  1992-2014 Time series TP only 24 
Fukunaga, Kato & Koeda (2015) 2013-14 Event study  17 
Eurozone 
Middeldorp (2015)
c
  2013-15 Event study 45-132 
Altavilla, Carboni & Motto (2015)
d
  2014-15 Event study  44 
Middeldorp & Wood (2016)
c  
 2015 Event study 41-104 
Sweden 
De Rezende, Kjellberg & Tysklind (2015)  2015 Event study  68 
Notes: 
a
 Greenwood & Vayanos scaled the effect relative to the size of the Treasury market. The estimate 
here is based on the ratio of Treasury debt to GDP in 2015. 
b
 These studies further differentiate between 
signaling effects and portfolio effects. The reported estimate is for the portfolio effect only. 
c
 The smaller 
estimate is for German bonds and the larger one is for Italian bonds. 
d
 The estimate is for an average of 
Eurozone bonds. 
Purchases normalised to 10% of GDP. 100bp equals one % point. Most studies present a range of 
estimates. The Table displays the preferred estimate if one exists. If not, it presents the midpoint of the 
range. For event studies, the purchases are normalised by all long-term bonds, not just government bonds. 
Some of the non-event studies include non-government bond purchases and others do not. "TP only" 
denotes studies that attempt to estimate the term premium component of movements in bond yields. For 
event studies, the normalisation is based on GDP in the final year of the event. 
Source: Gagnon (2016) 
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Figures 23 and 24 put the Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen event studies into a 
longer-term context by extending the daily data span several months ahead and 
analysing the estimated term premia component of US Treasury yields and the CCC less 
single B-rated corporate credit risk spread. Admittedly, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen focus on nominal bond yields, whereas the data reported in Figures 22 and 23 
refer to the underlying Treasury term premia component. However, this latter channel is 
how many investors understand the transmission process, since LSAP are thought to 
affect interest rate expectations through a signalling channel, and term premia via 
portfolio effects (Engen, 2015 and Bhattarai and Neely, 2016). The data are derived 
from a decomposition of nominal Treasury yields into: (1) real interest rates; (2) 
inflation expectations and (3) term premia. See equation (6) below. Term premia cover 
dimensions such as default risk, duration risk, prepayment risk, inflation risk, liquidity, 
safety and local scarcity. By definition, they are the excess yields that investors require 
to commit to holding long-term government bonds instead of a series of shorter-term 
bonds. For example, suppose that the interest rate on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note is 
2.5%, and assume that the interest rate on the 1-year U.S. Treasury bill is expected to 
average 2% over the next 10 years. Then the nominal term premium on the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury note would be 0.5% (50 basis points)
50
. The contribution to yields of each 
component varies both over time and with the holding period. Kim and Orphanides 
(2007) argue that the behaviour of long-term Treasury yields cannot be explained by 
changes to interest rate expectations alone. Calculations by Adrian et al. (2014) agree. 
Their data shows that whereas short-dated US Treasury yields are largely determined by 
nominal interest rate expectations, movements in term premia dominate the yields of 
long-dated bonds. We know from Cieslak and Povala (2014) that term premia effects 
are cyclical, i.e. mean-reverting, and they ultimately wash-out of yields because real 
interest rates determine the slope of the yield curve over very long-term spans: 
 
𝑦𝑡
𝑚 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+𝑖 +
𝑚−1
𝑖=0
1
𝑚
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+𝑖 +
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑡𝑝𝑡
𝑚                                                      (6) 
 
                                                          
50
 Term premia are usually positive, but they can be negative 
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where yt
m
 is the spot yield of a bond of maturity m at time t; Et denotes the expectations 
operator; Rt is the real interest rate; πt is the inflation rate; tpt
m 
represents the nominal 
term premium over a holding period m 
 
 
I use the daily cross-sectional average US Treasury term premia data provided by 
Adrian et al. (2014). These are unobservable variables and estimated with errors (see 
Rudebusch et al, 2007), but these estimates appear plausible and they are officially 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I assume that monetary policy 
does not affect the parametric structure of the model that generates these estimates. For 
the credit risk premia, I take the spread between triple CCC-rated (or ‘Junk’ debt) and 
single B-rated (‘high yield’) US corporate bonds, as published by Bank of America/ 
Merrill Lynch and downloaded from the FRED database. This spread measures the 
incremental risk premia required to hold the securities of US corporations in or close to 
bankruptcy. Similar results come from using the B-BBB
51
 spread versus investment 
grade. These securities should be especially sensitive to changes in systemic financial 
conditions and it has been found that their risk spreads play an important role in the 
broad transmission of monetary policy via the balance sheets of financial intermediaries 
(Adrian, Moench and Shin, 2010).  The daily risk premia data appear to confirm the 
message from Figure 22 that LSAP have been more often associated with rising, not 
falling, US Treasury term premia and with collapsing credit risk premia over a timespan 
of several months. The average term premium across 1-to-10 year US Treasuries in QE1 
(QE2) averaged 132bp (109bp) in the 60 days prior to the announcement effects 
sampled by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen and a slightly higher 135bp (110bp) 
through the remainder of the two respective QE periods. During their event studies, 
Treasury term premia fell following the LSAP announcement in five out of eight cases, 
but rose in all eight cases over subsequent months. Perversely, corporate credit spreads 
immediately widened in two cases following the announcement effects and only 
unambiguously fell in three cases. However, within 3-6 months, these credit risk 
spreads narrowed significantly, notably in the wake of QE1.  
 
These positive impacts on Treasury term premia motivate me to ask whether the various 
event studies have sufficiently questioned the data? The LSAP literature’s focus on 
                                                          
51 S&P categorize an ‘investment grade’ bond as BBB and above: Moody’s use the alternative Baa label 
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supply and its implicit assumption that the private sector’s demand for Treasuries is 
unaffected misses more important fluctuations in both the bank and non-bank private 
sector’s demand for safety that may follow policy changes. These endogenous links 
between liquidity, induced changes in risk appetite and the pricing of risk has been 
termed the risk-taking channel. It includes the positive effect following improvements 
in borrower collateral, which can foster additional risk-taking by banks (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989), and it is consistent with the positive feedbacks that occur between so-
called funding liquidity and market liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This 
channel has been largely absent from traditional narratives, but it may help to explain 
the anomalous movements of Treasury yields in these event studies. 
 
5.3 Review of Transmission Channel Literature 
 
The policy risk-taking channel represents a hybrid between the standard Keynesian 
transmission mechanism of portfolio balance (Tobin, 1969); the more recent focus on 
funding sources (Brunnermeier, 2009, and Gorton, 2012); an international dimension 
(Rey, 2016) and the concept of safe assets (Caballero, 2006). A safe asset is a financial 
instrument that provides: (1) low market and credit risks; (2) high market liquidity; (3) 
limited inflation risks; (4) low exchange rate risks and (5) limited idiosyncratic risks 
(IMF, 2012). It will likely correlate negatively with investors’ risk appetite. The 
canonical safe asset is the 10-year Treasury note, but the list includes all assets that are 
used in an information-insensitive fashion (Gorton et al, 2012). The supply of these 
assets is not perfectly elastic and may have an associated cost similar to the ‘Triffin 
Dilemna’ (Portes, 2013). Supply shortages can occur because of regulation, Central 
Bank LSAP, credit rating agency downgrades and falls in investors’ risk appetite. It is 
suggested in the literature that shortages in the supply of safe assets lead to 
macroeconomic disequilibria and greater financial stress (Caballero, 2006). 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) claim that the increasing supplies of US 
Treasuries reduce the probability of crises. Many policy-makers are alert to the threat to 
the global financial system of a structural shortage of these safe assets (IMF, 2012). 
 
Much of the early economics and finance literature ignores funding issues and 
institutional structure, possibly under the influence of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and 
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Friedman (1968). It focusses, instead, on the effect of the Federal Reserve, as an interest 
rate-setter and a reserve-provider, acting on a narrow monetary aggregate, such as M2 
that largely consists of the government-insured retail deposit liabilities of domestic high 
street banks. In a Modigliani and Miller World, economic agents are never finance or 
liquidity-constrained, and there are no feedbacks from the liability structure back on to 
the asset structure, as might, for example, occur when collateral effects affect the 
transmission mechanism by boosting borrowing potential or concerns over net worth 
and capital adequacy limit future funding opportunities. Wallace (1981) has shown that 
under these assumptions, changes in the size and composition of the monetary 
authorities’ balance sheet are neutral. As a result, specific financial frictions have to be 
introduced into models, such as the heterogeneity of investors’ asset preferences; 
various market segmentations, and limits to arbitrage sufficient for assets to be 
imperfect substitutes. With imperfect substitutability, LSAP alter the relative supplies of 
assets and change term and risk premia through a portfolio balance channel. This 
literature can be categorised into four distinct parts: (1) the transmission of Treasury 
supply factors (LSAP) on to asset prices; (2) the effect of asset prices and maturity 
composition on financial stability; (3) the importance of Treasury supply for financial 
intermediation in the credit and repo markets and its implications for the shape of the 
term structure, and (4) the transmission of monetary shocks to the real economy through 
term premia and the term structure. 
 
The impact of policy change is traditionally framed in terms of monetary shocks, rather 
than these Treasury supply shocks. The conventional monetary transmission mechanism 
comprises several possible channels: (1) credit and liquidity (Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992); (2) bank capital and bank balance sheets (Van den Heuvel, 2007); (3) risk 
appetite – arising from, say, changes in investors’ perceptions of default risk, duration 
risk and systemic risk (Borio and Zhu, 2012); (4) portfolio balance – through factors 
such as duration and safety (Tobin, 1958, 1969), and (5) borrower net worth and 
balance sheet strength, which improve the quality of loan collateral (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989). Treasury supply changes, following, say, LSAP, are likely also 
transmitted through similar channels. The literature is less clear about precisely how this 
transmission operates, but it broadly takes three forms: (i) a calming effect during 
financial crises when Central Bank purchases act as ‘buyer of the last resort’; (ii) a 
signalling effect that reinforces existing ‘forward guidance’ policies (see Appendix A), 
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and (iii) a portfolio channel, where LSAP affect duration, credit and liquidity risk by 
creating a scarcity of Treasury securities (See D’Amico et al. 2012 and Vayanos and 
Vila, 2009). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) study a number of additional 
channels and conclude that signalling, inflation and safety channels worked in both QE1 
and QE2; that prepayment, default and liquidity channels worked in QE1, but not QE2, 
and they found no evidence for a duration channel. They quantify the size of the safety 
channel at 160bp, based on residual effects, and argue that it applies consistently 
throughout QE1 and QE2. Gagnon (2016) summarises the recent empirical experience 
(see Table 9). Collectively, these studies require strong assumptions for identification 
and Wright (2011) warns about the consistency of the loadings. Their empirical results 
appear far from robust and their range is particularly wide, with estimates of the impact 
effect of LSAP on the nominal ten-year Treasury yield ranging from 15 basis points 
(bp) to more than 240bp, according to the data reported earlier in Table 9. Moreover, 
these data are, themselves, often averages that blend together the various LSAP 
episodes, without discriminating between the relative effectiveness of QE1, QE2 and 
QE3, and specifically the ‘novelty’ effect of QE1. There are also disturbing 
inconsistencies: simulations by Engen (2015) suggest that a LSAP programme sized to 
reduce 10-year Treasury yields by 20bp, only lower BBB investment grade corporate 
yields by 15bp, thereby perversely widening corporate credit spreads. Hamilton and Wu 
(2012) also find an inverse effect in QE2, where Treasury yields and term premia 
increased. 
 
Goodhart and Perotti (2015) explain the recent incidence of financial crises by linking 
the maturity mismatch of banks to liquidity strains. They argue that these crises result 
from the growth of wholesale funding markets in short-term liabilities and in the 
parallel shift of banks’ loan books towards longer-dated real estate assets (Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2015). These give rise to balance sheet illiquidity and in 2007/08 
led to a large maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. In general, private banks 
and other financial institutions perform both liquidity and maturity transformation 
functions (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, and Williamson, 2012), but their liabilities 
differ by marketability and their assets have credit risk, so making them less safe than 
government securities. The literature recognizes these agency problems as an important 
source of business cycle amplification. (See Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 and Kiyotaki 
and Moore, 1997). Borio and Zhu (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2015) describe a policy 
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risk-taking channel where financial intermediation plays a key role. These financial 
intermediaries are assumed to be risk-neutral, leveraged and subject to value-at-risk 
(VaR) constraints. Positive shocks raise their demands for assets and compress risk 
premia, which, in turn, by further relaxing internal VaR constraints, allow greater 
leverage. Looser monetary policy, by lowering financing costs, drives a positive 
feedback loop, thereby creating a pro-cyclicality of leverage that can threaten financial 
stability. (See D’Arista, 2009; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012 and Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012). 
 
In an earlier study of private financial intermediaries, Shin (2010) distinguishes between 
the gross size of financial balance sheets and the less important, but more traditional, 
net balance sheet size (i.e. net worth) which excludes inter-lender payment flows. He 
argues that long chains of financial intermediation highlight greater counterparty risk, 
since these imply a growing reliance on short-term and highly pro-cyclical financing. 
Shin also shows how the liability immunisation policies of these institutions can be 
destabilising, because when liabilities change faster than assets, the demand for 
duration-matching instruments can be excessive. He concludes that these structural 
changes explain the rapid growth in repos and the over-sized impact of short-term 
policy rates on the credit markets. The use of repos and, hence, leverage depend heavily 
on the shape of the yield curve. It has been known for some time that the yield curve 
can predict future macro-economic conditions (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991 and 
Moench, 2012), but it has only recently been introduced as a transmission variable in 
macro-economic models. (See Wu, 2001; Ang and Piazzesi, 2001; Evans and Marshall, 
2007, and Ludvigson and Ng, 2009). Estrella and Hardouvelis show how a flattening 
yield curve precedes a slower economy by around one year, which should also lead to 
higher default risks being subsequently discounted into credit spreads. It follows that, as 
the yield curve flattens and Treasury term premia narrow, so there occurs a 
corresponding rise in risk premia attached to other more risky instruments. 
 
To quantify these term premia, Adrian et al. (2013) develop statistical methods to 
decompose nominal US Treasury yields into expected short-term rates and term premia. 
They use a five-factor model, justified following a Wald test on the rank of the factor 
matrix, rather than the similar three-factor ‘no arbitrage’ model employed by Kim and 
Wright (2005). Theoretical macroeconomic models typically argue that term premia do 
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not matter, but the authors show that their term premia estimates are elevated when both 
unemployment and measures of uncertainty are high. However, they find little evidence 
that term premia rise when monetary policy tightens. In a parallel study, Rudebusch, 
Sack and Swanson (2007) give support to the observation made by the former Federal 
Reserve Chairman (Bernanke, 2006) that declines in term premia are financially 
stimulative, rather than recessionary as many previous empirical studies show. They 
conclude that policymakers should still assess the source of the change in term premia, 
since only those monetary policy and supply shocks that narrow term premia are likely 
to be stimulative. Bauer and Hamilton (2015) question many of these statistical test 
results, concluding that only the yield curve level and slope are robust predictors of 
excess returns and there is no convincing evidence of unspanned macro risks. Gilchrist, 
Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009) find that unexpected shocks to credit spreads, especially 
of medium rather than low grade issuers, account for a large proportion of the variation 
in economic activity two-to-four years ahead. In a recent follow-up, Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek (2012) show how changes in the credit-worthiness of broker-dealers cause 
shocks to excess bond premia, after removing an expected default component. These 
shocks lead to a fall in the financial sector’s effective risk-taking capacity, reduced 
credit supply and less favourable economic conditions.  
 
Although these credit and risk-taking channels have been mostly studied for closed 
economies, there is growing evidence that they might be also relevant in an international 
context, particularly given the significance of foreign activity in the US Treasury 
market. Net foreign buying of Treasuries has obvious parallels to the LSAP programme 
because the effective supply of safe assets is reduced as they are bid away from 
domestic holders. The literature largely focuses on ‘global imbalances’ (See Caballero, 
2006; Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008, and Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009). 
The transmission of US monetary policy shocks to the rest of the World is not well-
understood, but it is known that global banks finance cross-border lending to regional 
borrowers by tapping US dollar money market funds in the key financial centres, 
notably the Eurodollar markets. These wholesale funding pools are traditionally fed by 
US dollar revenues from oil and commodity producers, but they have lately enjoyed a 
windfall from buoyant US corporate cash flows
52
. Their recent expansion questions the 
                                                          
52 Under new liquidity coverage regulations, corporate deposits have become less attractive to domestic US banks. 
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ability of national economies to achieve monetary independence even under flexible 
exchange rates, so contradicting Mundell’s policy trilemma (Rey, 2016). Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2015) show that US monetary policy affects risk premia, 
international leverage and credit growth, which appears consistent with both the credit 
channel and the risk-taking channels of monetary policy. The empirical studies again 
disagree about the size of the impact effect from foreign buying on US Treasury yields. 
Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate the impact effect of foreign official purchases of 
US Treasuries at around 80 basis points. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) 
find that falls in foreign holdings increase long-term Treasury yields by 59 basis points 
relative to the Baa (BBB) corporate bond yield. In contrast, Sierra (2010) finds little 
effect on US Treasury bond yields from foreign investors at the 10-year maturity. 
 
5.4 Quantifying the Effects of Liquidity and Risk Appetite 
 
The specific claims made about Treasury term premia by event studies run counter both 
to the longer-horizon time-series evidence and to the impulse response functions 
estimated from a Bayesian VAR model. I construct this VAR to better understand the 
role of term and credit risk premia in policy transmission, again taking US Treasury 
term premia estimates from Adrian et al. (2014) and corporate credit spreads, as 
measured by the Bank of America/ Merrill Lynch benchmark series. Changes in the 
excess demand for longer duration safe assets are modelled using a risk appetite
53
 
variable labelled D-star that represents the position of the peak curvature of the US 
Treasury term structure along the maturity axis. Underlying the D-star statistic is a 
preferred habitat framework that generates a derived demand for maturity based on 
duration needs. Leibowitz, Bova and Kogelman (2014) and Greenwood, Hanson and 
Stein (2010) collectively evidence that institutional investors and corporate financial 
managers target liability duration to guide their choice of safe assets. Intuitively, as the 
risk appetites of investors and credit providers improve, their investment horizons 
should lengthen and lending and liquidity conditions expand, so encouraging investors 
to move further out along the 'risk curve' and into longer duration, less liquid and more 
volatile instruments. In modern investment parlance, this describes a shift towards 'Risk 
                                                          
53 Risk appetite as defined by Gai & Vause (2006) to distinguish it from both risk aversion and riskiness. 
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On'-type strategies (i.e. risk-seeking), such as equities and corporate debt, and away 
from ‘Risk Off’-type strategies, such as holding safe asset Treasury bonds and cash.  
 
As these assets re-price, so their implied term and risk premia change. The increase in 
risk appetite reduces the demand for safe asset duration, so lifting local term premia. 
This risk-taking policy transmission channel pushes up the prices of risky assets and 
lowers the prices of safe assets. This is consistent with the interpretation that greater 
risk-seeking activity (i.e. a rise in D-star), possibly encouraged by an increase in LSAP 
and Federal Reserve liquidity injections, leads to the substitution of safe Treasuries for 
riskier corporate credits. It may also include a rise in private banks’ leverage, as their 
balance sheet composition switches away from government bonds and towards more 
credits (i.e. loans and securities). These actions push up Treasury term premia and, by 
lowering external financing costs they are associated with narrower corporate credit 
spreads, lower volatility, more real capital spending and faster economic activity. They 
may also reduce investors’ need to hold extra liquidity for precautionary reasons, 
assuming that the resulting mix of Central Bank assets boosts system-wide liquidity (i.e. 
by encouraging more risk-taking by banks and other credit providers). In short, LSAP 
could result in a reduced demand for safe asset Treasuries and an increased demand for 
both more duration and riskier corporate credits, thereby raising Treasury term premia 
and subsequently tightening corporate credit spreads and boosting equity prices. This 
matches the earlier time-series evidence following the Global Financial Crisis and the 
intuition that investors’ demands for safe and risky assets should move oppositely. In 
practice, the implementation of unconventional monetary policies was originally 
designed to bolster a then flagging US economy and so help defray both perceived and 
actual defaults and systemic risks. It would be, therefore, reasonable to conclude from a 
time-consistency perspective that a successful outcome would be faster nominal GDP 
growth and, hence, higher nominal Treasury yields and lower default risk premia 
embedded in corporate securities, and thus tighter corporate credit spreads. 
 
These effects may also occur endogenously because changes in risk appetite could both 
be induced by liquidity factors and, in turn, stimulate future increases in credit 
provision. This makes it difficult to identify the risk-taking channel separately from the 
better known credit channel, not least because the latter depends on risk-taking by 
banks. Consequently, I set up a VAR to model the interactions and better understand the 
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drivers of US Treasury term premia and corporate credit risk premia. Prime candidates 
for inclusion are measures of domestic and international liquidity and real economic 
activity. The literature review in Section 5.3 shows the importance of LSAP policies, 
but questions whether the monetary transmission channels can be restricted to Federal 
Reserve activity alone, because other large-scale transactors in asset markets also affect 
asset prices. My contention is that the impact of policy applies over longer time periods 
to broader liquidity measures that embrace shadow banks, repo markets and 
international capital flows and include the role played by government bonds as safe 
assets in business cycle recessions. Financial market imperfections, as reflected in term 
and risk premia, are central to monetary policy transmission. It seems plausible that 
improvements (deteriorations) in risk appetite, possibly induced by monetary expansion 
(contraction), lead investors to lengthen (shorten) and broaden (narrow) their investment 
horizons by moving into longer (shorter) duration and riskier (safer) assets, including 
real capital goods (cash). The latter, in turn, through traditional multiplier effects then 
influence the tempo of business activity. To analyse these dynamic interactions between 
monetary policy, expected market volatility, investors’ risk aversion54, leverage and 
credit flows, I build on the work of Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2012) and Rey 
(2016). Like these previous studies, I analyse the dynamic links between the variables, 
but I also explicitly focus on the interplay between credit risk and term premia using the 
VAR framework. 
 
The proposed vector auto-regression (VAR) contains both economic and financial 
variables (zt) and follows the standard reduced form: 
 
𝑧𝑡+1 = Φ𝑧𝑡 + Ω
1/2𝜀𝑡,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝜀𝑡+1~𝑁𝐼𝐷(0, 𝐼𝑘) 
 
and where Φ is a n × k autoregressive matrix and Ω is a n × k matrix. The vector of 
economic and financial variables (zt) includes potential exogenous monetary policy 
variables (credit supply) and measures of investors’ risk appetite; transmission 
                                                          
54 Although, these terms are often used interchangeably, strictly risk appetite and risk aversion are not exact opposites 
(see Gai and Vause, 2006). I define risk aversion in terms of investor’s preferences, while risk appetite derives from a 
combination of these preferences and macroeconomic conditions that indicate riskiness. 
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variables, such as risk premia (Treasury term premia, corporate credit spreads) and 
market volatility, and variables, that measure outcomes, such as business activity and 
inflation.  
 
5.5 Data Description 
 
For monthly nominal Treasury term premia, I use the estimates at the 10-year maturity 
published by Adrian et al. (2014) and downloaded from the NYFRB website. Since this 
data series is not stationary according to an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (p=0.1212), I 
propose to also include in the VAR model a rolling three-year trend in US CPI (less 
food and energy) inflation. Evidence from Cieslak and Povala (2014) suggests that the 
effect of inflation on bond yields tends to be slow-moving and persistent. The corporate 
credit risk premia are calculated monthly from the spread between Bank of America/ 
Merrill Lynch single B high yield and BBB (Baa) investment grade bonds. These series 
are chosen in preference to CCC junk bonds for their longer available history. The 
Merrill Lynch MOVE index
55
 of bond market volatility is included in the VAR model 
to measure bond market liquidity risk and to allow for the further effects that bond 
volatility may have on the risk appetite of credit providers. This index seems better-
suited than the VIX for understanding the actions of credit-providers, who often hold 
large inventories of bonds as collateral. To capture the business cycle, I use the ISM 
Purchasing Managers’ Index for US manufacturing industry. These variables were 
downloaded from the FRED website. 
 
To model funding liquidity risk and the credit channel, I use the CBC Liquidity Indexes. 
These monthly data are published on-line (www.liquidity.com) and provide convenient 
and broad measures of US and International Liquidity. They have the advantage of 
providing a consistent quantitative measure of monetary policy than spans both the pre 
and post-GFC periods that, for example, unlike the Federal Funds rate is not 
compromised by the zero lower bound. Their construction follows the original 
recommendations of Gurley and Shaw (1960) by splitting money into its inside and 
                                                          
55 MOVE is a weighted index of implied volatility for one-month U.S. dollar interest rate options across the yield 
curve. It is devised by Merrill Lynch and has been produced since 1988 as a bond market equivalent of the CBOE 
VIX index for stocks.  
114 | P a g e  
 
outside components. Here, inside money is defined to embrace financial institutions 
other than banks and to include net foreign activity. The data is based on the Federal 
Reserve’s Flow of Funds (Z1) statistics, which cover a far-wider range of credit-
providers, e.g. so-called shadow banks, than conventional money supply measures. For 
example, the stock of US liquidity, as defined in asset-terms, totals close to US$24 
trillion in absolute size, or nearly double the circa US$13 trillion US M2 money supply. 
The index components allow a breakdown of US Liquidity into Federal Reserve, private 
sector and foreign sources. Index data are available for 80 economies and for several 
aggregates, such as total emerging market liquidity, which itself may influence Treasury 
demand given how many of these economies shadow the US dollar. The CBC indexes 
are reported in normalised data format and expressed as standard deviation units relative 
to a rolling 40-month mean. Since the CBC sub-index for Federal Reserve liquidity 
injections accounts for only one dimension of the LSAP, I also include the average 
maturity of the outstanding stock of Treasuries. 
 
Figure 25: D-star (Implied Risk Appetite) and LSAP, 2007-16 (Monthly, Years) 
 
Comment: The chart shows movements in D-star, the position of the curvature peak of the term structure 
(measured along the maturity axis). LSAP periods are shaded. D-star contracts from just over six years to 
4.7 years ahead of the GFC. It bottoms and rises strongly through QE1 to over 7.5 years, remaining 
elevated, with only small fluctuations, through the subsequent QE2 and QE3 periods. 
 
To capture investors’ risk-taking behaviour, I use the D-star calculation derived in 
Chapter 3. This statistic approximates the demand for safe asset duration from the 
position of the curvature peak in the US Treasury term structure along the maturity/ 
duration axis. It is related to the maturity distribution rather than the size of term 
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premia. D-star, averages 6.2 years (1946-2016) for the US, with a 10 month standard 
deviation. The data are stationary according to an augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(p=0.000). The absence of a trend may indicate there is no long-term excess demand for 
or supply of safe assets. Figure 25 shows a monthly time-series plot of D-star over the 
recent LSAP periods, designated QE1, QE2 and QE3. D-star rises strongly through QE1 
following the GFC: a time when risk appetite stood at extremely depressed levels. The 
data indicate that D-star bottomed prior to QE1, although the latter appears to reinforce 
its recovery. It also rises to a lesser extent through QE2, but actually falls coincident 
with QE3. Longer investment time horizons, i.e. higher D-star values, are associated 
with more risk-seeking behaviour by investors. I argue in Chapter 3 that intuitively this 
may be better understood from the special case of the quadratic yield curve, where the 
position of the curvature peak is mathematically related to the ratio between the slope 
and the curvature parameters. When both parameters move together, the curvature peak 
retains its position, but when the slope increases proportionately faster (slower) than the 
curvature, then the curvature peak, i.e. D-star moves rightwards (leftwards) along the 
maturity/ duration axis. Since curvature can also be explained by the duration effect of 
expected future interest rate moves, it will frequently correlate with the slope parameter 
assuming the ‘normal’ mean-reversion of interest rates. When rates are anticipated to 
rise (fall) significantly further, i.e. overshoot at cyclical economic extremes, then 
curvature will take on a smaller (larger) than normal value resulting in a larger (smaller) 
D-star value. 
 
5.6 Estimation Results 
 
Given the large number of variables deployed, I estimate a Bayesian VAR using 
monthly data from 1988-2016, incorporating a Litterman/ Minnesota prior. A lag length 
of three periods was chosen from the usual Likelihood Ratio and BIC criteria. The 
system is dynamically stable since all roots lie within the unit circle. A subset of the key 
impulse responses is shown in Figure 26. The complete set of generalised impulse 
response functions are reported in Appendix 5C, with equivalent results from a 
conventional VAR (with associated standard error bands) reported alongside. In general, 
the BVAR and the VAR give broadly similar results. 
116 | P a g e  
 
 
The upper four panels of Figure 26 illustrate the impulse response functions of 10-year 
Treasury term premia following shocks to risk appetite, liquidity and volatility. The 
liquidity impact is consistently positive with a peak after 10-12 months. The chart 
separately identifies the contributions from US central bank liquidity and emerging 
market liquidity: both are often large buyers of US Treasuries. The Federal Reserve 
initially has the stronger effect, but the liquidity impact from emerging markets on US 
term premia builds to a higher peak after 8-10 months. Following a shock to D-star (risk 
appetite) the response function quickly moves to a peak after around 10-12 months, 
before tailing off towards small negative readings two years out. Bond volatility 
(MOVE index) has an immediate positive effect on term premia, which then decays 
slowly over a two year period. Similar response functions are shown for credit risk 
premia in the lower four panels of Figure 26. In contrast to Treasury term premia, credit 
spreads tighten following liquidity shocks with a lag of 2-3 months and they appear to 
respond most to domestic private sector liquidity, possibly because this implies lower 
default risks. These asymmetric responses may help to explain the differential 
movements of term and credit risk premia between QE1 and QE2. The effect of D-star 
(risk appetite) on credit spreads evolves from positive to strongly negative after 10 
months. The largest effect on credit spreads comes from a unit shock to the US ISM 
index (Purchasing Managers Index), which unambiguously causes them to narrow, 
probably again because corporate default rates implicitly decline. Credit spread shocks, 
themselves, correlate negatively with Treasury term premia up to seven months ahead, 
in line with ‘Risk On’ and ‘Risk Off’ moves. The other response functions look 
plausible (see Appendix 5C). For example, extensions in the average duration of 
outstanding Treasuries reduce bond volatility and the consumer inflation trend has a 
slightly positive impact on these risk premia.  
 
The main findings from the BVAR can be summarised as follows: 
 
1) An increase in risk appetite (D-star) leads to higher Treasury term premia. These 
build to a peak at nine months, but turn negative after 22 months 
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Figure 26: Selected Impulse Response Functions (Periods) 
 
 
Comment: The upper four charts show the generalised impulse response functions over a 30-month time 
horizon for the Treasury real term premia following a unit shock to each of the four variables. The lower 
four charts describes the same for the credit risk premium. The broken line in the first chart denotes the 
response of Treasury term premia to an emerging market liquidity shock and the solid black line denotes 
the effect from a Federal Reserve liquidity shock. The broken line in the lower chart denotes the response 
of credit risk premia to private sector liquidity shocks. 
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2) An increase in the liquidity variables leads to a rise in Treasury term premia. This 
effect peaks at around six months. The impact coming from international liquidity 
(Emerging Markets) is strongest and Central Bank liquidity next strongest 
3) Larger Treasury term premia lead to subsequently lower credit spreads, with the 
peak effect coming after 23 months 
4) Credit spreads (B less Baa/ BBB) are shifted lower by an increase in the liquidity 
variables. Although spreads move perversely in the very short-term, they fall after a 
lag of four months and reach their minimums after 23 months  
5) An increase in risk appetite (D-star) also causes credit spreads to initially rise, before 
reversing its effect and pushing them to lows after 19 months  
6) An increase in the liquidity variables, notably private sector liquidity, improves risk 
appetite (D-star), with the effect peaking at 11 months  
7) Increases in bond volatility and falls in credit spreads both positively impact 
Treasury term premia after one month  
8) Increases in bond volatility (MOVE) and decreases in both the pace of US business 
activity (US PMI) and in the average maturity of Treasury debt all raise credit 
spreads after 1-2 months 
9) Larger Treasury term premia are associated with stronger US economic activity (US 
PMI), with the peak effect occurring 20 months ahead  
10) More abundant liquidity, notably Federal Reserve Liquidity, and greater risk 
seeking activity by investors and credit providers (D-star) both lead to positive 
impacts on US economic activity (US PMI), again with the peak effects coming 
after around 20 months 
11) As risk appetite increases, the average maturity of Treasuries tends to fall, possibly 
indicating that the maturity of newly issued government debt responds to weaker 
demand for longer duration bonds 
12) Central Bank liquidity responds positively to unfavourable shocks in risk appetite, 
volatility, economic activity and credit spreads 
 
119 | P a g e  
 
The BVAR results appear consistent with the interpretation that greater risk-seeking 
activity, possibly driven by an increase in LSAP and Federal Reserve liquidity 
injections or foreign buying of US Treasuries, leads to the portfolio substitution of safe 
Treasuries for riskier corporate credits. In parallel, risk-seeking private banks switch the 
composition of their balance sheets away from government bonds, towards more credits 
(i.e. loans and securities) and so take on higher leverage. This also aligns with the 
literature on looser private credit supply inducing falls in corporate bond risk premia. 
These actions push up Treasury term premia, but by lowering external financing costs 
they are associated with narrower corporate credit spreads, lower volatility, more real 
capital spending and faster economic activity. These effects appear to peak around 20 
months ahead. 
 
Figure 27: The Risk-Seeking Channel (Schematic) 
 
 
Comment: The chart describes the linkages between variables and illustrates the path of shocks to risk 
appetite and large-scale asset purchases (LSAP). The broken lines indicate the initial path of the LSAP 
shock and the subsequent feedback from changes to economic activity. The diagram shows several other 
feedbacks and emphasises the role of credit providers and the transmission through corporate credit 
spreads. 
 
In turn, narrower credit spreads and lower volatility act as an accelerator mechanism by 
feeding-back into an earlier stage of the transmission chain, possibly through the 
relaxation of banks’ internal VaR (value-at-risk) constraints. This adds to private sector 
leverage and liquidity, which raise Treasury term premia further, encourage additional 
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risk-seeking and so reinforce the traditional credit channel. Larger Treasury term 
premia also tend to correlate with stronger international liquidity, possibly because this 
implies a net capital flow away from the US to emerging markets, which, in turn, could 
indicate returning ‘flight’ capital quitting safe US Treasuries. The BVAR results are 
also consistent with a fall in the average maturity of the outstanding private sector stock 
of Treasuries, leading to greater Federal Reserve liquidity, in line with the operation of 
LSAP. Figure 27 shows a schematic representation of the transmission mechanism 
indicated by the BVAR, where the solid lines indicate the many plausible paths of the 
risk-seeking channel. The main impacts from LSAP and the feedback effect from 
economic activity are highlighted as broken lines. According to a conventional VAR, 
the D-star measure of risk appetite is Granger causal (p=0.361), whereas other variables 
including policy liquidity do not appear to be. 
 
The comparative impulse response functions reported in Figure 28 show that the effects 
of ‘liquidity’ and ‘risk appetite’ (i.e. D-star) shocks are positively correlated: more 
liquidity as well as a larger D-star lead to higher Treasury term premia, and, 
unambiguously from 10-periods onwards, both shocks also cause corporate credit 
spreads to tighten. D-star appears to have the larger relative effect on corporate credit 
spreads, which is plausible assuming it signals greater risk-seeking behaviour. Equally, 
the liquidity factors seem to be more important for Treasury term premia, which is 
consistent in circumstances when more liquidity reduces perceived systemic risk, since 
investors should reduce their risk-avoiding investment strategies and switch away from 
Treasuries. It could, therefore, follow that US Federal Reserve ‘Forward Guidance’ 
policies have their greatest impact on corporate credit spreads, whereas LSAP 
programmes tend to initially push up Treasury term premia and only later cause 
corporate credit spreads to tighten. 
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Figure 28: Comparative Impulse Responses to D-star and Liquidity Shocks – 10-year 
Treasury Term Premia and B-BBB Credit Spreads (Periods) 
(a) D-star 
 
(b) Liquidity 
 
Comment: The impulse response functions taken from a BVAR model show the comparative responses 
over a span of 30 periods of 10-year US Treasury term premia and B-BBB corporate credit spreads to 
shocks in D-star (upper panel) and Liquidity factors (lower panel). Term premia seem to be most affected 
by changes in liquidity conditions, whereas credit spreads are in the first instance positively impacted by 
D-star (risk appetite), before a strong negative effect then takes hold. Between periods 4 and 20 following 
the shock, credit spreads tighten significantly. 
 
I check robustness by re-estimating the VAR over the pre-crisis sample period 1988-
2006 and by removing lags to ensure overfitting is not an issue. Figure 29 compares the 
impulse reponses for the 10-year term premia with those for the full model. The cross-
check results do not alter my previous conclusions. However, I note that the effect of a 
D-star (risk appetite) shock is greater in the full sample that includes the GFC. This, in 
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turn, may be because risk appetite became extremely depressed during the crisis. Four 
studies with a different focus, but some related results (Bekaert et al. 2012; Bruno and 
Shin, 2013; Rey, 2016, and Mallick et al. 2017) allow further robustness checks. 
Bekaert et al. (2012) extract a variance premium from the CBOE’s VIX equity volatility 
index reflecting risk aversion
56
. They estimate a four-variable VAR that includes a 
business cycle indicator, the two VIX components and the U.S. Fed Funds target rate, 
inflation-adjusted. They find that a loose monetary policy reduces risk aversion (i.e. 
equivalent to my increase in risk appetite) and that periods of high VIX are followed by 
looser monetary policies. Bruno and Shin (2013) also run a four-variable VAR, using 
quarterly data over 1995-2007, but add measures of U.S. broker-dealer leverage and the 
real effective dollar exchange rate (i.e. this is similar to my inclusion of broader 
measures of liquidity). They find that a negative monetary policy shock leads to an 
increase in the VIX after four quarters and a decline in U.S. broker-dealer leverage after 
some two-and-a-half years. From a seven variable VAR, Rey (2016) similarly finds that 
a lower Federal Funds rate leads to falls in the VIX after about five quarters, while 
banks’ leverage and gross credit flows rise after three years. In turn, a fall in the VIX 
leads to increases in global domestic credit, after one year, and greater bank leverage 
and capital inflows. Mallick et al. (2017) compute a seven variable VAR to study the 
explicit effects of monetary policy on volatility and the subsequent impact of any 
change in volatility on bond term premia. They find that an expansionary monetary 
policy reduces volatility and lowers term premia, but its effect on business activity in 
the post-GFC period becomes insignificant. Moreover, volatility shocks apparently raise 
term premia in the pre-GFC period and lower them in the post-GFC period, possibly 
because of a ‘flight to safety’. Although all these four studies tend to report noticeably 
longer lag times, their conclusions seem compatible with my results since they 
collectively show: (1) the positive effect of liquidity factors on risk-seeking behaviour 
and (2) the importance of monetary transmission, via changing risk and term premia, 
along the risk-taking channel. The main structural differences between these studies and 
mine are: (i) my use of a larger 10-variable BVAR and adoption of a more recent 
dataset that includes the GFC; (ii) my focus on the joint interaction between the term 
and credit risk premia; (iii) my substitution of bond volatility (MOVE) for equity 
volatility (VIX); (iv) my inclusion of D-star to separately measure risk appetite, rather 
                                                          
56 Variance risk premium(t) = VIXt
2 – Et(σt+1
2), where σt is the realised return volatility on the S&P500 over 22 days 
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than taking the VIX or its derivatives, and (v) my use of variables that can better capture 
unconventional monetary policies, such as shadow bank credit, measures of Federal 
Reserve liquidity and cross-border capital flows. 
 
Figure 29: Robustness Tests – Effects on IRFs of Dropping Lags and Restricting 
Sample Size 
 
Comment: The upper two charts show the generalised impulse response functions over a 30-month time 
horizon for the Treasury real term premia following a unit shock to liquidity and risk appetite (D-star). 
The solid line denotes the full model and the broken line identifies the same model with lags restricted to 
one period. The lower two charts similarly distinguish between the full model (solid line) and a restricted 
sample (broken line), estimated prior to 2007. 
 
Are these risk appetite and liquidity shocks economically-meaningful sources of 
variation in the financial cycle over time? A variance decomposition, using a Cholesky 
ordering, shows that while D-star only explains some 6 percent of the variation in 
Treasury term premia, it accounts for nearly 15 percent of changes to bond volatility, 
and for as much as 12 percent of the variations in both credit spreads and the US PMI 
business cycle over a 30-month time horizon. The aggregate liquidity variables 
determine over 12 percent of the variation in Treasury term premia; some 13 percent of 
the variation in credit spreads; nearly 10 percent of the change in bond volatility and 
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over 8 percent of the variation in the US PMI. Thus, the combined impact of the risk 
appetite and liquidity factors on each of these four variables can account for between 
one fifth and a quarter of their overall variations. Although these shocks may or may not 
be correlated, which makes interpretation difficult, only 6 percent of the change in D-
star appears to be explained by liquidity and just 13 percent of the change in liquidity 
comes directly from D-star. On the other hand, as much as 25 percent of the changes to 
policy liquidity are reactions to financial instability, such as wider credit spreads, larger 
term premia and greater bond volatility. A further noteworthy result is that while 
Treasury term premia only separately explain around 3 percent of the variation in credit 
spreads, credit spread shocks themselves determine nearly 16 percent of the variation in 
Treasury term premia and an even larger 30 percent of the variation in the US PMI. 
Bruno and Shin (2013) find that shocks to the Federal Funds rate explain almost 30 
percent of the variance of the VIX at horizons longer than 10 quarters. In comparison, 
Bekaert et al. (2012) find that monetary policy shocks account for over 20 percent of the 
variance of risk aversion at horizons longer than seven quarters. Rey (2016) finds that 
shocks to the Federal Funds rate explain only around 4 percent of the variance of the 
VIX, but notes that the result is sensitive to the definition of leverage. Although there is 
some dispersion in these estimates depending on the number of variables and the exact 
specification of the VAR, they are all economically significant and potentially large 
effects. The results seem consistent with the interpretation that the liquidity and risk 
appetite counterparts of the LSAP are likely to have reduced the demand for safe 
Treasury securities and increased the demand for riskier corporate credits, thereby 
raising Treasury term premia and subsequently tightening corporate credit spreads. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Motivated by event studies of the post-GFC and Great Recession period, this chapter 
attempts to develop a better understanding of the policy transmission mechanism 
following LSAP. It distinguishes different risk premia channels for safe and risky 
assets; adopts a new measure of risk appetite rather than just taking stock market 
volatility, and includes broader definitions of liquidity. Like other studies, it shows: (1) 
the importance of a risk-taking channel; (2) the positive feedbacks between greater 
liquidity provision and lower risk, and (3) it specifically captures the positive policy 
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reaction to heightened financial market instability. However, it differs, notably from 
many event studies, by (4) highlighting the opposite movements between US Treasury 
term premia and corporate credit spreads following LSAP programmes; (5) it points to 
variations in the efficacy of LSAP conditional of the state of risk appetite and the 
subsequent response of private sector liquidity, helping to shed light on why the policy 
impacts of QE1 appear greater than the subsequent QE2 and QE3, and (6) it suggests 
that the D-star measure of risk appetite, itself, is weakly Granger causal. These 
differences may arise because of shifts in the demand for Treasuries implicit in the 
calming and signalling (i.e. ‘forward guidance’) and cash injection dimensions of 
LSAP. Moreover, the observed statistical stationarity of D-star may tell us that there is 
no long-term excess demand for safe assets as some claim. 
 
I specifically disagree with the widespread conclusion that LSAP lower and do not raise 
Treasury term premia and government bond yields. This claim is inconsistent with: (i) 
the time-series evidence; (ii) with the predictions from a Bayesian VAR model and (iii) 
from the likely long-run intensions of policy-makers (a notable time-inconsistency). In 
particular, the BVAR suggests that risk appetite is an important determinant of the 
financial cycle. It affects the leverage of global banks and subsequent credit growth 
(although I accept that my results above may show more statistical than economic 
significance), and ultimately changes Treasury term and risk premia. While close study 
of LSAP periods can improve our understanding of monetary transmission, event 
studies may be too one-sided insofar that they only consider the instantaneous effects of 
LSAP on a narrow range of Treasury issues and so ignore the possible long-term 
counter-trends and systemic effects, which may be better captured by a VAR. The 
definition of LSAP adopted by the event studies focuses on the one-off announcement 
effects on supply of several pre-selected Federal Reserve bond-buying programmes, 
rather than the broader systemic effects on demand that might include: (a) the impact 
from the simultaneous replacement of bonds with Central Bank or foreign investors’ 
cash; (b) the cumulative expansion of Federal Reserve credit over the period and (c) 
feedback effects from changes in investors’ risk appetite. While their emphasis on the 
reduced supply of safety acknowledges that US Treasuries are safe assets, the 
concomitant change in the demand for safety that may ultimately come to dominate is 
ignored, thereby missing the later downward pressure on Treasury prices. Thus, 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen identify what they term a safety channel that 
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should be more correctly seen as a scarcity effect, following Federal Reserve purchases 
of Treasuries from the private sector. These changes to risk-taking behaviour and in the 
demand for safety could be related to underlying changes in expected liability duration, 
and may possibly be induced, both by the knowledge that policy-makers are supportive 
(the bond market equivalent of the so-called ‘Greenspan Put’ in equities) and by the 
liquidity-boost counterpart from LSAP and the foreign-buying of Treasuries. 
 
The risk-taking transmission channel ultimately involves a portfolio substitution of safe 
assets (e.g. Treasuries) for risky assets among investors (e.g. corporate bonds and 
equities) and credit providers (e.g. loans and securities), and includes feedback effects 
that amplify the original shocks through a more traditional credit channel. I show from 
a BVAR simulation that these combined transmission channels can account for between 
one fifth and one quarter of the overall variation in each of US Treasury term premia, B-
BBB corporate credit spreads, bond volatility and the ISM US Purchasing Managers’ 
Index. Variance decomposition suggests that the risk appetite variable has the greater 
impact on corporate credit spreads, whereas the liquidity effect from LSAP is a more 
important determinant of term premia. Yet, in practice the credit channel is hard to 
separately distinguish because when private banks extend credit they also take on more 
risk. It follows that the risk-taking and credit channels will often overlap. Overall, these 
channels dominate other LSAP effects such as scarcity of safe assets and lower duration 
risks. As investors’ and credit providers’ risk appetite improves and their investment 
time horizons lengthen, so Treasury term premia increase and the Treasury yield curve 
steepens, leading to falls in risk premia attached to other more risky instruments. Thus, 
as corporate credit spreads narrow, the relative prices of high yield (lower quality) 
corporate bonds are boosted. I conclude that as the attractions of risky assets improve, 
so the appeal of holding safe assets correspondingly diminishes. It follows that real-time 
asset markets alternate between ‘Risk-On’ and ‘Risk-Off’ states. The efficacy of 
unconventional policy actions appear greatest in these Risk-Off states, when risk premia 
are elevated and when LSAP can encourage or, at least, reinforce an improvement in 
investors’ risk appetite. 
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Appendix 5A: Table 1, Major Actions and Statements Concerning Federal 
Reserve Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) (Source: Engen et al, 2015) 
 
11/25/2008 Federal Reserve Board announces its intention to purchase up to $100 billion in direct 
obligations of the housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Ginnie Mae) and up to $500 billion in GSE-issued MBS.  These purchases are to be completed within 
several quarters. So called ‘QE1’. 
 
3/18/2009 FOMC expands its asset purchase program to a total of $1.25 trillion in purchases of agency 
MBS, $200 billion in GSE obligations, and up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the 
end-2009.  
 
8/10/2010 FOMC states that it maintain its holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting 
principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury 
securities , and by continuing to roll over its holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.  
 
11/3/2010 FOMC announces that, in addition to reinvesting principal payments from its securities 
holdings, it will expand the overall size of its portfolio by purchasing a further $600 billion of longer-term 
Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011.  So called ‘QE2’. 
 
9/21/2011 FOMC votes to extend the average maturity of its securities holdings by purchasing $400 
billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and selling an equal amount 
of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less; these transactions are to be completed 
by the end of June 2012.  The FOMC also announces that it will now reinvest principal payments from its 
holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities, 
while maintaining its existing policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.  
 
6/20/2012 FOMC votes to maintain through the end of 2012 its ongoing maturity-extension program by 
continuing to purchase Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at a pace of 
about [$45 billion per month] while simultaneously selling or redeeming the same amount of Treasury 
securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less.    
 
9/13/2012 FOMC votes to begin purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of 
$40 billion per month, in addition to continuing its maturity-extension program and its reinvestment of 
MBS principle payments in agency MBS.  These actions imply increases in Federal Reserve holdings of 
longer-term securities of about $85 billion per month.  The FOMC also states that if the outlook for the 
labour market does not improve substantially, it will continue its purchases of agency mortgage-backed 
securities, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate until 
such improvement is achieved in a context of price stability, while also noting the size and composition of 
these purchases will take appropriate account of their likely efficacy and costs. So called ‘QE3’. 
 
12/12/2012 FOMC announces that, after the maturity extension program ceases at the end of 2012, it will 
begin buying an additional $45 billion in long-term Treasury securities per month while continuing to 
purchase $40 billion in agency MBS per month and reinvesting principle payments, thus implying that the 
Federal Reserve’s portfolio will continue to expand at a pace of $85 billion per month.  
 
3/20/2013, 6/19/2013, and 9/18/2013 FOMC refines its original guidance about the factors influencing 
the size, pace and composition of its ongoing asset purchase program by noting that it also depends on the 
extent of progress toward its economic objectives (March) and the inflation outlook (June).  It also 
stresses that the pace of purchases is contingent on economic outlook as well its assessments of costs and 
efficacy (September).  
 
12/18/2013 FOMC slows the ongoing monthly pace of purchases to $35 billion in agency MBS and $40 
billion in long- term Treasury securities and advises that further reductions are likely at upcoming 
meetings if incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement 
in labour market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective.  However, the 
FOMC also stresses that asset purchases are not on a pre-set course but are contingent on the economic 
outlook. 
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Appendix 5A: Table 2, ‘Forward Guidance’ in FOMC Statements Issued 
From Late-2008 to 2013 (Source: Engen et al, 2015) 
 
12/16/2008 After announcing a 0 to .25 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee 
notes that “weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds 
rate for some time.”     3/18/2009 The Committee “anticipates that economic conditions are likely to 
warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.”  
 
11/4/2009 The Committee “continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of 
resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.”  
 
9/21/2010 “The Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments 
and is prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery and to 
return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with its mandate.”  
 
8/9/2011 “The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions (including low rates of resource 
utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run) are likely to warrant exceptionally 
low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”  
 
1/25/2012 The Committee “… currently anticipates that economic conditions (including low rates of 
resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium-run) are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”.57  
 
9/13/2012 The Committee “… expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will 
remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens” and “... currently 
anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least 
through mid‐2015.”  
 
12/12/2012 The Committee “… expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will 
remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic 
recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee … currently anticipates that this exceptionally low 
range for the federal funds rate [0 to .25 percent] will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment 
rate remains above 6½ percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than 
a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation 
expectations continue to be well anchored. The Committee views these thresholds as consistent with its 
earlier date-based guidance. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of 
monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of 
labour market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on 
financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will 
take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 
percent.”  
 
12/18/2013 The statement reiterated the Committee’s previously announced “action” thresholds for 
unemployment and projected inflation, and how its decision to begin tightening depend on a wide range 
of economic factors.  In addition the Committee stated that it “… now anticipates, based on its assessment 
of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds 
rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6½ percent, especially if projected 
inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal.”  
                                                          
57
 In a separate statement released at the time, the Committee stressed that it would take a “balanced 
approach” in pursuing its dual objectives of price stability and full employment.  The Committee also 
announced that agreement had been reached on a long‐run inflation goal for PCE inflation equal to 2 
percent.  Because the rate of unemployment consistent with long‐run price stability depends on factors 
outside the control of the central bank and needs to be estimated, no formal target was set for this leg of 
the dual mandate. 
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Appendix 5B: Impulse Response Functions 
Figure B1.1: Bayesian VAR (BVAR) : Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovatio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel (Figure B1.1) is the estimated impulse response functions from a Bayesian VAR with a Litterman/ Minnesota 
prior using monthly data over 1988-2016. Generalised responses are shown over a 30-month time horizon. 
DSTARLINE is the risk appetite variable, D-star; USISM is the ISM Purchasing Managers’ Index; BAMLB-BAA is 
the high yield credit spread; ACMTP10 is the US Treasury term premia on the 10-year bond; AVMAT is the average 
maturity of outstanding US Treasury bonds; CPITREND is the 3-year trend in US Core CPI inflation; USCBL is the 
CBC index of US Federal Reserve Liquidity injections; USPSL is the CBC index of US domestic private sector 
liquidity creation; EML is the CBC index of Emerging Market Liquidity conditions; MOVE is the Merrill Lynch 
index of US bond volatility. 
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Figure B1.2: Bayesian VAR (BVAR); Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel (Figure B1.2) is the estimated impulse response functions from a Bayesian VAR with a Litterman/ Minnesota 
prior using monthly data over 1988-2016. Generalised responses are shown over a 30-month time horizon. 
DSTARLINE is the risk appetite variable, D-star; USISM is the ISM Purchasing Managers’ Index; BAMLB-BAA is 
the high yield credit spread; ACMTP10 is the US Treasury term premia on the 10-year bond; AVMAT is the average 
maturity of outstanding US Treasury bonds; CPITREND is the 3-year trend in US Core CPI inflation; USCBL is the 
CBC index of US Federal Reserve Liquidity injections; USPSL is the CBC index of US domestic private sector 
liquidity creation; EML is the CBC index of Emerging Market Liquidity conditions; MOVE is the Merrill Lynch 
index of US bond volatility. 
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Figure B2.1: Conventional VAR: Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The panel (Figure B2.1) is from a conventional VAR estimated over the same period, with dotted lines showing 90% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Generalised responses are shown over a 30-month time horizon. DSTARLINE is 
the risk appetite variable, D-star; USISM is the ISM Purchasing Managers’ Index; BAMLB-BAA is the high yield 
credit spread; ACMTP10 is the US Treasury term premia on the 10-year bond; AVMAT is the average maturity of 
outstanding US Treasury bonds; CPITREND is the 3-year trend in US Core CPI inflation; USCBL is the CBC index 
of US Federal Reserve Liquidity injections; USPSL is the CBC index of US domestic private sector liquidity 
creation; EML is the CBC index of Emerging Market Liquidity conditions; MOVE is the Merrill Lynch index of US 
bond volatility. 
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Figure B2.2: Conventional VAR: Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The panel (Figure B2.2) is from a conventional VAR estimated over the same period, with dotted lines showing 90% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Generalised responses are shown over a 30-month time horizon. DSTARLINE is 
the risk appetite variable, D-star; USISM is the ISM Purchasing Managers’ Index; BAMLB-BAA is the high yield 
credit spread; ACMTP10 is the US Treasury term premia on the 10-year bond; AVMAT is the average maturity of 
outstanding US Treasury bonds; CPITREND is the 3-year trend in US Core CPI inflation; USCBL is the CBC index 
of US Federal Reserve Liquidity injections; USPSL is the CBC index of US domestic private sector liquidity 
creation; EML is the CBC index of Emerging Market Liquidity conditions; MOVE is the Merrill Lynch index of US 
bond volatility. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to better understand the term structure of interest rates. 
In their attempts to reduce the dimensionality of the term structure data, many 
researchers overlook the information content available beyond the standard three yield 
curve parameters. Not only do latest statistical analyses warn that the traditional 
principal component estimates of these parameters are unstable over time, but the 
testing climate of the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis, when monetary policy was 
largely focused on Large-scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) of US Treasuries by the Federal 
Reserve, has found these traditional explanatory factors wanting. My conclusions seem 
closest to the recent research of Hanson, Lucca and Wright (2017). Unlike Adrian et al. 
(2014), they do not identify additional yield curve parameters. However, they point-out 
the instability of principal component methods and, like me, they argue against the 
claims made by the many recent event studies that LSAP lead to lower term premia and 
falling Treasury yields (Gagnon, 2016). In fact, as I show, rising term premia appear to 
consistently follow from these LSAP programmes. Ultimately, my explanation for this 
contra-wise move relies on a backwards shift in the demand curve for safe asset 
Treasuries at long maturities (drawn with respect to yields) induced by the associated 
liquidity injections, rather than, as they suggest, slow-moving arbitrage capital and the 
increasing elasticity in the demand curve for maturity. Although, I acknowledge that 
greater regulation has lately decreased the availability of arbitrage capital in the US 
fixed-income markets, the speed of even these reduced flows is still likely to be rapid. 
  
My three key contributions lie behind this observation: (1) Measurement – I identify a 
fourth yield curve parameter, called D-star, that implicitly describes the cross-sectional 
pattern of term premia across tenors by measuring the position of the hump in the term 
structure along the maturity axis. This parameter is theoretically motivated by the 
preferred habitat model of Vayanos and Vila (2009) and by the ‘gap-filling’ model of 
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010), to ensure that it does not appear ad hoc. (2) 
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Evaluation – Using estimates of D-star derived from a standard distance-measure, and 
later cross-checked for its robustness against Kalman filtered factors, I show that this 
new parameter adds value. Statistical tests demonstrate that it is Granger causal of a 
number of macro-finance variables that comprise standard financial stress indexes 
(FSIs); Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) indicate that it can predict these same key 
variables some 12-15 months ahead; out-of-sample forecasting tests demonstrate that it 
delivers a lower mean-squared error (MSE) than its benchmark, and it performs 
respectably in two recent event studies. (3) Transmission – Taking D-star as a measure 
of investors’ risk appetite makes it easier to track-down the effects of quantities on the 
shape of the yield curve. D-star specifically helps to better understand recent policy 
transmission through the risk-taking channel of Adrian and Shin (2010); Borio and Zhu 
(2012), and Bruno and Shin (2014). My intuition is that LSAP programmes are multi-
faceted and embrace scarcity and duration effects, as well as more powerful signalling 
and liquidity effects that ultimately induce a shift in the demand curve for safe asset 
Treasuries as investors’ fears of systemic risk reduce. These latter liquidity effects 
overlap the risk-taking and traditional credit policy transmission channels. They 
constitute part of the wider liquidity effects coming from domestic and foreign credit 
providers (Adrian, Moench and Shin, 2010, and Rey, 2016). I attempt to quantify their 
impact using a Bayesian vector-autoregression (BVAR) model, similar to Rey (2016). 
The BVAR simulation shows how these combined transmission channels account for 
between one-fifth and one-quarter of the overall variation in each of US Treasury term 
premia, B-BBB corporate credit spreads, bond volatility and the ISM US Purchasing 
Managers’ Index. A variance decomposition suggests that the D-star risk appetite 
variable has the greater impact on corporate credit spreads, whereas the liquidity effect 
from LSAP is a more important determinant of term premia. I conclude that the efficacy 
of unconventional policy actions appear greatest in so-called Risk-Off states, when risk 
premia are elevated and when LSAP can encourage or, at least, reinforce an 
improvement in investors’ risk appetite. 
 
I suggest that this research can take three future directions. First, there is an obvious 
task to calculate and test equivalent D-star values for other international fixed-income 
markets. These calculations could extend to index-linked as well as conventional 
nominal bond markets, and, where they exist, also to corporate as well as government 
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bond term structures. Second, the statistic I devise to calculate D-star is a practical 
compromise that must be put into the context that reliable estimates of term premia are 
not yet widely available. A more robust measure of D-star must be a goal, but this in 
turn ultimately requires better estimates of term premia and, by implication, better term 
structure models. Third, this research has a number of clear policy implications that can 
be further explored. The recent event study literature concludes that LSAP programmes 
reduce Treasury yields. Although I note that this outcome is both questionable and not 
time-consistent with policy-makers long-term aspirations, the conclusion is still often 
acknowledged as fact. This demands a better understanding of the policy transmission 
mechanisms. However, in the meantime D-star can still be usefully employed as one of 
the array of indicators monitored by policy-makers to warn of upcoming financial 
stress.  
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